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Abstract 
 
For approximately the last fifteen years, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have been 
mounting highly sophisticated undercover sting operations in Canada known colloquially 
as Mr. Big stings.  These undercover operations involve multiple officers posing as 
members of a ruthless, powerful and wealthy criminal organization in order to trick 
suspects into making confessions to serious crimes, nearly always homicides.  The 
undercover officers essentially orchestrate a chance meeting with the suspect, known 
operationally as the “target”, and exert their considerable influence and resources to 
convince him that he is being inducted into a criminal gang.  The target is typically a 
person suspected of having committed a murder in the past, but who has never been 
charged due to lack of evidence.   
 
Over a period of months or weeks the undercover officers attempt to build a relationship 
with the target based on fear, greed, companionship, or a combination of those or other 
emotions.  The target is given tasks to perform which appear criminal in nature, but 
which are actually staged crimes in which every participant is an undercover officer.  The 
target is eventually told he must meet with the boss of the gang, the “Mr. Big” after 
whom the sting is named, in order for a final decision to be made on whether or not the 
target can join the gang.  The target is told that he must confess to the previous murder of 
which he is suspected in order to join the gang.  Sometimes the target confesses readily, 
other times he protests his innocence, but Mr. Big will not accept exculpatory statements.  
Often further inducements are offered by Mr. Big, most notably a promise to derail the 
investigation by using his influence over corrupt justice system participants.  If the 
suspect admits culpability he will be charged with the crime and nearly always convicted 
at trial. 
 
Canadian courts have exercised virtually no control over police tactics in these cases.  
Defence counsel have argued against the use of the evidence on the basis of a breach of  
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms with regard to the right to silence and also with 
regard to abuse of process.  These arguments have been unsuccessful.  Defence counsel 
have also argued unsuccessfully that the statements should be inadmissible under 
Canadian hearsay law.  It has also been argued, equally unsuccessfully, that the 
undercover operators should be treated as persons-in-authority, and hence that the 
statements elicited from the targets should have to be proven voluntary beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Canadian judges have also been unwilling to allow the defence to lead 
expert evidence in these cases to tell the trier of fact about the possibility of false 
confessions.  The ultimate result is that there is no control over police tactics in these 
stings. 
 
There has been one proven wrongful conviction as a result of these stings, that of Kyle 
Wayne Unger.  Other wrongful convictions may come to light.  Short of its outright 
abolition, probably the best way to control the sting and prevent wrongful convictions is 
to subject the statements to a formal voluntariness inquiry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 This thesis will explore the phenomenon of the “Mr. Big” sting in Canada from 
both a legal and a practical perspective.  Although the scholarly approach favours a legal 
perspective, there are many practical non-legalistic factors involved in an examination of 
the sting that must be examined and explained in order to make legal analysis of the 
problems presented by the sting understandable.  Simply put, much of the thesis must of 
necessity focus on what might be called the ‘nuts and bolts’ of how the sting is run in its 
various guises and permutations.  This focus requires a substantial amount of writing as 
an exercise in simple reportage before the legal issues surrounding the sting can be gone 
into in depth.  
 This being the case, it is proposed that the subject at hand can best be approached 
in the following manner in seven chapters.  The first chapter, in order to deal with the 
above-mentioned practical issues, will consist of a fairly comprehensive overview of how 
the Mr.Big sting is run in Canada and the various scenarios that make up a successful 
operation.   The second chapter will serve as an introduction to the legal analysis of the 
sting and raise a few issues of general importance.  The third chapter will focus on the 
sting in relation to the right to silence under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.1  The fourth chapter will focus on whether or not the sting is capable of 
being defined as an abuse of the court’s process.  The fifth chapter will examine the issue 
of expert evidence in relation to the sting.  The sixth chapter will examine whether 
admissions made by accused persons in Mr. Big stings can be classified as hearsay.  The                                                         
1 Part I of The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 
1982, c 11, hereinafter the Charter. 
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seventh chapter will examine the concept of legal voluntariness, but with particular 
attention paid to the person-in-authority requirement and its significance in relation to the 
sting. 
 Ultimately, in the briefest terms, the position of this thesis is that the statements 
made by accused persons to undercover officers in Mr. Big stings may well be unreliable 
due to the various influences put upon them to confess.  It is submitted that the 
substantial possibility of the statements being unreliable is not taken seriously enough by 
Canadian courts.  It is further submitted that this lack of caution is manifest in the nearly 
overwhelming commitment of Canadian judges to admitting Mr. Big statements into 
evidence regardless of the possibility of miscarriages of justice.  Concomitant with this 
proposed state of affairs, it is the further position of this thesis that a thorough canvassing 
of Mr. Big jurisprudence reveals a pervasive and unchecked spirit of unfairness in Mr. 
Big cases.  Possible solutions to the above problems may not be readily apparent, but it is 
submitted that some alternative to the current regime of unrestricted admissibility into 
evidence of these suspect statements is absolutely necessary. 
 In terms of methodology, it bears mentioning that the research base for this thesis 
consists almost entirely of an examination of case law.  A small amount of commentary 
exists and has been of help.  However, major treatises on evidence have for the most part 
confined themselves to citation of the leading case on admissibility and voluntariness in 
relation to statements made to undercover officers; i.e. R. v. Grandinetti,2 and left it at 
that.    
                                                        
2 2005 SCC 5, 1 S.C.R. 27 [Grandinetti]. 
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 As a final note, it is worth mentioning that, although a few women have been 
targeted in the sting, the great majority of suspects in these cases are male.  Therefore the 
male pronoun will be used in this thesis when referring generally to accused persons.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  4 
CHAPTER ONE – THE “MR. BIG STING” AND ITS ELEMENTS 
  
 The Mr. Big sting is an undercover police operation, undertaken in Canada by the 
RCMP, which aims to obtain evidence against a person who is suspected of having 
committed a serious crime.  The crime being investigated is usually a homicide, although 
the sting has on very rare occasions been used to target persons suspected of other crimes, 
such as attempted murder.3  The person who is being investigated by the RCMP 
undercover team is generally referred to by them as the ‘target’, and that terminology 
shall be adopted in this thesis.  The sting is alternately referred to in Canada as a ‘big 
boss’ sting or a ‘crime boss’ sting or occasionally as a ‘reverse sting’.  It is a highly 
developed operation in Canada and is indeed referred to by Kirby J. of Australia’s High 
Court as the “Canadian Model”.4  
 The sting consists of a concerted effort by an undercover team of officers to 
convince a target that he or she has been recruited by a powerful criminal organization 
that is capable of great violence but that also is capable of giving great financial rewards 
to its members.  Usually the target will be initially approached by one RCMP undercover 
operator in a seemingly chance encounter and invited on a casual basis to perform some 
small task for the initial contact officer, either in return for money, or simply out of a 
desire to help.  If the target is receptive to the initial contact, further efforts are made by 
the undercover team to effect the creation of an employer/employee relationship between 
the undercover operators and the target.  In addition, an impression of a bond of 
companionship is attempted in order to make the target feel at ease.  Usually one officer,                                                         
3 R. v. Joseph 2000 BCSC 1891, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 547 [Joseph]. 
4 Tofilau v. the Queen [2007] HCA 39 at para. 117 [Tofilau]. 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referred to as the “primary” operator, will take on the role of friend and mentor to the 
target and hold out the possibility of a more full and meaningful membership in the gang 
if the target is deemed to be worthy by Mr. Big.   
 The target slowly becomes immersed in what he believes to be a nationally 
established criminal organization.  The primary operator (who is usually, but not always, 
the same operator who made the initial contact with him) gives him jobs to do; such as 
delivering mysterious packages, driving automobiles to different locations, or depositing 
money into various bank accounts.  In most cases the jobs become more apparently 
serious and the target is made to believe he is participating in substantial smuggling of 
drugs, guns or other contraband, counterfeiting operations and even in violent 
shakedowns of those who have crossed the gang. 
 Ultimately, the target is informed that he is expected to come clean to Mr. Big 
about every aspect of his criminal past including the homicide of which he is suspected.  
In some cases the target is confronted by the primary operator regarding the unsolved 
homicide, whereas in other cases the target volunteers the information of his own 
volition, i.e. the information that he has been (and continues to be) a suspect in an 
unsolved homicide or homicides.  An interview is scheduled between the target and the 
purported boss of the criminal organization; and various reasons, arguments and 
inducements are presented to the target as to why he should confess to the boss that he 
has committed the crime that the police suspect him of having committed.  Denials and 
other protestations of innocence, although not always forthcoming from the target, are 
generally frowned upon by the primary operator and by Mr. Big himself.  Usually the 
target ends up confessing to the homicide to Mr. Big during the interview.  The interview 
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has, of course, been audio- and video-recorded.  The next step is the target’s arrest for the 
crime.  All of the statements he has made during the course of the sting are used against 
him as evidence at his trial.   
 The whole thing usually takes about four months.   
 
A. THE TARGET 
 
 The target of a Mr. Big sting is, as previously stated, usually male.  Notable 
exceptions are the targets in R. v. Black5 and R. v. Boudreau.6  Generally the target is not 
financially stable.  A typical target was described as follows by D.J. Martinson J. of the 
British Columbia Supreme Court: 
 
In the fall of 2004, the police embarked on what is known as a “Mr. Big” crime 
boss operation.  At the time of the crime boss operation, Mr. Wilson’s financial 
and personal circumstances can only be described as bleak.  He had little, if any, 
income; he lived at least part of the time in a homemade trailer with almost no 
amenities.  He had a beat-up old car.  He had few prospects.7 
 
 
The target in R. v. Osmar also claimed that he had been unemployed and unable to find a 
job when the RCMP approached him at the beginning of a Mr. Big sting.8  
 Although not all targets are significantly affected by poverty, some definitely are, 
and nearly none of the targets of Mr. Big stings could be described as middle class or 
upper class.   
                                                        
5 2007 BCSC 1105, 75 W.C.B. (2d) 620 [Black]. 
6 2009 NSSC 30, 274 N.S.R. (2d) 315 [Boudreau]. 
7 R. v. Wilson 2007 BCSC 1940, 76 W.C.B. (2d) 563 at para. 19 [Wilson]. 
8 2007 ONCA 50, 217 CCC (3d) 174 at para. 19 [Osmar (C.A.)]. 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 Two notable exceptions are Atif Ahmed Rafay and Glen Sebastian Burns, who 
are from affluent backgrounds and who were each convicted of three counts of 
aggravated first-degree murder in Washington State after a successful Mr. Big sting 
executed upon them while the two were residing in British Columbia.  This affluence 
appears to have had a considerable influence on their situation.  Burns’ sister Tiffany is a 
successful television journalist who has produced a film entitled “Mr. Big: A 
Documentary” about her brother and Rafay’s experience.  Rafay and Burns’ case has 
been kept in the public eye more than those of other targets, arguably due to the resources 
of Burns’ sister, which are more considerable than those of the families of other 
convicted and incarcerated targets.  The Rafay/Burns case possesses other unique 
characteristics from legal and other perspectives and will be referred to later in this thesis. 
 Along with a generally low-income level, targets are also usually not educated 
beyond a secondary or often a primary level.  Many targets, although certainly not all, 
have also had no previous experience with the criminal justice system.   
 Also of considerable importance is the fact that a significant percentage of the 
targets have substance abuse problems including alcoholism.  This was the case in R. v. 
Hathway,9 R. v. Griffin,10 and also in R. v. Terrico11 in which one of the undercover 
constables testified to the fact that it was apparent to him that the target had a drinking 
problem.12  This, of course, becomes significant in that many of the scenarios played out 
by the undercover operators involve alcohol consumption.  It has been suggested in 
various defence arguments, with a glaring lack of success at all levels of the Canadian                                                         
9 2007 SKQB 346, 323 Sask. R. 1[Hathway]. 
10 2001 MBQB 54, 154 Man. R. (2d) 1 [Griffin]. 
11 2005 BCCA 361, 199 C.C.C. (3d) 126 [Terrico]. 
12 Ibid. at para. 8. 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court system, that, by running scenarios involving alcohol on targets who are addicted to 
alcohol, the RCMP are encouraging admissions which may not be reliable. 
 Much more could be written about the typical target in a Mr. Big sting.  Some are 
single, some are married, some are childless, while others are parents.  They come from 
different ethnic backgrounds, although the majority appears to be Caucasian.  Some First 
Nations individuals are targets, and it is an interesting fact that an inordinately high 
percentage of First Nations accused persons targeted by these stings are ultimately 
acquitted.13  Of course, unless specifically referred to by the court, it is generally not 
readily apparent from written judgments exactly what a target’s ethnicity is; and, 
ultimately race and/or ethnicity does not appear to have much significance in our inquiry 
beyond the above-mentioned higher rate of acquittal for Aboriginal targets.  
 However, as a final observation, it is a striking feature in the history of the sting in 
Canada that it has on some occasions been executed on children.  This circumstance will 
be examined in some depth later in this thesis. 
 
B.  A SIGNIFICANT EVIDENTIARY FEATURE 
 
 A major concern inherent in the overwhelming majority of Mr. Big stings is the 
fact that they are usually executed in criminal investigations where there is no other 
evidence implicating the target.  That is, when the police suspect a target of having 
committed a homicide, but have absolutely no evidence linking that target to the crime, it 
                                                        
13 R. v. Mentuck 2000 MBQB 155 [Mentuck]; R. v. Crane Chief  [2002] A.J. No. 1706 
(Q.B.) [Crane Chief]; R. v. C.K.R.S. 2005 BCSC 1624, 68 W.C.B. (2d) 350 [C.K.R.S.]; R. 
v. O.N.E. 2000 BCSC 1200 [O.N.E.]. 
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is only then that the powerful Mr. Big tool is selected from the investigative arsenal.  In 
R. v. Lowe the trial judge remarked on this circumstance in phrasing which finds an echo 
in many Mr. Big sting cases: 
 
With the exception of some evidence of motive and opportunity, the Crown's 
case rests entirely on admissions made by Mr. Lowe made in the course of the 
undercover operation.  The Crown provided no physical (“real”) evidence linking 
Mr. Lowe, his D.N.A., any object associated with him, or any place associated 
with him, with Mr. Rudy's D.N.A., clothing or effects, or with any place 
associated with Mr. Rudy.  The Crown provided no evidence that a murder 
weapon was found.  The expert opinion evidence as to the date of Mr. Rudy's 
death is inconclusive.14 
 
 
Of course, since the Mr. Big confession is the only evidence pointing to guilt in most 
cases, it is of supreme importance to ensure that the confession is reliable. 
 On a logistical level, the fact that the confession evidence is the only evidence on 
which the RCMP and the Crown are relying15 gives the RCMP the advantage of being 
able to wait until years after the commission of the crime being investigated to launch the 
sting.  The target, if guilty,16 will be relaxed and have his guard down, the murder having 
been committed so long ago.  
 
C.  THE HOOK 
 
 The operation begins with what appears to the target to be a chance meeting 
between himself and a friendly stranger who is eventually revealed to have associations                                                         
14 2004 BCSC 1104, [2004] B.C.J. 1702 at para. 220 [Lowe]. 
15 This, of course, is not the situation pertaining to those not uncommon cases in which 
the target is persuaded to lead the police to the hitherto unknown location of the body of 
his deceased victim.   
16 Or, for that matter, if not guilty. 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with organized crime.  This chance meeting can be orchestrated quite simply or can be 
more complex and imaginative.  The most common opening scenario is probably that in 
which the target is approached by a stranger, often in a drinking establishment, shown a 
photo of an absent third party, usually a woman, and asked if he has seen her around.  Of 
course the target has not seen the woman.  At this point the target will be asked by the 
undercover operator if he will help to locate the woman in the photo for a reasonable fee.  
Ideally, the target will agree and end up spending the next few hours going around to 
different bars and other public gathering places, ostensibly looking for the woman in the 
photo.  The undercover operator will offer money to the target for his help and try to get 
the target’s contact information, which is usually forthcoming.  After a day or two has 
passed the target will be contacted again and asked if he would like to earn some more 
money and the sting begins in earnest. 
 In another case the target was initially contacted when a young woman knocked 
on his door looking for help with a flat tire.  When her boyfriend came by the next day to 
pick up the car, the target was convinced to help out by accompanying him to a 
mechanic.17  The boyfriend offered the target other work and he quickly became involved 
in what he thought was a criminal organization. 
 One of the more clever schemes to initiate contact took place in R. v. Bridges: 
 
By posing as door-to-door market surveyor, an undercover RCMP officer 
convinced the accused to take part in a survey.  The accused was then advised 
that as a result of his participation in the survey, he had won an all expenses paid 
trip to see a Calgary Flames hockey game in Calgary.  The accused attended the 
game with a few other ‘grand prize winners’ who were also undercover police 
officers.  One of the undercover police officers befriended the accused.  Over the 
                                                        
17 Hathway, supra note 9 at paras. 36-37. 
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course of the next few months, the undercover police officer convinced the 
accused he was a member of a successful crime organization.18 
 
In any event, this chance meeting between the target and the undercover officer leads to 
the target’s involvement in the gang and is his first step on the road to a confession to Mr. 
Big.19 
 
D. THE PRIMARY 
 
 The primary undercover operator, or simply the primary, is the person with whom 
the target has the most contact on a day-to-day level.   The primary is usually, but not 
always, the same person who made the initial contact with the target.  The primary is the 
undercover officer in charge of cultivating the relationship between the target and the 
undercover officers.  He gives the target fake criminal tasks to perform which range from 
innocuous deliveries of packages up to ostensible support positions in fabricated criminal 
operations. 
 It is also the primary’s job to inculcate respect in the target for the criminal 
organization and its integrity, as well as for the boss of the organization.  In most cases, 
especially more recent ones, the target is made to understand that the best way to show 
respect and to be accepted is to be totally honest at all times and never to tell lies to 
anyone in the organization, especially the boss.    
                                                        
18 2005 MBQB 142, 200 Man. R. (2d) 213 at para. 3 [Bridges]. 
19 Keenan and Brockman, in their book entitled Mr. Big (Winnipeg: Fernwood 
Publishing, 2010), have produced a more fully developed statistical analysis of the initial 
contact methods used by the undercover operators at page 53 thereof. 
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 Of course, another job of the primary is to portray himself to the target as a 
ruthless, violent, merciless criminal who is not above killing in order to secure desired 
results for himself and for the criminal gang.  Although the RCMP generally do not 
appear to represent themselves as members of a particular criminal gang, it is sometimes 
the case that targets make assumptions about with whom exactly they are dealing.  For 
example, one target testified that he took his primary’s comment that he was affiliated 
with an Eastern crime group which he referred to as the “family” as evidence that he had 
become involved with the Mafia.20  
 Although the primary does perform other police tasks, the two above mentioned; 
i.e. stressing the importance of honesty and credibly manifesting the persona of a clever, 
Machiavellian thug; are probably the most important. 
 
E. THE INITIAL JOBS 
 
 Initially the target, who is, as previously mentioned, often impecunious or close to 
it, is given somewhat menial tasks to perform by the primary.  These initial jobs are not 
usually obviously criminal in nature, but they are often somewhat suspicious.   
 One of the tasks that a target might be asked to perform is driving a car from one 
location to another, parking it in a public lot and leaving the key on the back tire.  
Another task might consist of retrieving a bag or parcel from a bus station locker and then 
delivering it to another location or possibly handing it off to another undercover officer 
performing a ‘cameo’ role in the sting.  
                                                        
20 Hathway, supra note 9 at para. 61, and see also C.K.R.S., supra note 13 at para. 37. 
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 Another job that probably appears a little more suspicious to the targets is the 
money depositing/money laundering scenario, in which the target is given sums of money 
and asked to deposit them in various accounts at banks throughout a city.21 
 These tasks are always remunerated by the primary, who may pay the target as 
little as fifty dollars or as much as a few hundred.  These tasks rarely net the target as 
much as a thousand dollars, but such sums are not entirely unheard of.  In one case the 
target received a total of $6,000 as a result of all of the jobs she performed for the gang.22   
 In addition to direct payments, the primary may help to pay some of the target’s 
bills or other debts, including picking up the tab for fuel or groceries.23 
 
F.  “STANDING SIX”, THE BAG OF CREDIT CARDS, THE BORDER SCENARIO 
AND TRAFFICKING IN DRUGS AND WEAPONS 
 
 Eventually, the target is drawn into participation in what appears to be overtly 
criminal activity.  The initial apparent criminal task may simply consist of acting as a 
lookout for the police, or “standing six”, while the primary operator ostensibly commits a 
crime. 
 More serious and obvious crimes that are portrayed by the gang include purported 
agreements for the sale of weapons or the sale of a bag of credit cards.  The weapons, of 
course, are never actually shown to the target but usually are ostensibly inside a crate or 
                                                        
21 Black, supra note 5 at para. 156. 
22 Ibid. at para. 157. 
23 Ibid at para. 173, Lowe, supra note 14 at paras. 229-230. 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pictured on a computer screen.  Likewise, the credit cards in the bag are not actually 
stolen but are merely a prop. 
 One of the more intriguing purported crimes is the rarely used border scenario, in 
which a target is made to believe he is assisting the criminal organization in facilitating 
illegal activity across the border between Canada and the United States.  This was 
described in R. v. Casement, in which it was used, as a scenario 
 
in which Mr. Casement was taken to a location purported to be the Canada/US 
border and sent to retrieve a bag from a man on the "American" side. When 
handed the bag, Mr. Casement was told to be very careful with it. Thereafter, Mr. 
Casement transported the bag to Mission, British Columbia where he took it to a 
hotel room occupied by two undercover operators, one purported to be a member 
of the Muslim community and potential "purchaser" of the bag's contents. Inside 
the hotel room, the bag was opened and found to contain what appeared to be C4 
explosive.24 
 
 
G.  THE VIOLENT SCENARIO25 
 
 The most controversial aspect of the sting may well be the violent scenario.  As 
previously stated, one of the primary’s main roles is to credibly present himself to the 
target as a violent, ruthless and successful criminal.   An image of success is often 
conveyed by means of showing to the target evidence of a lavish lifestyle, such as driving 
an expensive car and wearing jewelry.  Indeed the RCMP have been known to orchestrate 
dinner parties in expensive restaurants attended by upwards of a dozen undercover 
                                                        
24 2007 SKQB 422, 376 Sask. R. 67 at para 5 [Casement]. 
25 Alternately, and somewhat cryptically, referred to as ‘The Toni Scenario’. 
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operatives masquerading as gang members, all in order to impress the target with the 
apparent material rewards of gang membership. 
 The violent scenario is meant to bolster the primary’s credibility with regard to 
the other end of the spectrum of criminal behaviour.  The scenario usually involves the 
stalking, possible kidnapping, and assault of an individual who has crossed the 
organization; either by failing to pay a debt, informing to the police, or otherwise 
transgressing the rules laid down by the gang.  The target usually participates by 
accompanying the primary on the mission, standing guard and otherwise providing ‘back-
up’ to the primary while he menaces or beats the victim.  The victim is, of course, another 
RCMP officer who may be professionally made up to appear to have bruised and 
bloodied features after the purported assault by the primary.  The fake victim, often 
portrayed by a female officer, exhibits extreme terror in the face of the primary 
undercover officer’s wrath, pleading for mercy from the latter which is only met by more 
violence and more threats, not just to the victim him or herself, but often to the victim’s 
family members, which may include the victim’s children 
 Possibly the most gruesome violent scenario in the reported cases occurred in R. 
v. Steadman, referred to in that judgment as “The Blood Scenario”: 
 
During the course of the undercover operation, the police had Mr. Steadman 
participate in destroying evidence of what he believed was a failed extortion 
attempt.  On April 13, 2003 Mr. Steadman was told by R that his assistance was 
needed that evening to assist in dealing with some “trouble” that K was having.  
It was made clear to him that K had attempted to collect the debt owed by the 
man that had earlier attempted to pay the organization with sequentially 
numbered bills.  The police had, in preparation for Mr. Steadman’s arrival, 
splashed animal blood in a hotel bathroom and then dragged K through the blood 
from the bathroom to the hotel room door.  A baseball bat was put in the room.  
When Mr. Steadman arrived with R, K was dressed only in a towel.  He had just 
showered.  He was obviously agitated; in Mr. Steadman’s words he was 
  16 
“freaking out”.  He told Mr. Steadman and R that he had attempted to collect the 
debt owed by the man and in the process tried to hit him in the stomach with the 
bat, but the man had ducked the blow and K ended up hitting him in the head.  
Mr. Steadman was led to believe the man was in a car parked in the hotel parking 
lot.  Another undercover officer, introduced as R’s cousin, was also in the room.  
R asked his cousin if the man was dead to which his cousin replied he was “out 
cold” but still breathing.  R told his cousin to dump the man close to a nearby 
hospital.  He told Mr. Steadman to clean up the room and provided him with 
latex gloves and some cleaning supplies for that purpose.  He then told K that he 
was taking him to the airport for a flight to Ontario where K was to remain until 
any police interest in the matter passed.  He also explained to K that the 
organization would arrange for an alibi for him.  All of this took place in Mr. 
Steadman’s presence.  He and R then bagged K’s bloody clothes.  R left with K, 
leaving Mr. Steadman to clean the room.  When R returned a couple of hours 
later he was alone.  Mr. Steadman had cleaned the room thoroughly.  They then 
put the towels he had used in the bag with K’s clothes and left.  The accused 
suggested that they should throw the bat in the river, get some gas, and burn the 
clothes.  They drove to his house and en route the accused threw the bat in a 
river.  Once at his house Mr. Steadman retrieved some gas and, together with R, 
burned the bloody clothes.26 
 
 
 An especially frightening subset of the violent scenario is one in which a 
purported victim is actually killed as a result of having displeased the criminal 
organization.  In one case, in a scenario whimsically referred to as the “Whack at Yaak”, 
the target was made to believe that the primary undercover operator had shot and killed 
another criminal during a drug deal gone bad in Yaak, British Columbia to which he, the 
target, had driven the undercover officer.  The target, Jason Dix, was waiting in the 
driver’s seat of a car outside the motor home in which he had been told the primary 
undercover operator was conducting the deal: 
 
Ultimately, shots were fired and the operative left the motor home carrying a 
sawed-off shotgun. He turned toward the motor home, shot into it, approached it, 
and shot into it again. He then ran to the vehicle in which the Plaintiff was 
waiting and threw the sawed-off shotgun into the bush near the vehicle. He 
informed the Plaintiff that he had shot the individual in the motor home after that                                                         
26  2007 BCSC 483 at para. 56 [Steadman]. 
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person had fired upon the operative and after that person attempted to cheat the 
operative of the money that the operative was to receive.27  
 
In a sinister turn, the undercover team then used this harrowing experience and the 
target’s belief in his apparent participation in murder as a coercive tool to try to get a 
confession out of him: 
 
For the next two days the Plaintiff remained with these individuals. He was 
subjected to extreme pressure by them, as they initially said that they did not 
believe what the Plaintiff told them about the Whack at Yaak, but then later 
accepted this story. They advised him that as now the Plaintiff had something on 
the gang which could be used by the Plaintiff and held over the gang, the gang 
would need something on the Plaintiff. Specifically, the Plaintiff was repeatedly 
asked about his involvement in the James Deiter and Tim Orydzuk homicides. 
He repeatedly denied any involvement. It is clear that during these discussions 
the Plaintiff was left with the impression that if he went to the authorities and 
told them about the murder he had witnessed, he would be killed by the gang. 
Several statements by operatives acting as members of the gang constitute clear 
threats.28 
 
The ‘you have something on us, we need something on you’ gambit will be discussed at 
greater length later in this thesis.  
 Interestingly, in R. v. Black, which dealt with a female accused, the target was 
merely informed of a scenario in which someone who had crossed the gang was 
murdered.29 
 The violent scenario is problematic in that it arguably serves to intimidate the 
target in addition to building the primary’s credibility.  Some targets have attested to the 
galvanizing effect that the violent scenario had on them, making them feel that they too 
were subject to being seriously assaulted and killed if they failed to live up to the                                                         
27 Dix v. Canada 2002 ABQB 580, 7 Alta. L.R. (4th) 205 at para. 126 [Dix]. 
28 Ibid. at para. 130. 
29 Black, supra note 5 at para. 158. 
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expectations of Mr. Big and his gang or caused the gang to doubt their loyalty.   This 
aspect of the sting is significant to the legal analysis and will be examined in greater 
depth later in this thesis. 
 
H.  THE MONEY COUNTING SCENARIO AND THE PAYDAY PROMISE 
 
 Two other significant scenarios are the money counting scenario and the payday 
promise.  The money counting scenario takes place in many but not all of the stings.  In 
this scenario the accused is given a large amount of cash to count, presumably 
representing just a small fraction of the criminal gang’s ill-gotten gains.  Although not 
much is ever made of this scenario in the judgments30 it is contended that the money 
counting scenario may be significant in its effect on the accused.  It is also contended that 
the scenario is probably calculated by the undercover operators to have a strong 
persuasive influence on the target.  To place in the target’s hands large sums of money, 
i.e. tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars, must have a significant effect on his psyche, 
particularly when one considers that targets are, as a general rule, impecunious.  So much 
money is so close at hand, and if the target proves to be worthy he may, it is reasonable to 
assume, be entitled to take a share of that money. 
 The payday promise, which is a much more common feature of Mr. Big stings, 
dovetails neatly with the money-counting scenario.  The payday promise usually consists 
of a ‘big deal’ or other large-scale criminal transaction that is presented to the target as 
being on the horizon for the criminal organization.  The target can expect to take part in 
                                                        
30 See for example Joseph, supra note 3 at para. 10. 
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the proceeds of whatever crime is taking pace as long as he can satisfy the boss, Mr. Big, 
that he can be trusted.31  The proposed criminal operation could be helping in a large drug 
transaction or weapon transaction.  The proposed payment could be as high as $20,000 to 
$30,00032 or even as high as $80,000.33  Sometimes it is purported to the target that the 
cash is kept in a safe deposit box and will be released to him upon his satisfying the boss 
and/or completing his role in the upcoming big deal.   
 The continued use of the money counting scenario and the payday promise 
technique, which are almost always both played out in close temporal proximity to each 
other, and which are generally executed closer to the culmination of the sting than its 
inception, arguably inject a powerful element of greed into an undercover operation 
which already heavily relies on psychological manipulation, such as the shock inherent in 
the above-mentioned violent scenario, to elicit confessional statements from the target.  
Indeed, the payday promise is even used in those cases where children are targeted.  The 
circumstances in R. v. O.N.E. are illustrative: 
  
 
5   The investigation took a form very similar to the investigation in Mentuck.  It 
involved the use of the “crime boss” scenario, in which suspects are initiated into 
a purported criminal organization.  O.N.E. and Kilpatrick bought and sold 
cigarettes they were told were illegally obtained, were led to believe they were to 
take part in a major drug deal which would pay them US$50,000, had food, 
clothes and hotel rooms paid for by undercover operatives, and witnessed feigned 
anger and violence, including a severe beating staged for the consumption of 
O.N.E.  The accused and Kilpatrick were progressively allowed to feel more 
involved in the organization and eventually were introduced to the “boss” of the 
organization, for whom they had been directed by the undercover operatives to 
show great respect. 
                                                         
31 Lowe, supra note 14 at para. 230. 
32 R. v. Forknall 2000 BCSC 1694, 71 W.C.B (2d) 575 at para. 7 [Forknall (voir dire)]. 
33 R. v. Bonisteel 2008 BCCA 344, 236 C.C.C. (3d) 170 [Bonisteel]. 
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6  The “crime boss” informed O.N.E. that Vancouver police were preparing to 
arrest her for the second degree murder of Steudle.  To that end, the “boss” 
produced bogus internal police memoranda discussing the intended arrest.  He  
told O.N.E. that he could have a dying former member of the organization 
confess to Steudle’s murder and thus exonerate O.N.E. if she could provide him 
with sufficient details to make the confession credible.  The accused repeatedly 
denied any involvement in Steudle’s death.  The “crime boss” implied that she 
would no longer be permitted to remain with the organization and that she would 
lose the opportunity to be paid the US$50,000  cash that she had earlier been 
shown.  Furthermore, the undercover officer playing the “boss” made clear that 
any help in the purported second degree murder charge would be withdrawn 
without an adequate response to the boss’s inquiries.  After continued pressure, 
she eventually confessed to a role in Steudle’s death.34 
 
 
Clearly, the strength of the psychological pressure of the payday promise, in a form such 
as that described above, adds significantly to the pressure that is brought to bear upon the 
target and his motivation to confess. 
 
I.  THE INSINUATION THAT ARREST IS IMMINENT 
 
 This element of the sting takes different forms and generally arises closer to the 
end of the sting than the beginning.  Essentially, it will be brought to the target’s attention 
that the police are closing in on him as a suspect and he is likely to be prosecuted for the 
crime of which he had been previously suspected but for which he had not been 
prosecuted.  This is effective due to the fact that the majority, if not all, targets of Mr. Big 
stings were indeed associated in some way with the murder in question, either as out-and-
out suspects, as persons of interest, or merely as witnesses.  This insinuation takes 
                                                        
34 2001 SCC 77, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478 at paras. 5 to 6 [O.N.E. Publication Ban].  Although 
this target was acquitted at trial, the issues regarding a publication ban in her case were 
litigated all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
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various forms.  In some cases uniformed policemen may simply show up at the door of 
the target and inform him that he is still a suspect in the case and that the police may wish 
to have more contact with him later and possibly collect samples of his DNA.35  Other 
techniques include ‘prop letters’ such as those referred to in the above-cited excerpt of R. 
v. O.N.E.  A third favourite ploy involves the police collaborating with local television or 
radio broadcasters to air ‘crimestoppers’-style public service vignettes at coordinated 
times when they know the target and the primary will be together with their set tuned 
in.36   
 The purpose of these insinuations appears to be to keep the target aware of his 
vulnerability to the police and to increase the likelihood of his reliance on the criminal 
organization to save him from being arrested, prosecuted and convicted. 
 The insinuations that arrest is imminent often take place before the 
meeting/interview with Mr. Big.  However, Mr. Big often himself alludes to the fact that 
arrest is imminent, through the use of prop letters and other ruses, during the interview 
with the target.  Again, the above cited excerpt from R. v. O.N.E.  shows an example of 
this tactic. 
 
J.  THE CAMEO 
 
 The cameo, as an aspect of the Mr. Big sting, is a somewhat curious and definitely 
interesting element.  In a general sense, a cameo consists of a brief appearance in a sting 
scenario by an undercover officer who is not substantially connected to the particular Mr.                                                         
35 Hathway supra note 9 at para. 93. 
36 Osmar (C.A.), supra note 8 at para. 10. 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Big undercover operation.  In fact, in the judgments it is suggested that usually the cameo 
operator is not even aware of who the target is in the sting in which he is participating as 
a ‘bit player’.  A cameo may consist of an undercover operator simply sitting in a public 
place and receiving a package or a case of some kind from a target who believes he is 
transporting illicit goods.  No words may even be exchanged between the target and the 
cameo operator, or if there are words they may be limited to something along the lines of 
“here is the case” and “thank you”.  The cameo operator presumably reports back to his 
supervisor, files a report, and then leaves the operation.  Further information on how the 
cameo operators are selected is sparse, as the only source of information is the judgments 
themselves. 
 However, a more specific kind of cameo used to greater effect is the cameo 
appearance of Mr. Big himself.  Although not used in all of the stings, it appears to have 
some effect on the target: 
 
This scenario involved a “chance” sighting of the crime boss in a public 
restaurant in Calgary. Mr. Hathway had no prior knowledge that this was to 
occur, and a staged phone call set the scene. Mr. Hathway and Constable Chubbs 
were in a bar with another operative (providing Constable Chubbs with samples 
of counterfeit products). The other operative produced a new $100 bill which was 
genuine and indicated that it was counterfeit. At that time, the call came and they 
left. Mr. Hathway asked if there was a problem, and Constable Chubbs indicated 
they had to meet someone downtown. He then indicated they were going to see 
“the Boss”. He told Mr. Hathway to be respectful, truthful and honest. They 
walked in and Constable Chubbs observed Sergeant Dibblee and his 
“bodyguard”. They walked in and the “bodyguard” greeted Constable Chubbs 
but stopped Mr. Hathway and directed him to sit in the lounge. This was the 
prelude for a later actual interview with the crime boss. Approximately 30 
minutes transpired, and Constable Chubbs left to get Mr. Hathway. Mr. Hathway 
inquired if everything was okay, and Constable Chubbs simply indicated that he 
had gotten “chewed out” by “the Boss” for bringing Mr. Hathway. They then 
discussed honesty, trust and loyalty, and Mr. Hathway assured Constable Chubbs 
that he would never let him down. 
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The “bodyguard”, another undercover operative, is a large man with a body 
builder’s physique, and he physically stood in the way to prevent Mr. Hathway 
from following Constable Chubbs.37 
 
Although the rationale underlying these cameo appearances of the boss is not clear from 
what the police witnesses usually have to say at trial, it has been suggested by the defence 
that they are a means of convincing the target that he has gotten deeper into the business 
of the gang: he has now seen the boss’s face and knows more, maybe an unacceptable 
amount, about the gang. This arguably puts the target in a seemingly more vulnerable 
position. 
 
K. THE INTERVIEW 
 
 The culmination of the Mr. Big sting is the interview between Mr. Big and the 
target.  The interview is recorded in both video and audio.  It is in this scenario that the 
boss attempts to elicit a confession to the murder or murders of which the target is 
suspected.  We have already touched upon the various insinuations made to the target that 
arrest is imminent, both before and during the interview. However, other varied and 
generally successful tactics and inducements are used and held out to the target in order 
to convince him to confess. 
 i.  Mr. Big solves all problems, but you must confess.  The primary tactic, of 
which all the other tactics are arguably only facets, is the strong message that Mr. Big can 
make all legal problems relating to the unsolved murder disappear.  To this end, Mr. Big 
generally makes it known to the target that he is convinced of the target’s culpability and                                                         
37 Hathway, supra note 9 at paras. 87-88.  
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that he wants to know the full details of the target’s involvement.  This full conviction of 
Mr. Big that the target is complicit in the crime, to the extent that he is unwilling and 
unable to believe otherwise, is pointed up in several of the judgments.  The following 
excerpt from a British Columbia Court of Appeal judgment is typical: 
 
The appellant’s confession was obtained in his discussion with B.A. on 8 
February 2000 at the culmination of the R.C.M.P. undercover operation in which 
several police officers played roles of criminal gang members, and B.A. was the 
boss of the organization.  The sophisticated and elaborate scenarios set up by the 
police portrayed B.A. as a person of great power and authority, the opportunity 
of membership in the gang for the appellant as one holding the promise of great 
financial gain, and the appellant’s membership in the gang as being dependent 
upon his absolute truthfulness with B.A.  By the time of the confession, various 
gang members, and B.A. himself, repeatedly had told the appellant that they 
believed he had killed his wife, and that unless he was frank with B.A. about that, 
he would be unacceptable as a member because he could not be trusted, and 
neither he nor others could be protected from further police investigation.38 
 
 As a general rule, denials of culpability are not accepted by Mr. Big.  Sometimes 
judgments make only passing reference to denials, as is the case in R. v. Peterffy, in 
which it is stated that “[a]fter initially denying any involvement Peterffy said that he 
“took care of business”.”39  Some judgments go more in depth.  Indeed, some of the 
judgments point up a certain air of resignation on the parts of some targets: 
 
[53] Mr. Angly also points to the use of almost irresistible inducements and the 
implied threat that anyone who endangered the organization would be killed. In 
addition, he notes that the accused were encouraged by undercover operators to 
indulge in the consumption of alcohol. 
  
                                                        
38 R. v. Skiffington 2004 BCCA 291, 186 C.C.C. (3d) 314 at para. 34 [Skiffington]. 
39 2000 BCCA 132, 45 W.C.B. (2d) 315 at para. 6 [Peterffy]. 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[54] The result of all this, he submits, was revealed in Mr. Raza's remark about 
the homicide to an undercover operator that, "You're making me want to say I 
lined it up, and that's the only way you'll be happy".40 
 
 
 ii. The fall guy.  In addition to the refusal to accept the denial of responsibility, 
Mr. Big also usually implements the ‘fall guy’41 tactic as a way to elicit a confession 
from the target.  In simplest terms, the crime boss will inform the target that he has in 
place an operative who for various reasons is willing to confess to the murder the target is 
suspected of having committed.  However, this can only happen if the target is absolutely 
truthful with the boss and gives him as much detailed information about the commission 
of the killing as he can.  The information will then be relayed to the fall guy who will 
volunteer a detailed confession to the police putting the target in the clear. 
 Usually the purported motive for the fall guy’s confession is that he is terminally 
ill.  Sometimes the fall guy is purported to be acting for money.42  In one case it was put 
to the target that the fall guy was awaiting execution in Thailand, and that if he confessed 
to a murder in Canada his life could be spared and he could be sent home to do his time 
in the presumably better conditions of a Canadian prison.43  In any event, the need for 
details of the killing are required. 
 iii.  Earth, Fire, Dumpster, Water.  It is notable that the details are often uniform 
in many respects.  The most compelling similarity in this respect is the means by which 
targets say they have disposed of murder weapons and other physical evidence.  Murder 
weapons are invariably thrown into bodies of water (and are never found later by the                                                         
40 R. v. Raza 1998 CanLii 5352, 1998 B.C.J No. 3242 (B.C.S.C.) at paras 53 and 54 
[Raza]. 
41 Sometimes inexplicably referred to as the ‘Henry fall guy’ tactic. Go figure. 
42 Peterffy, supra note 39 at para. 6. 
43 Black, supra note 5 at para. 205. 
  26 
police).  Clothes are either burned or thrown into dumpsters (again, never, ever found by 
the police, though perhaps more understandably).  To a student of these stings, reading 
the details given by targets in their Mr. Big confessions as they relate to this physical 
evidence provides food for thought.  If one were to murder someone with one’s bare 
hands, or a knife, or a gun how would one attempt to dispose of the evidence?  By 
throwing it into a river?  By burning or burying?  And, of course, the more important 
question: If one were called to give an accounting to Mr. Big of a murder one had not 
committed, what details would one come up with to convince Mr. Big of the truthfulness 
of the confession?  At least within the scope of the research underlying this thesis, not 
one of the targets in any operation in the history of the Mr. Big sting has ever handed 
over a weapon to the boss and said ‘here it is, this is what I killed him with’ or handed 
over a pair of gloves or other clothing and said ‘here, this is what I was wearing when I 
did it’.  The evidence is, almost without exception, irretrievable and, of course, no 
evidence at all.  This, however, is not the case with all physical evidence deriving from 
the Mr. Big interview. 
 iv. The gold standard – the body.  Although murder weapons and other evidence 
are never retrieved as a result of the sting,44 it is the case that sometimes the accused will 
lead the police to the previously unknown location of the dead body in order to prove that 
he is a killer.   This was evidently the situation in the case of R. v. Casement.45  Casement 
was found guilty of first-degree murder by a jury after becoming the target of a Mr. Big 
sting.  A unique feature of the sting in which he was caught was the fact that he was 
being investigated for the murder of a different victim altogether.  He denied all                                                         
44 As far as we know. 
45 Casement, supra note 24 at paras. 3 to 6. 
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involvement in that crime to the gang, but he did volunteer that he had committed another 
murder, this second deceased having been missing for some years and not even officially 
classified as a homicide victim.  He led the police to where he had left the body and was 
prosecuted for that murder, although not for the initial one of which he was suspected.46 
 Cases like Casement’s are rarer than those in which the target leads the police to 
an area at which the police already know the body to have been found.  This can be 
problematic when one considers the possibilities of conscious or unconscious leading of 
the target.  Cases also exist where targets lead police to a general area that is correct, but 
are unable to pinpoint the exact location where the body was found or get it wrong. 
 v. You have something on us, we want something on you.   As previously 
mentioned in referring to Dix v. Canada, this is another area of the sting that is 
problematic, arguably on a level approaching that of the violent scenario.  Like the 
violent scenario, it is not used in every Mr. Big sting, but it is not uncommon either.  This 
facet of the sting, usually used during the interview or as a prelude to the interview, 
consists of the target being informed that, since he now possesses so much personal 
information about the criminal organization, including the possibility of having seen the 
boss’s face during a “cameo” scenario, it is necessary for the target to give the gang 
inculpatory information about himself that they can hold over him or ‘have on him’.  
Essentially, in order for the gang to feel comfortable about the target, he must confess to 
a serious crime.47  The initial and explicit consequence is that if he does not confess the 
gang will feel uncomfortable about him; with secondary, more implicit consequences 
                                                        
46 Ibid. at paras. 28 and 46 to 51. 
47 See R. v. Osmar [2001] O.J. No. 5797 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 12 and 49 [Osmar [Ont. 
S.C.J.)]. 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being left mainly to the target’s imagination.  Interestingly, in at least one case the target 
testified that he volunteered a confession pre-emptively, in an effort to build trust with 
the gang by giving them something to hold over him.48 
 vi.  The primary’s voucher.  A further feature associated with the interview is the 
impression upon the target that the primary has vouched for him to the boss and, as a 
result, his credibility is on the line.  The primary tells the target that he needs to tell the 
boss the truth about his involvement in the murder or else he, the primary, will look 
bad.49 
 
L. THE ARREST 
 
 After the confession is given to Mr. Big the target is allowed to go on his way.  
Presumably pending some sort of approval process involving examination of the 
recordings,50 the target will be arrested a few days later and charged with the murder.  In 
some instances it does not dawn on the target that he has been tricked and he may attempt 
to contact the primary for help.51 
 
M. ONGOING THEMES – THE NECESSITY OF HONESTY AND TRUST, THE 
DANGEROUSNESS OF THE GANG, THE ABILITY TO WALK AWAY 
 
                                                        
48 R. v. Lowe, supra note 14 at para. 249. 
49 Ibid. at para. 257. 
50 How this works is not apparent from caselaw. 
51 Hathway, supra note 9 at para. 128. 
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 Trial transcripts, recordings of conversations between the target and undercover 
officers, and judgments of the courts disclose that throughout many Mr. Big undercover 
operations the target is constantly made aware of the fact that he is expected to be 
completely honest and forthcoming with members of the gang, and that the ability for all 
gang members to trust each other is the foundation of the gang’s success.  The target will 
sometimes be told that even if he makes mistakes and messes up jobs he should never try 
to hide that fact from the primary or other gang members, not least because if he is honest 
about making mistakes and how he has made them, it may be possible for the boss, 
through his influence, to fix whatever problems the target has created. 
 Another theme, related to the general theme of honesty mentioned directly above, 
which often runs throughout a Mr. Big sting is the general attitude of boastfulness in 
which the target will sometimes engage.  Because the target is hoping to join a criminal 
gang, he may be tempted to lie about the extent of his criminal involvement, claiming to 
have committed crimes, even committed murders, which he had nothing to do with in 
order to impress the gang.  Significantly, it is not unknown for the primary or the boss to 
express incredulity at the target’s claims, telling him not to “bullshit”.52 
 In fact, lies told by the target to the undercover officers at all stages of the sting 
are a common feature of the operation.  Trial judges53 recognize this and often provide 
particulars of proven lies told by targets in their judgments: 
 
Mr. Lowe lied to Jason about a number of matters.  These included:  his navy 
record; his experience in dealing with difficulties at the nightclub; his knowledge 
of gangsters; his sexual exploits; his ability to move cars across the border with 
his dealer card and to obtain fake T4 slips; his driver's license status; and other                                                         
52 R. v. Casement, supra note 24 at para. 5. 
53 and presumably juries. 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collateral matters.  He gave varying accounts to Jason and Mr. B regarding his 
business relationship with Mr. Rudy, for example with respect to how much 
money was at stake.  He told them that before he killed Mr. Rudy, he told people 
that Mr. Rudy would be away on business.  (However, the Crown led no 
evidence confirming that.)  His account to Mr. B of the history of the nightclub 
was different in some respects from the account he gave to Jason.  He told Jason 
that his partner was stealing from him.  He said that he had bought the nightclub 
building.  He said that he was paying $10,000 a week, not $5,000 or $2,000.54 
 
Obviously the fact that a target tells lies to the primary and to Mr. Big is significant, for 
reasons that will be examined more fully in the legal analysis undertaken later in this 
thesis. 
 Two final related ongoing themes which are present throughout the sting are, 
firstly, the continuous message to the target that the gang is indeed a very dangerous, 
organized, efficient and ruthless entity, obsessed with security, and not to be crossed on 
pain of death; and, secondly, the vaguely contradictory message that, despite everything 
that happens, despite any of the fake crimes he has committed, witnessed or in some way 
been privy to, the target is allowed at any time to sever his ties with the gang and ‘walk 
away’.  This is a theme that recurs in many of the judgments.  In R. v. Forknall, the Voir 
Dire Judge stated that “neither Mr. Copeland nor Mr. Forknall were ever detained.  It was 
made clear to both they did not have to participate if they did not want to”,55 but a few 
paragraphs later he also makes the finding that: 
 
No direct threats were made to either Copeland or Forknall.  Each may 
reasonably have inferred from Constable Bentham comments about getting 
“whacked” (killed), and “he kicks my ass once I kick your ass twice” and similar 
statements that breach of the rules of the criminal organization they were seeking 
to join could well lead to violence against themselves.56                                                         
54 R. v. Lowe, supra note 14 at para. 313. 
55 Forknall, supra note 32 at para. 13. 
56 Ibid. at para. 15. 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The juxtaposition of the ‘free to leave at any time’ policy with the purported strict 
discipline and secrecy of the gang, backed up by casually dispensed violence and the 
autocratic rule of a deeply suspicious crime boss, may not make sense to some observers.  
That said, it is a paradox that has not appeared to carry much weight with triers of fact in 
the Canadian criminal courts. 
 
N.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE STING 
 
 Not every unique feature of the Mr. Big sting has been described in this initial 
chapter.  However, enough has been outlined to allow a broad discussion of the various 
legal problems that the sting raises.  As previously stated these include problems relating 
to the confessions rule and voluntariness, section 7 rights to silence, abuse of process, 
expert evidence issues, admissibility under hearsay exceptions and, ultimately, fairness.  
All of these will be discussed in the following chapter.   
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CHAPTER TWO – SOME INTRODUCTORY MATTERS AND OBSERVATIONS 
ARISING FROM A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE STING 
 
A.  OVERVIEW OF LEGAL QUESTIONS AND ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED  
 There is no question that numerous legal questions and issues arise from the 
implementation of the Mr. Big sting in Canada.  It is safe to say that these questions and 
issues are all defence-related since the use of the sting has been endorsed at all levels of 
the Canadian court system.  For the prosecution little if any issue with the legality and 
admissibility of evidence gathered though the sting arises because Mr. Big confessions 
are quite simply always ruled to be admissible.  The fight over Mr. Big evidence in 
Canada is one carried on entirely by the defence.   
 At least in layman’s terms, Mr. Big sting evidence is first and foremost confession 
evidence, and as such the question of voluntariness under the common law arises as 
defined by Iacobucci J. in R. v. Oickle.57  However, a cursory perusal of Mr. Big 
jurisprudence reveals that voluntariness is considered by the Canadian judiciary to be of 
little if any importance in determining admissibility in these cases.  This state of affairs 
has much to do with the ruling in R. v. Grandinetti58 in which a majority of the Supreme 
Court of Canada affirmed that voluntariness as it is defined in Canadian criminal law did 
not arise as an issue in Mr. Big/crime boss cases due to the fact that police undercover 
operators are not capable of being defined as persons in authority for the purposes of the 
common law inquiry as described in R. v. Oickle.   
                                                        
57 2000 SCC 38; [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 [Oickle]. 
58 Grandinetti, supra note 2. 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 The blanket exclusion of Mr. Big cases from the common law voluntariness 
inquiry is indeed problematic.  The question arises as to whether or not the voluntariness 
rules in Canada are comparable to the rules regarding hearsay exceptions that existed 
before the landmark case of R. v. Khan.59  That is, has Canadian law on the determination 
of voluntariness in criminal cases become overly rigid and ossified, too firmly reliant 
upon and attached to a ‘categories approach’ in its reasoning and application?  It is the 
position of this thesis that this is indeed the case.   
 When one considers the underlying principles of our law of confessions, it is clear 
that our treatment of Mr. Big confession evidence denotes an attitude towards 
fundamental notions of fairness that seems to have jumped the tracks.  As Iacobucci J. 
noted in R. v. Oickle, the essential problem with admitting involuntary confessions is that 
they may be unreliable.  Reliability, it is argued, is something determinative.  It is not, 
contrariwise, something that can be mechanically determined by resort to evidentiary 
rules that may have been outstripped and rendered ineffective by continuing 
developments in police investigative tactics and strategies throughout legal history.   
 To base a determination of the voluntariness, and hence the reliability, of a 
confession solely on whether or not the declarant knew he or she was speaking to a police 
officer or other traditional person in authority is no longer a conscionable option, at least 
in the context of a Mr. Big case when a life sentence for murder is on the line.  This, of 
course, is not to say that the knowledge of whether or not the receiver of an inculpatory 
statement is a person in authority is irrelevant, but it is urged that the authoritative status 
ought only to be considered as one of many factors in determining whether or not a 
                                                        
59 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, 59 CCC (3d) 92 [Khan]. 
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confession in a Mr. Big sting should be considered voluntary or reliable enough to be 
admitted as evidence. 
 The present state of the Canadian law is that Mr. Big confession evidence always 
passes the test for threshold reliability determined by the trier of law.  Ultimate reliability 
is a matter to be determined by the trier of fact.  The current state of affairs has juries 
nearly always finding these confessions reliable and returning verdicts of guilty.  
 Closely related to, if not subsumed in, the question of voluntariness is the issue of 
the Hodgson warning arising out of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. 
Hodgson.60  The facts in this case concerned a confession made by an accused who had 
disclosed to the parents of a young complainant that he had sexually assaulted her.  After 
confessing some facts to the parents, the complainant’s mother struck the accused and the 
complainant’s father held a knife to the accused’s back while they waited for the police to 
arrive.  In these circumstances the accused made more inculpatory statements.  The 
Supreme Court of Canada had the opportunity to modify the person in authority rule but 
“declined to eliminate the requirement”.61  Instead, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled 
that the trier of law in such cases may choose to instruct the trier of fact that statements 
made in such circumstances may be unreliable and untruthful.   
 It is arguably telling that there needs to be a legal doctrine in place, a doctrine 
decidedly optional in its application, relating to how triers of fact ought to view 
confessions obtained in an atmosphere of violence. 
 Besides the common-law confessions rule and the attendant Hodgson warning, 
the significance of section 7 of the Charter will also be examined in the legal analysis.                                                          
60 [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449, 127 C.C.C. (3d) 449 [Hodgson cited to S.C.R.]. 
61 Terrico, supra note 11 at para. 30. 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As a general rule, it suffices to say that just as the lack of a traditional person in authority 
in a Mr. Big sting forecloses the application of the voluntariness test, so does the lack of a 
traditional detention situation take away from the accused the availability of the Charter-
protected right to silence.  Accused persons in these cases have attempted to argue the 
formation of a kind of psychological detention in the unfolding of the sting but with no 
success.  That said, section 7 does bear some examination in the context of Mr. Big 
confession evidence.  In particular, the defence in one case attempted to argue that the 
common-law voluntariness rule as it now stands, with its insistence upon the person in 
authority requirement, is itself contrary to section 7 of the Charter.62 
 Another major attack that the defence in Canada has made upon the admissibility 
of Mr. Big confession evidence is on the basis of the doctrine of abuse of process.  Once 
again the efforts of the defence have been fruitless in this regard.  In cases in which this 
argument has been advanced judges note the necessity of balancing the possibility of 
damage to the integrity of the administration of justice against the need of society to 
effectively investigate and prosecute crimes.  It is also in the context of the abuse of 
process argument that judges in their written reasons tend to reflect metaphorically upon 
the difference between mere tricks and dirty tricks.  From reading the judgments there 
appears to be a line in the sand between these two species of deception, never really 
adequately located or defined by the judges.  In practice it appears never to be possible 
for police actions in Mr. Big stings to cross the line from acceptable to unacceptable; no 
matter how evidence is obtained it is always admissible. 
                                                        
62 R. v. Forknall 2003 BCCA 43 at para. 24 [Forknall (C.A.)]. 
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 This state of affairs, it is argued, is especially troubling in situations where, for 
example, targets with serious alcohol addiction problems are encouraged by undercover 
operators to drink alcohol.  Another troubling situation is that in which a target is made to 
believe that he has participated in a gang-sanctioned execution or serious assault on 
somebody who has crossed the criminal organization.  One might think that convincing a 
target that he had become entangled in a gangland murder, or giving free and unlimited 
access to alcohol to an alcoholic before attempting to get a confession out of him, would 
give rise to serious doubts in a judge’s mind about the propriety of police tactics.  
However, in Canadian courts the evidence is never excluded on the basis of abuse of 
process.  The test, referenced ubiquitously in the jurisprudence, is whether or not the 
police behaviour would ‘shock the conscience of the community’.  Judges have 
uniformly decided that the community’s interest in solving (or at least resolving) murder 
cases outweighs the questionable nature of Mr. Big tactics.  In fact, almost no judges find 
Mr. Big tactics to be questionable at all.   
 A fourth legal issue, one which has actually made some limited headway in the 
defence’s opposition to Mr. Big evidence, is the question of the admission of expert 
evidence on the phenomenon of false confessions.  A majority of judgments continues to 
exclude expert evidence on the basis of the criteria as set out in R. v. Mohan,63 often 
classifying expert evidence on false confessions in a Mr. Big sting as novel science, and 
citing Sopinka J.’s admonition that courts need to focus greater scrutiny on it for that 
reason.  Psychological studies and social science studies on false confessions were 
                                                        
63 [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, 89 C.C.C. (3d) 402 [Mohan cited to S.C.R.). 
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endorsed by Iacobucci J. in R. v. Oickle.64   However, because the material cited in that 
case concerned the effect of police tactics in traditional interrogations, it is generally not 
understood by the courts to be authority for admitting expert evidence on false 
confessions in Mr. Big cases. 
 There have, however, been a few cases where expert evidence was ruled 
admissible by the trial judge, such as R. v. C.K.R.S.65  Interestingly, this was one of the 
few Mr. Big cases that resulted in an acquittal.  Ultimately, it may be that the area of 
expert evidence is where defence attempts to locate a chink in the armour of Mr. Big 
eventually meet with success.   
 Another evidentiary issue to be touched upon in the debate over admission or 
exclusion is whether or not the target’s statements to undercover officers should be 
treated as hearsay and relatedly, whether or not they should be considered admissions 
against penal interest. 
 The above-mentioned evidentiary issues will all be separately examined at greater 
length in the chapters three to seven of this thesis.  However, one other evidentiary 
concern that bears some mention, although it is only very rarely the subject of direct 
judicial commentary and will not be examined in a separate chapter, is the veritable 
mountain of evidence that a Mr. Big sting can produce.  As stated in the first chapter, 
these stings can often take four months or longer to execute.  The time needed for 
defence counsel to view and listen to all of the video- and audio-taped evidence, as well 
as the time needed to peruse transcripts of the recordings (the recordings are notorious for 
their poor quality and for being frequently inaudible), plus the time needed to examine                                                         
64 Oickle, supra note 57 at paras. 34 to 45. 
65 C.K.R.S., supra note 13. 
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police notes and other evidence arising over the length of the operation, can easily end up 
amounting to hundreds of hours or more.  It is often the case that defence counsel is hard-
pressed to stay on top of all of the disclosure arising out of the Mr. Big investigation, 
especially when one lawyer is attempting to conduct the defence all on his or her own.  
The fact that many of the targets are impecunious, which, as previously mentioned, is 
often a defining feature of these cases, further complicates matters as court-appointed 
counsel can have trouble securing adequate remuneration for the considerable amount of 
work that must be done on these cases. 
   
B.  THE SPECTRE OF MURDER AND THE SHADOW OF KYLE UNGER 
 As mentioned in the first chapter, murder is nearly always the crime that is the 
subject of the Mr. Big technique.   Murder is often decried as the most serious crime 
known to Canadian law.  Sometimes crimes against the state such as treason and others 
enumerated in s. 469 of the Criminal Code66 are equated with it in terms of seriousness; 
however, even members of a stateless society fear murder, whereas those of us who are 
citizens of the state rarely fear spies and traitors as much as we do the killers whom we 
know to live among us.  A visit to the true crime section of any local bookstore makes it 
clear that our society takes great interest in murder, especially sexually motivated murder 
and serial murders.  The content of television programming is just as fully made up of 
murder as the content of the advertising that sustains it is made up of sex.  Murder 
informs our contemporary consciousness, and our knowledge of an unresolved murder is 
                                                        
66 R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46. 
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like that of an unconsummated marriage.  We simply cannot stop questioning it as an 
unacceptable state of affairs. 
 Murders need to be resolved and Mr. Big delivers the desired result.  However, 
unsettling loose ends remain.  First and foremost, it is necessary always to keep in mind 
that there are only rarely witnesses to murder, and even when there are, they are only 
very rarely independent, disinterested, and hence reliable.  Frauds and thefts are often 
captured on video.  Vehicular crimes are witnessed.  Victims of all violent crimes except 
murder can accuse their alleged attackers in court.   That said, the biblical image of the 
first murder victim Abel’s blood crying out from the ground is only wishful thinking.  
Murder is silent and puzzling.   
 The significance of confession evidence in murder cases therefore arguably takes 
on added, perhaps undue significance if only because it breaks the silence surrounding 
the crime.  The families of the victims of other crimes probably experience a notable 
increase in the amount of sound and noise in their lives:  the voices of lawyers, of police, 
of the victims themselves who may be traumatized and the voices of doctors caring for 
them.  The families of the victims of unsolved murders must instead contend with the 
silence of police who have no leads, the silence of the courts that have no case to try, the 
silence of the perpetrator who has eluded detection and, most significantly, the silence of 
the victim.  The Mr. Big confession relieves the silence but it is for that reason that it 
ought to be carefully scrutinized at all stages of court proceedings.  Of course the need 
for scrutiny is at least doubled when one considers, as one must, that in the majority of 
Mr. Big cases the confession is the only evidence on which a conviction can rest.  The 
operation nearly always only takes place when the police have no forensic evidence, no 
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identification evidence, no other confessional evidence, in fact, nothing other than 
suspicion sharpening their aim on the target.  This significant and glaring evidentiary 
feature should never be given less weight than it warrants. 
 The most significant development in the law regarding Mr. Big stings since their 
inception recently occurred with the overturning of the conviction of Kyle Wayne Unger 
in 2009.  Unger, along with a co-accused Timothy Houlahan, had been convicted by a 
jury of the brutal sexual murder of a teenage girl in 1993.  The facts were extremely 
harsh.  The victim was under eighteen and had been sexually assaulted prior to her death.  
Additionally, her corpse was desecrated as sticks were inserted into her vagina and anus 
after her death.  Unger was convicted and his conviction was upheld on the strength of a 
hair fibre found on the victim which was consistent with his own, the evidence of a 
jailhouse informant who claimed Unger admitted to him that he had committed the crime, 
and a confession to undercover police masquerading as a criminal gang.  Years later it 
was determined that the hair found on the victim’s body was in fact not Unger’s.  Also, 
the judicial attitude towards jailhouse informant evidence had changed substantially since 
the time of Unger’s conviction.  It had previously been routinely admitted, but by 2009 it 
was subject to so much scrutiny as to be nearly inadmissible.  Following a review by the 
Federal Minister of Justice, Unger’s retrial was ordered.  The prosecution thereafter 
withdrew the charges and Unger was acquitted. 
 Kyle Unger represents the first instance in Canadian law of an acknowledged 
wrongful conviction arising out of a Mr. Big sting.  Although in this instance it is quite 
probable that Houlahan had been the only perpetrator of the crime with Unger being only 
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an unfortunate patsy, it is possible that the real killer is still at large.67 This case’s 
significance will be examined more fully later in the thesis, however at this point it 
suffices to say that it, as well as the thirteen years served by Unger in the penitentiary, 
casts a long shadow over all of the cases and convictions that have resulted from these 
operations.   
 
C.  A FEW MORE WORDS ABOUT METHODOLOGY 
 
 Before embarking in earnest on specific discrete areas of legal analysis, it is 
necessary to note that efforts to compartmentalize the discussion according to established, 
textbook evidentiary principles may not always be entirely successful.   For example, 
issues of expert evidence witness testimony on false confessions tends to overlap with the 
common-law rule on voluntariness, in large part due to Iacobucci J.’s reliance upon 
scientific evidence in R. v. Oickle.68  Another example is the fact that the existence of 
threats, promises, inducements, coercion, and an atmosphere of oppression in the sting 
are significant in both the voluntariness and abuse of process inquiries.  In short, although 
perhaps not much needs to be made of it, it is possible to become confused by the 
apparent intertwining of facts, problems and evidentiary issues that an examination of the 
‘corpus’ of Canadian Mr. Big jurisprudence uncovers. 
 A further obfuscating factor is the fact that the typical Mr. Big sting produces a 
voluminous quantity of disclosure and data to be dealt with by counsel.  This in turn can 
produce a daunting amount of what might be called ‘raw’ evidence to be dealt with by the                                                         
67 Houlahan successfully appealed his conviction but later committed suicide. 
68 Oickle, supra note 57. 
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triers of fact and law at both the preliminary inquiry and at trial.  The end result of this 
situation is that it is often difficult for the legal researcher to feel confident that he or she 
is really seeing an accurate portrayal of the Mr. Big sting merely by reading judgments 
that may only be ten or twelve to fifteen or twenty pages in length.   Naturally one cannot 
expect to get an idea of the demeanour of witnesses by reading judgments, but there is 
also the fact that videotape and audiotape evidence is unavailable for scholarly review.  
Furthermore, there is much evidence that judges may simply not see fit to mention in voir 
dire judgments and sentencing decisions.  Also significant, of course, is the fact that the 
majority of these cases are murder cases and heard by a jury. Therefore, in most cases, no 
reasons regarding how the accused was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt are 
available.  Furthermore, if defence counsel does not request voir dires at trial, which 
happens quite a lot more often than one might expect to be the case, it is quite possible 
that a whole Mr. Big sting murder case can go through the criminal legal system without 
any record being made of it beyond the trial transcripts.  
  A striking example of such a case in which almost no detail is available 
from the reported judgments is R. v. Skiffington.69  In this appeal the sting is mentioned 
only briefly and is described cursorily in only one or two paragraphs, mainly in the 
following excerpt: 
 
In the fall of 1999, the police commenced a sophisticated undercover operation in 
Newfoundland, and elsewhere, with a view to obtaining a confession from the 
appellant.  The police plan involved a number of undercover officers playing 
roles as members of a criminal organization which offered the appellant well 
paid employment on the condition that the crime boss, B.A., another undercover 
police officer, could be satisfied of the appellant’s honesty and trustworthiness.  
In this context, the appellant was persuaded to confess to B.A. that he murdered                                                         
69 Skiffington, supra note 38. 
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Ms. Martin.  The appellant’s confession to B.A. was tape recorded, and the jury 
heard the tape recording and had a transcript of the conversation.70 
  
Furthermore, the defence had called no evidence at trial, which of course meant that the 
accused did not testify.71  We do know that there were several exculpatory statements 
made by the accused, both to uniformed officers and an undercover cell plant72 as well as 
to the Mr. Big undercover operatives73, but we do not know what those statements were.  
We also know from the Court of Appeal’s judgment that there existed only a brief 
window of opportunity for Skiffington to have committed the crime74 and that there was 
no other forensic evidence linking him to the killing other than his confession including 
no murder weapon.75  We also know that Skiffington, like so many other Mr. Big targets, 
experienced “financial difficulties”.76  Other than this we know little of the sting on 
Skiffington other than that it was sophisticated and elaborate, that he was repeatedly told 
by the fake gangsters that they believed he had killed his wife, and that he was told he 
could not be trusted unless he admitted it to them.  He was also told that he could not be 
protected from police investigation unless he admitted the crime to Mr. Big.77 
 Based on what is known from the Court of Appeal’s decision, it seems as though 
Skiffington’s conviction stands on fairly shaky ground.  Like the recently exonerated 
Kyle Unger, Skiffington was known as a person who told lies, and who did in fact lie to 
Mr. Big in a confession that, according to his counsel, contained inaccuracies and                                                         
70 Ibid. at para. 10. 
71 Ibid. at para. 12. 
72 Ibid. Ibid. at para. 6. 
73 Ibid. at para. 26. 
74 Ibid. at para. 7. 
75 Ibid. at para. 5. 
76 Ibid. at para. 42. 
77 Ibid. at para. 34. 
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inconsistencies.78  The question arises: how many other vital Mr. Big facts have been lost 
for one reason or another due to the vagaries and formalities of the criminal legal 
system?79 
  Ironically, an investigation of the Mr. Big phenomenon becomes something like a 
criminal investigation in itself.  We see only the traces left behind and have to work to 
uncover the truth with limited available information.  Perhaps, in the interests of 
scholarship, it would be advisable for someone to run a sting on Mr. Big. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
78 Ibid. at para. 43. 
79 In the interest of brevity no further cases will be cited with regard to this intriguing 
sub-topic, however, some other judgments may be of interest to the Mr. Big sting 
aficionado, including R. v. McIntyre 135 N.B.R. 266 (N.B.C.A.) [McIntyre (C.A.)], R. v. 
Moore [1997] B.C.J. No. 1569 (B.C.C.A.) [Moore], and R. v. French (1997) 36 W.C.B. 
(2d) 254, 98 B.C.A.C. 265 [French]. 
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CHAPTER THREE – THE SECTION 7 RIGHT TO SILENCE  
 An examination of the section 7 right to silence and its application to the Mr. Big 
sting is a good example of the overlapping of legal issues referred to previously in this 
thesis. This is  mainly because section 7 is also notionally where an accused can attempt 
to get a remedy under the doctrine of abuse of process.  A brief précis of the law in these 
areas as they relate to Mr. Big can be summarized as follows:  Defence counsel in these 
cases have unsuccessfully attempted to argue that the Mr. Big sting should be held to 
violate the section 7 right to silence and that the confession evidence obtained thereby 
should be excluded pursuant to section 24(2).  The most obvious reason for the failure of 
this argument is that the accused in these cases are not detained when the statements are 
made. 
 The abuse of process argument has also been made by the defence on the 
proposition that the police tactics used in Mr. Big stings are so reprehensible that they 
would shock the conscience of the community if they were widely known.  The remedy 
for this breach of community values should, the defence argues, be the exclusion of the 
evidence or a judicial stay.  This argument has failed at trial and at the provincial 
appellate level but it has not been completely foreclosed by the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
 The overlapping of issues referred to above becomes apparent from a perusal of 
the case law, some of which asserts that the abuse of process doctrine has largely been 
subsumed by section 7.  That said, few trial judges comment on this particular legal 
development and most look at abuse of process as a separate and distinct issue without 
referring to section 7.  Fewer serious section 7 arguments with regard to the right to 
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silence are made due to the fact that it is generally the weaker argument, and also due to 
the fact that, although the abuse of process argument never seems to result in exclusion of 
evidence in Mr. Big cases, there is uniform agreement that it is theoretically possible for 
the argument to succeed. 
 The case of R. v. Osmar80 is probably the leading case with regard to the right to 
silence under section 7 of the Charter and its effect on Mr. Big stings.  Both the Trial 
Judge and the Ontario Court of Appeal considered defence counsel’s right to silence 
arguments in these cases.  In the 2001 voir dire decision, the Trial Judge summed up 
defence counsel’s arguments as follows: 
 
23     The defence argues that R. v. Moore (1997) 94 B.C.A.C. 281, which has 
been cited by the prosecution as standing for the proposition that inculpatory 
statements made during an undercover operation prior to detention, were not 
protected by Section 7 of the Charter, does not, in fact, go that far. It is submitted 
that the case only refers to the right to silence, which is a small component of 
Section 7, and that the accused's right against self-incrimination is a principle of 
fundamental justice that has now been constitutionalized as the principle against 
self-incrimination, which the defence states applies in a non-custodial setting. In 
this regard the defence stresses the case of R. v. White (1999) 135 C.C.C. (3d) 
257, S.C.C. where the Section 7 issue was whether the admission into evidence, 
of statements made under compulsion (i.e. statutorily forced), would violate the 
principle against self-incrimination. 
24     According to the defence, Hebert, only dealt with the right to silence 
because the principle against self-incrimination had not yet developed. 
25     In advancing a Section 7 violation of his right against self-incrimination, 
the accused takes the position that the conduct of the police deprived him of his 
right to choose to speak, or not to speak, to police officers.81 
 
Most notably here, defence counsel is attempting to argue that the right to silence under 
section 7 should, at least in these circumstances, be held to apply even though the                                                         
80 Osmar (Ont. S.C.J.), supra note 47, and Osmar (C.A.), supra note 8. 
81 Osmar, supra note 47 at paras. 23-25. 
  47 
accused was not in custody at the time the Mr. Big statements were made.  The Trial 
Judge outlined the defence argument as follows: 
 
77     As a result of answers to questions posed to police officers during their 
cross-examination on this voir dire, the accused argues that as a result of police 
conduct, which involved not only an extensive overt surveillance but also the 
employment of an undercover operation, that he was subjected to a situation akin 
to detention with the result that his right to silence and his right against self-
incrimination were denied. In particular, the accused alleges that he was openly 
followed by the police on a virtual 24 hour basis with the result that he claimed 
to be isolated from his friends and family members. In addition, because of the 
detailed description given out during a press conference on July 21, 1998, as to 
the suspect in the two murders, the police did everything but actually name him. 
Because of the intense surveillance the defence submits that Osmar was 
purposefully inflicted with emotional and psychological trauma, was effectively 
prohibited from finding work and was alienated from his friends and relatives, 
thereby being deprived of his right to liberty and security of the person.82 
 
 Defence counsel argued that the Mr. Big statements should be excluded pursuant 
to s. 24(2) as their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
Notably, although eventually dismissed as unpersuasive by the Trial Judge and the 
Ontario Court of Appeal in Osmar, the argument that being a murder suspect had made it 
difficult for the accused to find legitimate work appears to have been a factor in the 
wrongful conviction of Kyle Unger, who also was known to be a suspect in his 
community. 
 The Trial Judge in this case made a fairly comprehensive response to defence 
counsel’s argument with regard to the alleged breach of the right to silence under section 
7: 
 
79     As to whether the police conduct, including the use of trickery, deprived the 
accused of his constitutional right to silence and the right against self-                                                        
82 Ibid. at para. 77. 
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incrimination, the starting point in understanding the analysis of the right to 
silence, in the context of this case, is with the Supreme Court of Canada decision 
in R. v. Hebert where McLachlin J. stated that the right to silence does not apply 
in the pre-detention stage and does not affect the use of undercover officers prior 
to detention. The questioning of a suspect, who is not under arrest, although he 
has indicated that on the basis of legal advice that he does not wish to make a 
statement, does not violate the right to silence as guaranteed by this section. (See 
Regina v. Hicks [1990] 1 S.C.R. 120)83 
 
 One of the more interesting aspects of the Osmar judgment is its discussion not 
only of the section 7 right to silence as traditionally understood, i.e. being effective only 
when the accused is detained, but also of the principle against self-incrimination.  
Defence counsel attempted to bring this principle into play as described by the Trial 
Judge in the above-cited paragraphs 23, 24, 25 and 77.  Three judgments were relied 
upon by the defence at trial in its attempt to explicate the principle as it related to 
Osmar’s situation:  Lamer J.’s dissent in R. v. Jones84 Iacobucci J.’s judgment in R. v. S. 
(R.J.)85, and Iacobucci J.’s judgment in R. v. White86.   
 One might refer to the principle against self-incrimination, as described by the 
Canadian courts, as an amorphous and benign common law concept of some antiquity. 
Iacobucci J. described the principle against self-incrimination as: 
 
An overarching principle within our criminal justice system, from which a 
number of specific common law and Charter rules emanate, such as the 
confessions rule, and the right to silence, among many others; the principle can 
also be the source of new rules in appropriate circumstances.87 
  
                                                        
83 Ibid. at para. 79. 
84 [1994] 2 S.C.R. 229, 89 C.C.C. (3d) 353 [Jones cited to S.C.R.]. 
85 [1995] 1 S.C.R. 451, 96 C.C.C. (3d) 1 [S.(R.J.) cited to S.C.R.]. 
86 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417, 135 C.C.C. (3d) 257 [White cited to S.C.R.]. 
87 Ibid. at para. 44. 
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It is not surprising that defence counsel in Osmar’s case would attempt to rely on a 
broader principle against self-incrimination when attempting to exclude statements made 
by an accused when not detained, but ultimately the Trial Judge refused to recognize a 
broader protection against self-incrimination.  The Trial Judge noted that Iacobucci J. 
discussed the existence of the amorphous principle against self-incrimination in R. v. S. 
(R.J.) but even there he recognized that the specific section 7 right to silence as 
recognized in Hebert is only available when the accused is detained.  The pertinent parts 
of Iacobucci J.’s reasoning in this regard are quoted by the Osmar Trial Judge at 
paragraph 84: 
 
84     The principle against self-incrimination under Section 7 is closely linked to 
the concept of the right to silence. In this context Iacobucci draws on the analysis 
in Hebert. In discussing the limits of the principle, he writes at page 47: 
   
"In post Charter terms other limitations on the principle against self-
incrimination are also visible. The right to silence recognized in Hebert is 
not a free-floating right always available, but rather a right which has so far 
been linked to the concept of detention and moreover it is not a right which 
is absolute and capable of being discharged only by waiver."88 
 
 
 Furthermore, the Trial Judge responded to the argument about the violation of the 
principle against self-incrimination as follows: 
…… 
 
91     The current state of the law is that short of custodial interrogation (i.e. 
detention), the Section 7 rights of the accused, with respect to his right to silence, 
are not engaged. S. (R.J.) and White have not gone so far as to state that Section 7 
is engaged prior to detention, because they deal with the issue of state compelled 
testimony and the Section 7 rights of the accused against such self-incrimination 
are engaged at the point of compulsion. In the case of testimonial compulsion                                                         
88 Osmar (Ont. S.C.J.), supra, note 47 at para. 84. 
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this would be at the time of trial; whereas in the case of documentary or bodily 
compulsion, this could be before trial, at the point where the reports or bodily 
fluids are compelled. The principle against self-incrimination, if we are to accept 
the description by Lamer J. in Jones, is that it is not triggered until the individual 
and the state become adversaries in a proceeding. The principle, therefore, does 
not attach merely because the investigation has focused on the accused as a prime 
suspect. The principle or right attaches once the government initiates adversarial 
proceedings, whether by way of a formal charge, detention or where the adverse 
positions of the state and the accused have solidified. To extend the principle 
against self-incrimination, prior to the onset of adverse proceedings, would be an 
overreaching application of Section 7 Charter rights. Even Miranda in the U.S., 
which relied on the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination, refers to 
custodial interrogations as opposed to non-custodial interrogations at the police 
station.89 
 
 From the above quotation it seems clear that just as detention is required to give 
rise to the section 7 right to silence simpliciter, the “onset of adverse proceedings” is 
required to bring to life the principle against self-incrimination or alternately, a 
‘solidification’ of the adverse positions of the individual of the state.  It is submitted that 
the already nebulous definition of detention seems less uncertain than the even less well-
formed ‘solidification of adverse positions’ referred to here.   
 In any event, the Trial Judge dismissed the argument of defence counsel, who 
made substantially the same argument at the Ontario Court of Appeal, this time relying 
on the Supreme Court cases of R. v. Turcotte,90 R. v. Hodgson,91 and, again, R. v. White.92 
 As an initial statement of the law, the Court of Appeal noted that the weight of 
previous decisions favoured the admission of Mr. Big statements under both the 
                                                        
89 Ibid. at para. 91. 
90 2005 SCC 50, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 519 [Turcotte] 
91 Hodgson, supra note 60 
92 White, supra note 86. 
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common-law voluntariness rule, as well as the right to silence under section 7 of the 
Charter.93  They do, however, acknowledge the defence’s argument, describing it thusly: 
 
In an interesting argument, Mr. Campbell, on behalf of the appellant, argues that 
our understanding of the right against self-incrimination has evolved so that 
physical detention is no longer required to trigger the constitutionally protected 
right to silence.  Accordingly, he submits that the appellant’s statements to the 
police officers were inadmissible under the Charter.94  
 
Defence counsel made other arguments relating to expert opinion evidence but they will 
be considered in a different portion of this thesis. 
 After going through the facts of the case and the evidence presented at trial, the 
Court of Appeal again opined that the weight of the Canadian law on section 7 of the 
Charter would seem to be against excluding the statements made by Osmar.  However, 
they acknowledge the Appellant’s argument: 
 
[25]         Two decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada would seem to be 
insurmountable barriers to the success of this ground of appeal.  In R. v. Hebert, 
the Supreme Court of Canada held that the right to silence guaranteed by s. 7 of 
the Charter is not infringed by undercover police operations where the suspect is 
not detained.  Then, in R. v. McIntyre [1994] 2 S.C.R. 480, the court affirmed the 
application of Hebert in a Mr. Big-type case.  The appellant seeks to avoid the 
impact of these cases by arguing that more recent decisions of the Supreme Court 
have held that s. 7 is implicated whenever the state seeks to use self-
incriminating evidence by coercive methods.  He argues that trickery combined 
with elicitation can amount to coercion and that there is no requirement of 
detention.95 
 
 First the Court considered Hodgson, which, according to them, did not help the 
Appellant’s case.  The Court of Appeal  noted that Hodgson was not a Charter case and 
                                                        
93 Osmar (C.A.), supra note 8 at para. 3. 
94 Ibid. at para. 4. 
95 Ibid. at para. 25. 
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in fact the Supreme Court in that case cited portions of Hebert which seem to support the 
detention requirement: 
 
Admittedly, Hodgson was not a Charter case.  However, the court referred to and 
quoted from Hebert, including, at para. 22, this passage from p. 32 of Hebert: 
. . . one of the themes running through the jurisprudence on confessions is 
the idea that a person in the power of the state’s criminal process has the 
right to freely choose whether or not to make a statement to the police. 
This idea is accompanied by a correlative concern with the repute and 
integrity of the judicial process. This theme has not always been ascendant. 
Yet, its importance cannot be denied. It persists, both in Canadian 
jurisprudence and in the rules governing the rights of suspects in other 
countries.  [Emphasis added.]96 
 
Next the Court of Appeal considered White, in which the admission of statements made 
under statutory compulsion by a motorist at a roadside stop had been ruled to be contrary 
to section 7.   This case is important in that the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the 
existence of the principle against self-incrimination and its nature as “over-arching” and 
“emanating”.  However, the Ontario Court of Appeal further considered the necessity of 
the examination of the context of the contact between the state and the individual that is 
necessary to determine whether the right not to incriminate oneself has been violated: 
 
[32]         In White, Iacobucci J. examined four contextual factors that led him to 
find that use of statements made under statutory compulsion from provincial 
traffic legislation violated s. 7.  Those factors were [firstly] the existence of 
coercion, [secondly] an adversarial relationship producing “a context of 
pronounced psychological and emotional pressure” (para. 58), [thirdly] the real 
possibility of an unreliable confession to a person in authority “whose authority 
and physical presence might cause the driver to produce a statement in 
circumstances where he or she is not truly willing to speak” (para. 62), and 
[fourthly] abuse of power…97 
                                                         
96 Ibid. at para. 28. 
97 Ibid. at para. 32. 
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The Court of Appeal then goes on to find that there is no violation of the principle 
because there was little to no coercion involved in this particular incarnation of the sting, 
in which the target was actively seeking a job in the fictitious criminal organization.  In 
part the Court of Appeal relies here on previous findings made by the lower courts that 
the target was not as hard up to find employment as he claimed and that he was not as 
emotionally affected by the intense surveillance as he claimed.98 
 The Court of Appeal further found that although an adversarial relationship 
existed there was “no pronounced psychological or emotional pressure”99 in evidence 
such as to raise the second contextual factor identified by Iacobucci J. in White. 
 As far as the third and fourth factors are concerned, the Court of Appeal, in a 
curious move, appears to conflate them for no apparent reason: 
 
[36]         Finally, this example of the Mr. Big strategy does not contain the 
elements of a real possibility of an unreliable confession because of abuse of 
power by a person in authority.  There was no abuse of power.  The appellant 
was presented with an opportunity to obtain employment in a criminal 
organization, but he was not threatened or intimidated.  Even if it is possible to 
apply the White analysis to this case, the evidence and the findings of fact by the 
motion judge undermine any claim to a violation of s. 7.100 
 
It likely makes no difference whether abuse of power, the fourth consideration, is 
considered separately from the third consideration of whether or not a statement is 
reliable when made to a person in authority under circumstances where the authority and 
the physical presence of the receiver of the statement may result in an overborne 
                                                        
98 Ibid. at para. 34. 
99 Ibid. at para. 35. 
100 Ibid. at para 36. 
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unwillingness to speak.  That said, the conflation of the two issues does seem to detract 
from clarity in the analysis. 
 Having found that the contextual factors in White had not been present or 
sufficiently present in Osmar’s case, the Court of Appeal ruled that the police activity in 
the latter case did not violate the section 7 right to silence or, presumably, the larger 
principle against self-incrimination which still may operate when an accused is not under 
detention.   
 As far as Turcotte was concerned, its relevance was denied by the Court of 
Appeal because the issue it dealt with was whether or not an accused’s silence could be 
used against him at trial.  Osmar was ruled to be different because in that case the 
accused gave up his right not to speak.101 
 After having met defence counsel’s arguments with regard to Hodgson, White, 
and Turcotte, the Court of Appeal turned to what is clearly the controlling case in regard 
to the section 7 right to silence as it pertains to undercover operations in Canada: R. v. 
Hebert.  They cite the relevant passage: 
 
[41]         Justice McLachlin went on at p. 41 of Hebert to specifically address 
the issue raised by this case, the use of undercover police officers to elicit 
statements from a suspect who is not detained: 
Secondly, it applies only after detention. Undercover operations prior to 
detention do not raise the same considerations. The jurisprudence relating 
to the right to silence has never extended protection against police tricks to 
the pre-detention period. Nor does the Charter extend the right to counsel 
to pre-detention investigations. The two circumstances are quite different. 
In an undercover operation prior to detention, the individual from whom 
information is sought is not in the control of the state. There is no need to 
protect him from the greater power of the state. After detention, the 
situation is quite different; the state takes control and assumes the                                                         
101 Ibid. at para. 39. 
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responsibility of ensuring that the detainee’s rights are respected.  
[Emphasis added.] 
[42]         It may be that the right to silence recognized in Hebert could be 
extended to a case where the accused, although not in detention, was 
nevertheless under the control of the state in circumstances functionally 
equivalent to detention and equally needing protection from the greater power of 
the state.  But that is not this case.  This appellant was not under the control of 
the state nor was the context such as to require that he be protected from the 
greater power of the state.  The appellant’s assertion that elicitation and trickery 
are sufficient to require Charter scrutiny is not supportable by the authorities or 
by a reasoned extension of the principles in those cases.102  
 
The judgment in Hebert really does seem to close the door on a section 7 right to silence 
argument in Mr. Big cases as McLachlan J. clearly singles out undercover police 
operations as being exempt from its operation.  The Court of Appeal also cited the one 
paragraph-long Supreme Court case of R. v. McIntyre, which dealt with a set of facts 
somewhat similar to those in Osmar: 
 
[McIntyre] argues that his statements made to undercover police officers after he 
had been released but while he was still the subject of a murder charge are 
inadmissible under ss. 7 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. We share the view of the majority that the accused was not detained 
within the meaning of Hebert and Broyles. Furthermore, the tricks used by the 
police were not likely to shock the community or cause the accused’s statements 
not to be free and voluntary. The appeal is dismissed.103 
 
 
The Supreme Court’s ratio in McIntyre is not without its persuasive appeal, especially 
with regard to the right to silence and the detention factor.  However, we will argue later 
in this thesis that, in relation to tricks and community shock, its significance may be 
                                                        
102 Ibid. at paras. 41 to 42. 
103 [1994] 2 S.C.R. 480, 153 N.B.R. (2d) 161 at para. 1 [McIntyre (S.C.C.) cited to 
S.C.R.]. 
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seriously over-emphasized and its value as stare decisis highly overestimated in Mr. Big 
cases. The Ontario Court of Appeal then opined as follows: 
 
 
[47]         The entire court, including McLachlin J., sat on McIntyre.  The issue of 
detention cannot be regarded as obiter in that case.  I do not think it open to this 
court to reject the detention requirement for this aspect of the right to silence 
under s. 7.  I would not give effect to the appellant’s Charter argument.104 
 
 It is clear from Osmar that the section 7 right to silence and the nebulous principle 
against self-incrimination from which it emanates will be no defence against the 
admission of evidence in Mr. Big stings in Canada.  That said, there is no question that 
the principle against self-incrimination is ever-present in any case in which the state 
attempts to use an accused’s statements against him or her in court.  Furthermore, after 
reflection upon the corpus of jurisprudence relating to Mr. Big in Canada, one wonders 
exactly how far the undercover team would have to go in order to give rise to 
circumstances “functionally equivalent to detention” as referred to by the Ontario Court 
of Appeal in Osmar.105  For example, picture a target in a hotel room in downtown 
Vancouver, a city that may be unfamiliar to him.  He is behind a locked door, being 
questioned by a crime boss who, as far as the target knows, is functionally equivalent to 
Maurice Boucher of the Hells Angels or Vito Rizzuto of Cosa Nostra, and he knows the 
crime boss’s henchmen are nearby.  He has been repeatedly told that he can leave 
whenever he wants, but he may well have witnessed what appeared to be the violent 
beating or murder of an operative who has displeased the boss.  Answers are being 
                                                        
104 Osmar, supra note 8 at para. 47. 
105 Ibid. at para. 42. 
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demanded of him.  The question arises, if these are not circumstances functionally 
equivalent to detention, then what are? 
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CHAPTER FOUR – ABUSE OF PROCESS 
 
 Abuse of process, when examined as a distinct issue in the Mr. Big scenario, 
presents a much less abstract problem than that posed by the section 7 right to silence.  
As previously stated, most judges tend to consider abuse of process separately from the 
Charter right to silence although they seem to co-exist in the same legal space. 
 Interestingly, a perusal of the cases gives the reader the impression that abuse of 
process is the doctrine of law that gives an accused the best chance of successfully 
convincing a court/finder of law to exclude Mr. Big confession evidence.  All levels of 
courts agree that it is possible for an accused to do so.  Ironically, however, it may be in 
relation to abuse of process that one is struck by the most illogical pronouncements and 
palpable unfairness in the judicial considerations of the sting at both trial and appeal 
levels. 
 Defining the abuse of process argument in relation to the Mr. Big sting is a 
relatively straightforward affair.  The argument goes that police tactics in the sting are so 
inappropriate, extreme and distasteful that they wind up shocking the community, or, as 
some would modify that criterion, right-thinking or informed members of the community.  
The traditional remedy for an abuse of process under the common law is a stay of 
proceedings, however, as noted in R. v. Caster,106 this is no longer necessarily the case.  
At paragraph 13 of that case, the British Columbia Court of Appeal cited the Supreme 
Court of Canada: 
 
                                                        
106 2001 BCCA 633, 159 CCC (3d) 404 [Caster]. 
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[13]   The remedy for abuse of process was traditionally a stay of proceedings. 
With the convergence of the Charter and the abuse of process doctrine has come 
a recognition that the balancing of individual and societal interests requires a 
consideration of lesser remedies as well. In other words, a stay of proceedings is 
not the only appropriate remedy in cases involving both the integrity of the 
justice system and the rights of an individual accused. At para. 69 in O’Connor, 
supra, L’Heureux-Dubé J. explained: 
… It is important to recognize that the Charter has now put into judges' 
hands a scalpel instead of an axe -- a tool that may fashion, more carefully 
than ever, solutions taking into account the sometimes complementary and 
sometimes opposing concerns of fairness to the individual, societal interests, 
and the integrity of the judicial system.107 
  
Defence counsel, as a result of the above ruling, have the opportunity to seek less 
extreme remedies than a stay of proceedings in the murder cases in which Mr. Big Stings 
have almost exclusively been used.  However, success has been equally elusive whether a 
stay is sought or only an exclusion of evidence or even parts of evidence. 
 The current law of abuse of process in the Mr. Big context may have been 
canvassed most thoroughly and clearly by Allbright J. in the relatively recent case of R. v. 
Hathway.  Hathway had raised numerous arguments for exclusion of his confession in 
pre-trial motions but Allbright J. ruled that a voir dire would only be conducted in 
relation to the abuse of process argument.  Initially Allbright J. stated that the standard 
for determining whether or not an abuse of process had occurred, either at common law 
or under the Charter, would be that of a balance of probabilities.108 
 In paragraphs 133 to 135 and 138 of Allbright J.’s judgment, he lays out the 
salient Canadian jurisprudence as follows: 
 
[133]  The seminal case in Canada dealing with a consideration of abuse of                                                         
107 Ibid. at para. 13. 
108 Hathway, supra note 9 at para. 132. 
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process is the Supreme Court’s commentary in R. v. Jewitt, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 128. 
Commencing at page 131, the Court observed: 
Abuse of Process 
 
Before considering whether a stay of proceedings is a judgment or 
verdict of acquittal or tantamount thereto, it is necessary to determine 
whether, at common law, a discretionary power to stay proceedings in a 
criminal case for abuse of process exists, in the words of Laskin C.J. in 
Rourke v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 1021, as a means of “controlling 
prosecution behaviour which operates prejudicially to accused persons” 
(p. 1034). 
The inherent jurisdiction of a superior court to stay proceedings 
which are an abuse of its process was recognized in Canada as early as 1886, 
in the case of In re Sproule (1886), 12 S.C.R. 140. In recent years, however, 
uncertainty has clouded the question whether Canadian courts, apart from 
powers given to the Attorney General under s. 508 of the Criminal Code, 
have a discretion to stay proceedings for abuse of process. ... 
  
[134]  The Court further observed at pages 136‑137: 
It seems to me desirable and timely to end the uncertainty which 
surrounds the availability of a stay of proceedings to remedy abuse of 
process. Clearly, there is a need for this Court to clarify its position on such 
a fundamental and wide-reaching doctrine. 
... 
I would adopt the conclusion of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. 
Young [(1984), 40 C.R. (3d) 289] and affirm that “there is a residual 
discretion in a trial court judge to stay proceedings where compelling an 
accused to stand trial would violate those fundamental principles of justice 
which underlie the community’s sense of fair play and decency and to 
prevent the abuse of a court’s process through oppressive or vexatious 
proceedings”. I would also adopt the caveat added by the Court in Young 
that this is a power which can be exercised only in the “clearest of cases”.109 
 
                                                        
109 Ibid. at paras. 132 to 134. 
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 At paragraph 135 Allbright J. further adverted to the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
unanimous decision in R. v. Grandinetti in which Abella J. seems to affirm the 
appropriateness of an abuse of process inquiry in a case involving sophisticated 
undercover operations: 
 
36     There is no doubt, as the Court observed in Hodgson, at para. 26, that 
statements can sometimes be made in such coercive circumstances that their 
reliability is jeopardized even if they were not made to a person in authority. The 
admissibility of such statements is filtered through exclusionary doctrines like 
abuse of process at common law and under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, to prevent the admission of statements that undermine the integrity of 
the judicial process. The “abuse of process” argument was, in fact, made by Mr. 
Grandinetti at trial, but was rejected both at trial and on appeal, and was not 
argued before us.110 
 
Interestingly, Abella J. here seems to identify abuse of process as both a common law and 
a Charter doctrine without saying one is subsumed by the other. 
 At paragraph 138 of Hathway, Judge Allbright opined that “[t]hese two decisions 
[Jewitt and Grandinetti] of the Supreme Court of Canada provide the basic framework 
for consideration of whether, in the unique circumstances of this “Big Boss” sting 
operation, Project Erlina, the applicant has demonstrated an abuse of process.”111 
 From the above quotations, the abuse of process argument can arguably be 
reduced to a few points: firstly, it is a means for controlling prosecution behaviour which 
operates prejudicially to accused persons; secondly, courts have an inherent jurisdiction 
to stay proceedings which are an abuse of process; thirdly, an abuse of process occurs 
when actions that bring an accused to court violate fundamental principles of justice 
which underlie the community’s sense of fair play and decency; fourthly, proceedings                                                         
110 Grandinetti, supra note 2 at para. 36. 
111 Hathway, supra note 9 at para. 138. 
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that come about as a result of those actions are oppressive and vexatious; fifthly, the 
discretion should only be exercised in the clearest of cases; sixthly, abuse of process acts 
as a filter and can be argued in Mr. Big type cases. 
 However, what remains to be determined is what exactly the police or state agents 
have to do in order for an abuse of process to arise.  Allbright J. again cites the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the following passage: 
  
[143]            At the root of the matter before me is that allegation that the conduct 
of the authorities in Project Erlina amounts to an abuse of process such that it 
would shock the community. In considering the doctrine of abuse of process and 
its inherent tests (as articulated in R. v. Jewitt, supra), the Supreme Court of 
Canada, prior to its decision in R. v. Jewitt, commented upon the practical 
application of the abuse of process doctrine in a fashion relevant to this 
application. This commentary is found in R. v. Rothman  [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640. At 
pages 696‑697, Lamer J. offered the following observations on the principle: 
... Therefore the rules regarding the admissibility of statements by an 
accused to persons in authority may be enunciated in the following manner: 
 
 1. A statement made by the accused to a person in authority is inadmissible 
if tendered by the prosecution in a criminal proceeding unless the judge is 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that nothing said or done by any person 
in authority could have induced the accused to make a statement which was 
or might be untrue; 
        2. A statement made by the accused to a person in authority and tendered by 
the prosecution in a criminal proceeding against him, though elicited under 
circumstances which would not render it inadmissible, shall nevertheless be 
excluded if its use in the proceedings would, as a result of what was said or 
done by any person in authority in eliciting the statement, bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. 
I would emphasize that under the above mentioned second rule the 
judge is not exercising a pure discretion to exclude, as is the case under s. 
178.16(2) of the Criminal Code, and that his finding is to be dealt with in 
appeal as any other finding, subject to the differences and limits of the 
Appeal Court’s jurisdiction as defined by ss. 603 and 605 of the Criminal 
Code. 
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I hasten to say also that, if the second portion of the rule is not a true 
discretion, it is even less a blanket discretion given judges to repudiate 
through an exclusionary rule any conduct on the part of the authorities a 
given judge might consider somewhat unfortunate, distasteful or 
inappropriate. There first must be a clear connection between the obtaining 
of the statement and the conduct; furthermore that conduct must be so 
shocking as to justify the judicial branch of the criminal justice system in 
feeling that, short of disassociating itself from such conduct through 
rejection of the statement, its reputation and, as a result, that of the whole 
criminal justice system, would be brought into disrepute. 
 
The judge, in determining whether under the circumstances the use of 
the statement in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute, should consider all of the circumstances of the proceedings, 
the manner in which the statement was obtained, the degree to which there 
was a breach of social values, the seriousness of the charge, the effect the 
exclusion would have on the result of the proceedings. It must also be borne 
in mind that the investigation of crime and the detection of criminals is not a 
game to be governed by the Marquess of Queensbury rules. The authorities, 
in dealing with shrewd and often sophisticated criminals, must sometimes of 
necessity resort to tricks or other forms of deceit and should not through the 
rule be hampered in their work. What should be repressed vigorously is 
conduct on their part that shocks the community. That a police officer 
pretend to be a lock‑up chaplain and hear a suspect's confession is conduct 
that shocks the community; so is pretending to be the duty legal‑aid lawyer 
eliciting in that way incriminating statements from suspects or accused; 
injecting Pentothal into a diabetic suspect pretending it is his daily shot of 
insulin and using his statement in evidence would also shock the 
community; but generally speaking, pretending to be a hard drug addict to 
break a drug ring would not shock the community; nor would, as in this 
case, pretending to be a truck driver to secure the conviction of a trafficker; 
in fact, what would shock the community would be preventing the police 
from resorting to such a trick.112 
 
Allbright J.’s invocation of the above examples of acceptable and unacceptable police 
conduct from Rothman is a common hallmark of Canadian judgments in Mr. Big cases.  
Although the actual words “abuse of process” are not used anywhere by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Rothman, the case has become central in abuse of process                                                         
112 Ibid. at para. 143. 
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jurisprudence in Canada.  Especially important in that regard is the final paragraph cited, 
wherein the court avails itself of both metaphor and of concrete examples to make its 
point.   
 The judgment states that the job the police have in investigating serious crimes is 
no game.  It ought not to be and is not governed by the “Marquess of Queensberry rules”.  
The police are dealing with shrewd and sophisticated adversaries and the imposition of 
“the rule” upon them113 in their work will only hamper them.  In determining whether or 
not admission of a statement would bring the administration of justice into disrepute a 
court ought to consider all the circumstances of the proceedings, the manner in which the 
statement is obtained, existence and degree of a breach of social values, how serious the 
charge is and the effect the exclusion of the statement would have on the result of the 
proceeding.   
 It is submitted that it is worthwhile repeating these oft-quoted ideas in a slightly 
different form in order to de-familiarize them and make them amenable to fresh 
examination.114  
 The Supreme Court gives some concrete examples at the end of the cited passage 
as to what conduct would shock the community so much as to bring our system into 
disrepute: 
 
1. A police officer pretending to be a chaplain in order to get a suspect to confess 
 
2. A police officer pretending to be a lawyer in order to get a suspect to confess 
                                                         
113 i.e. the police 
114 Similarly, it is also submitted that it is useful to think about what exactly is meant by 
the metaphorical use of the term ‘Marquess of Queensberry rules’: actually, they are rules 
for boxing. 
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3. Injecting a diabetic with sodium pentothal, under the pretense that it is actually 
insulin, in order to get a suspect to confess 
 
 
Two other concrete examples, which are posited by the court as more than acceptable 
methods to elicit incriminating statements are 
 
4. A police officer pretending to be a hard drug addict in order to break a drug 
ring 
 
5. A police officer pretending to be a truck driver in order to secure the 
conviction of a trafficker 
 
These examples are referred to as being more than acceptable because the Supreme Court 
states quite clearly that it would in fact be exclusion of confession evidence in such cases, 
and obtained through such tactics, that would shock the community, not its admission.  
 ‘Community Shock’ is a standard phrase encountered in abuse of process 
jurisprudence.  So too is ‘dirty trick’.  The dirty trick is juxtaposed with what might be 
called normal tricks and acceptable deceitfulness.  The dirty trick was first defined by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Collins: 
 
        I would agree with Howland C.J.O. in Simmons, supra, that we should not gloss 
over the words of s. 24(2) or attempt to substitute any other test for s. 24(2). At least 
at this early stage of the Charter's development, the guidelines set out are sufficient 
and the actual decision to admit or exclude is as important as the statement of any 
test. Indeed, the test will only take on concrete meaning through our disposition of 
cases. However, I should at this point add some comparative comment as regards the 
test I enunciated in Rothman, supra, a pre‑Charter confession case dealing with the 
resort to "tricks", which was coined in the profession as the "community shock test". 
That test has been applied to s. 24(2) by many courts, including the lower courts in 
this case. I still am of the view that the resort to tricks that are not in the least 
unlawful let alone in violation of the Charter to obtain a statement should not result 
in the exclusion of a free and voluntary statement unless the trick resorted to is a 
dirty trick, one that shocks the community. That is a very high threshold, higher, in 
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my view, than that to be attained to bring the administration of justice into disrepute 
in the context of a violation of the Charter.115 
 
 
Clearly the dirty tricks question is part of the community shock doctrine first enunciated 
in Rothman.   
 Of course the fact that the abuse of process argument appears in most ways to 
have merged with section 7 of the Charter makes the law somewhat unclear on some 
levels.  However, this lack of clarity would seem to be functionally moot, as voir dire 
judges and appellate panels universally expend no time at all parsing the importance of 
L’Heureux-Dube J.’s judgment on this issue in R. v. O’Connor.  Canadian judges tend to 
focus only on what could be called the meatier questions of the existence of dirty tricks 
and resulting community shock.  In any event, what the case law does make clear is that 
the tactics used in Mr. Big stings do not meet the test prescribed to constitute an abuse of 
process, i.e. they do not violate the community’s sense of fair play and decency. 
 In the first chapter of this thesis many examples of the tactics used in Mr. Big 
stings were outlined.  Some of the tactics might at first glance seem to have the capacity 
to shock members of the Canadian community.  However, judges have never once ruled 
against the Crown and found the police to have played a dirty trick on a target. 
 Clearly the question of threats of violence perceived by the target is usually 
foremost in the mind of defence counsel in considering whether an abuse of process 
argument may be successful.  The continually occurring insinuations and implications to 
the target that the criminal gang is prone to violent and murderous solutions to protect its 
interests are major aspects of most operations.  The degree to which coercion and 
                                                        
115 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at para. 41 [Collins cited to S.C.R.]. 
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pressure are brought to bear on individual targets varies, but in those cases where they are 
used the police never seem to cross the line which would place them within the realm of 
community shock.  Of course the ‘violent scenario’ as we have termed it, is especially 
contentious in this regard. 
 The violent scenario, which, it has previously been noted, is also sometimes 
referred to as the “Toni scenario”, figures significantly in many abuse of process cases.  
Sometimes its implication/use is only referred to in the judgments, leaving the reader to 
guess at how intense it may have been and the effect it may have had on the target.  This 
was the case in R. v. Bonisteel.116   Some of the details given by Bonisteel to Mr. Big 
were argued by the defence to have been provided to him.117 Some of the details seem 
generic, e.g. his statement that there was a lot of blood; or unrealistic, e.g his assertion 
that he had stabbed the first of the two victims and left the knife in her for five minutes 
while the second victim made no attempt to escape.118  Bonisteel argued that he was 
fearful of being killed or hurt by ‘Buck’, the crime boss: 
 
[24]           The appellant testified that he made the false confession because he 
was afraid that Buck would harm him if he did not.  During cross-examination, 
Crown counsel asked the appellant why he did not deny killing the girls during 
the October 26 interview.  The appellant explained that he had already told Buck 
he had no involvement in the murders, but “Buck wasn’t listening to that, 
apparently. … The only thing Buck wanted to hear was what Buck wanted to 
hear, and that’s exactly what I told him.”  He said that Buck was a “dangerous 
guy”, and he was afraid he would be beaten or killed if he did not tell him want 
he wanted to hear.  Later in the cross-examination, the appellant said he was 
“well aware of the fact that … there’s some similarities between what happened 
to Toni … and what’s going on [with me and Buck] in that room.”119  
                                                         
116 Bonisteel, supra note 33. 
117 i.e. to Bonisteel. 
118 Bonisteel, supra note 33 at para. 23. 
119 Ibid. at para. 24. 
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In his appeal Bonisteel argued community shock.  The Court of Appeal disagreed: 
 
[90]           The Ontario Court of Appeal considered a similar argument in Osmar 
(at para. 48).  It referred to R. v. McIntyre, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 480, where the 
Supreme Court of Canada, in brief oral reasons, dismissed an appeal from the 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal, stating, among other reasons, that “[t]he tricks 
used by the police were not likely to shock the community or cause the accused’s 
statements not to be free and voluntary”.  Justice Rosenberg found that the 
decision of the Supreme Court in McIntyre directly met the appellant’s argument 
that the strategy employed by the police would shock the community, as the facts 
in McIntyre were no worse than the circumstances in Osmar yet the Supreme 
Court held they would not likely shock the community. 
[91]           There are aspects of this case that arguably may be “worse” than 
McIntyre and Osmar.  There was nothing in Rosenberg J.A.’s description of 
those undercover operations that included a beating such as was staged in the 
“Toni” scenario, nor is there any reference to significant financial inducements, 
such as the prospect of obtaining $80,000 after performing a job for the gang.  
[92]           Do those facts put this case in a different category – that of police 
tactics that shock the community?  I would say no.  The cases that have 
considered Mr. Big scenarios demonstrate a range of tactics.  In Roberts, for 
example, the undercover police, in the presence of the appellant, threatened a 
man and his pregnant wife (both undercover officers) with serious harm if they 
did not come up with a sum of money.  These tactics do not reach the “appalling” 
examples described in Oickle. 
[93]           I agree with Rosenberg J.A. who said in Osmar (at para. 48): 
I should not be taken as holding that the manner in which the Mr. Big 
strategy is executed could never shock the conscience of the community and 
lead to exclusion on common law grounds.  However, the facts of this case 
do not meet that test.120 
 
A few salient features can be drawn from the above citations.  Firstly, the police tactics 
identified earlier as the violent scenario and the payday promise definitely featured in 
Bonisteel’s case.  We don’t know how graphic and egregious the actual circumstances                                                         
120 Ibid. at paras. 90 to 93. 
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were. i.e. was there an actual fake beating witnessed by the target, was a gun pointed at 
the ersatz victim, were his or her children or spouses threatened, was he or she bound and 
gagged and/or thrown in the trunk of a car, et cetera?  We also know that 80,000 dollars 
were a “prospect” for Bonisteel. 
 We also see the British Columbia Court of Appeal making a comparison between 
the facts of this case and the facts in other Mr. Big cases.  This is a common feature of the 
judgments.  Bonisteel’s experience is ruled to be worse than those employed in McIntyre 
and Osmar but not as bad as those employed in Roberts.  Comparisons like these are 
expected and useful in a common law jurisdiction, but in the Mr. Big context they are of 
little practical value since no threshold for excluding Mr. Big evidence has ever been 
passed or even determined. 
 A final, and possibly most important feature to be commented on is the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal’s reliance on the judgment in R. v. McIntyre.121  This case was 
previously referred to in the above section dealing with the right to silence.  However, its 
import becomes much more contentious in a straightforward abuse of process argument.  
The unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada from McIntyre’s appeal as of 
right is indeed brief, only one paragraph long: 
  
GONTHIER J. ‑‑ The appellant argues that his statements made to undercover 
police officers after he had been released but while he was still the subject of a 
murder charge are inadmissible under ss. 7 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.  We share the view of the majority that the accused was not 
detained within the meaning of Hebert and Broyles.  Furthermore, the tricks used by 
the police were not likely to shock the community or cause the accused's statements 
not to be free and voluntary.  The appeal is dismissed.122 
                                                         
121 McIntyre (S.C.C.), supra note 103. 
122 Ibid. at para. 1. 
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 Many Mr. Big judgments cite this Supreme Court judgment as authority for 
rulings that Mr. Big does not run afoul of the Canadian abuse of process doctrine.  In our 
view, however, this is a questionable conclusion for the following reasons.   As 
previously stated, Mr. Big stings as they have come to be known today originated in 
British Columbia.  Specifically, the first case to reach the courts may have been R. v. 
Raza123 in 1998.  In this regard it is notable that McIntyre was a New Brunswick case 
with the sting itself occurring in 1990, roughly seven years before the ‘classic’ Mr. Big 
cases started in British Columbia. 
 All we know of the McIntyre sting comes from the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal judgment.  We know the operation was called Project Javelot.  We know that the 
accused was befriended by an undercover operator while in lockup.  Upon release he was 
again contacted by the undercover operator.  We know that he was made to believe he 
could join a criminal gang involved in tobacco, prostitution and guns as long as he could 
prove that he could kill if necessary.  We know he at first refused to talk about his past 
but ultimately admitted killing the victim.124 
 However, there are a number of aspects that appear to be different.  Most Mr. Big 
stings take a few months to unfold.  McIntyre confessed after ten days.  There is no 
evidence that any of the familiar scenarios were used on McIntyre.  Of real significance is 
the fact that we cannot tell from the Court of Appeal’s brief summary of the facts whether 
McIntyre was merely approached with the possibility of joining a gang or if he was, like 
targets in classic Mr. Big cases, given an ‘associate’-role from the start.  We don’t know 
                                                        
123 Raza, supra note 40.  
124 McIntyre (C.A.), supra note 79 at pp. 9-10 
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if he was given minor tasks like moving cars or depositing large sums of cash at a bank or 
being a lookout or a passive participant in a staged beating.  The overwhelming majority 
of Mr. Big targets are already enmeshed in what they believe to be criminal activity 
before they are pressured by Mr. Big to confess.  They have been paid handsomely for 
committing fake crimes, they are dependent on the gang, they have developed emotional 
bonds with the officers targeting them, they have literally been wined and dined, had new 
clothes purchased for them and promised an exciting and prosperous new life.  This is 
unlikely to have been the case with McIntyre as the whole operation targeting him 
apparently began on October 2, 1990 and ended on October 12 with his arrest.125  Classic 
Mr. Big stings, due to their generally longer time frames and greater sophistication, must 
obviously result in more pressure to confess being brought to bear on a target than may 
have been put on McIntyre. 
 All of the above being the case, it is arguably highly unsafe to rely on the one 
paragraph judgment of the Supreme Court as firm authority that Mr. Big stings should 
not generally be held to be an abuse of process.  Based on what we know about it, 
McIntyre should probably not be classified as a Mr. Big sting.  It should certainly not be 
relied upon as binding stare decisis for the proposition that Mr. Big stings are not subject 
to abuse of process arguments.  Unfortunately, a number of Mr. Big judgments have 
relied on it to admit evidence without taking into account any of the qualifications listed 
above.  These cases include R. v. Riley,126 R. v. Hart,127 R. v. French,128 R. v. 
                                                        
125 Ibid.  
126 2001 BCSC 1407, 52 W.C.B. (2d) 47 [Riley]. 
127 2007 NLTD 74, 265 Nfld. and P.E.I.R. 266 [Hart (voir dire)].  
128 French, supra note 79. 
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McCreery,129 R. v. Osmar,130 R. v. Terrico,131 R. v. Ashmore,132  R. v. Redd,133 and the 
previously cited R. v. Hathway.134 
 Besides Bonisteel, the use of the violent scenario was used and ruled by a voir 
dire judge not to be an abuse of process in O.N.E.135  The scenario was summarized as 
follows by E.R.A. Edwards J.: 
 
[33]   The targets had been briefly introduced to another undercover officer, M., 
during one of the feigned drug deals.  Subsequently, on January 28, 1999, K.K. 
pretended to be so angry with M., who he suspected of being a “rat”, that the 
targets were visibly disturbed and afraid he might be angry with them.  They 
were assured he was not. 
[34]   K.K. sent J.B. to get a “piece and muffler” [gun and silencer].  J.B. showed 
it to J.K. who was “scared” by it and told J.B., who also acted scared, that she 
hoped K.K. wasn’t going to use it.  J.B. then telephoned O.N.E. who was with 
K.K. and told her she had the “piece and muffler” which J.B. then delivered to 
K.K. 
[35]   K.K. took O.N.E. with him to meet M.  The gun was in the car with them 
in an envelope so O.N.E. never saw it, but realized what it was from J.B.’s call.  
K.K. told her to get out of the car and angrily told M to get in.  He then 
administered what appeared to O.N.E. to be a vicious beating to the supposed 
“rat” M, leaving him at the road side. 
[36]   O.N.E. told K.K. she was impressed with his apparent ability to beat the 
much larger M.  She told K.K. she had wrongly been accused of beating another 
inmate in an institution and would beat women for him if he had any qualms 
about doing so.  She told K.K. she would “take a bullet” for him. 
[37]   K.K. agreed on cross-examination this scenario was intended to show 
O.N.E. that the criminal organisation would resort to deadly force to deal with 
                                                        
129 33 W.C.B. (2d) 39, [1996] B.C.J. No. 2403 (S.C.) [McCreery S.C.]. 
130 Osmar (C.A.), supra note 8. 
131 Terrico, supra note 11. 
132 2011 BCCA 18, 267 C.C.C. (3d) 108 [Ashmore]. 
133 43 W.C.B. (2d) 62, 1999 B.C.J. 1471 (B.C.S.C.) [Redd]. 
134 Hathway, supra note 9. 
135 O.N.E., supra note 13. 
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persons who betrayed it and that O.N.E. might assume that she would be beaten 
if she “fucked around with”, that is, displeased him or S.D.136 
 
 
O.N.E. was 16 and 17 years old at the time the sting was run on her.  E.R.A. Edwards J.  
 
ruled as follows on the abuse of process issue: 
 
[75]   Defence counsel argued that the techniques used, when applied to a “young 
person” as defined by the Young Offenders Act, were such as to amount to an 
“abuse of process” which would “shock” the conscience of the community, that 
they violate s. 7 of the Charter and that the statements obtained using these 
techniques are therefore inadmissible. 
[76]   This argument has been rejected in cases involving the use of substantially 
similar undercover techniques, including USA v. Burns and Raffay [sic], (1997), 
117 C.C.C. (3d) 454, where the targets of the undercover operation were age 19. 
[77]   In Burns, Hollinrake JA quoted the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal 
in R. v. Roberts 147 W.A.C. 147 wherein Hall JA for the Court could “… discern 
no improper coercion or force applied by the [undercover] police to make [the 
target] confess” despite argument the “conduct of the police portraying 
themselves as hardened criminals prepared to make threats of death…[which] 
was calculated to and did terrify the [target] into making false statements about 
his criminal activity”. 
[78]   Hollinrake JA noted in Burns at paragraph 26 the appellants’ argument 
that “they were put in a situation that was designed to be coercive” by the 
techniques used by the undercover officers, but concluded “The judge found 
there was no duress.  In my view, the facts fall far short of supporting this 
submission of the appellants . . . it must fail as a ground of appeal.” 
[79]   The “facts” in Burns, that is the undercover techniques, were not 
qualitatively different from those used in this case.  If anything, they were 
objectively more coercive than those used in this case.  The same is true in 
Roberts. 
[80]   The only clear distinction between this case and Burns is the age of the 
target.  Here the accused was 16 to 17 at the relevant time.  The fugitive Burns 
was 19. 
[81]   To accept the submission of defence counsel that age is a critical                                                         
136 Ibid. at paras. 32-37. 
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distinction would be to promulgate a judge made rule that the type of undercover 
operation mounted in this case and many others is constitutionally impermissible 
where the target is a young person. 
[82]   The trial judge in Burns found that the undercover officers’ “conduct 
viewed objectively would not … shock the sensibilities of an informed 
community considering the brutality of the crime then under investigation and 
would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”  The Court of 
Appeal agreed.  I am unable to conclude that the age difference between O.N.E. 
and that of Burns transforms this case into one which would shock the 
sensibilities of the community. 
[83]   Defence counsel also relied on the fact the police knew the accused in this 
case was a “street kid” with a “horrendous” background of parental neglect and 
abuse. 
[84]   It does not follow that the community would be shocked by the police 
embarking on this undercover operation without evaluating in advance the 
likelihood the target might respond to undercover techniques by giving a false 
confession.  Reliability of the fruits of these undercover operations is a matter for 
determination at a trial in light of all the circumstances. 
[85]   The undercover operation in this case is indistinguishable on any principled 
basis from that used in many other cases.  I therefore find that the argument it 
amounted to an abuse of process violating s. 7 of the Charter fails.137 
 
 
Clearly the abuse of process argument failed utterly in this case.  However, the judgment 
does raise some issues.   
 Firstly, although the voir dire judge denies any legal relevance to O.N.E.’s under-
18 status, that view is definitely too simplistic.  There is no doubt that Canadian statutes 
and common law envisage a different procedure and a different application of the 
criminal law for accused persons under 18 years of age.  This indisputable fact 
undermines the trial judge’s statement that there is no principled basis for distinguishing 
the case of O.N.E. from those involving adult targets.  After all, what more principled 
basis could there be than the fact that the different treatment of youths by our criminal                                                         
137 Ibid. at paras. 75 to 85. 
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law is established by Parliament and has indeed been in effect since 1908 with the 
passage of the Juvenile Delinquents Act?138 
 Secondly, it is also an indisputable fact that, although it has recently been linked 
with or subsumed by section 7 of the Charter, the doctrine of abuse of process is, in a 
practical sense, entirely a common-law doctrine.  In determining the existence or absence 
of abuse of process Canadian judges refer only to stare decisis in their decisions.  They 
do not refer to the Criminal Code or any other statutory authority.  This fact serves to 
weaken any apparent motivation underlying the trial judge’s stated reluctance at 
paragraph 81 to “promulgate a judge made rule that the type of undercover operation 
mounted in this case and many others is constitutionally impermissible where the target is 
a young person.”  After all, we know the judge is entitled to evaluate community shock, 
and we also know that Canadian law clearly mandates that youths should be treated 
differently in criminal cases.  
 Another highly significant factor is the fact that O.N.E. is a case of first instance, 
i.e. this is the very first case in which a Mr. Big sting was used upon a youth as defined 
by the then operant but now repealed Young Offenders Act,139 or the present Youth 
Criminal Justice Act.140  This being the case, it seems somewhat miserly for a judge to 
decline to give any reasons for refusing to treat a young person differently than an adult 
offender in determining the existence of an abuse of process.  This is especially the case 
when one considers how mentally and emotionally manipulative the sting is, and 
juxtaposes that problematic state of affairs with the fact that the Young Offenders Act 
                                                        
138 R.S.C. 1970, c. J-3. 
139 R.S.C. 1985, c Y-1. 
140 S.C. 2002, c. 1. 
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specifically recognized that the mentality of young people in relation to crime is 
fundamentally different than the mentality of an adult.  Also, what if the target had been 
only twelve and thirteen or thirteen and fourteen years old at the time of the sting?  
Would that make any difference in determining whether the sting would be a dirty trick 
or shock the conscience of the community?  If so, why should the trial judge draw a line 
at O.N.E.’s age of sixteen and seventeen years?  Where should the line be drawn if not 
where it was drawn by Parliament: on an accused’s eighteenth birthday?   
 Of course, to give the Crown argument its due, it must be acknowledged that rules 
of evidence should in almost all cases apply equally to parties regardless of age.  
However, it is still maintained that it is significantly short sighted for a voir dire judge to 
refuse to take into account a target’s status as a youth in determining whether there has 
been an abuse of process.   
 As a final note, it bears mentioning that, contrary to what is stated in the 
judgment, the violent scenario was not used in Burns and Rafay, although it was used in 
Roberts.  Much more could be said about the very unique and interesting case of R. v. 
O.N.E., which, as far as one can tell, is not only the only first time Mr. Big was used on a 
child, it is also the only Mr. Big case which resulted in a verdict of not guilty being 
returned by a jury.   
 The violent scenario is probably the most contentious tactic used by the police in 
the Mr. Big sting.  Even so, its use has never been ruled to be an abuse of process.  
However, it does bear mentioning that it has received some obiter criticisms from the 
bench for its extreme nature.  Allbright J. in Hathway, opined as follows about the violent 
scenario used in that case: 
  77 
 
As this scenario was audio recorded, the best evidence is the recording itself as it 
displays the roles of all the participants and their demeanor. At no time during 
this scenario is any violence purportedly directed towards Mr. Hathway nor are 
any threats. His submissions relating to this scenario are to the end that the use of 
a firearm is inappropriate and extreme, and as his counsel has very ably argued, 
this scenario, if understood by the community at large, would be found to be 
shocking. I have carefully considered this scenario, albeit at this stage in 
isolation, and have concluded that while it is extreme and I too have concerns 
about the manner in which the firearm was used, particularly pointing it at two 
individuals, I am unable to say the community would find this scenario shocking. 
It has been utilized on other occasions and has not been found to be so deviant or 
violent that its use would offend the community to the level required for the 
demonstration of an abuse of process. Such does not end the potential impact, 
however, of this scenario as the applicant rightly contends that the entire 
operation must be examined, and this, of course, is a significant portion of that 
undercover operation.141  
 
In an earlier case, R. v. Smith142 Stewart J. remarked upon the “obvious stupidity” and 
“pervading unseemliness” of having the target assist in a violent scenario by applying 
force to an undercover officer in a staged execution termed “the boyfriend hit 
scenario”.143   
 In Canadian law, the violent scenario never shocks the conscience, and its use to 
impress, intimidate or instill fear in the target is never deemed a dirty trick.  More could 
be said about violent/execution scenarios and about threats and intimidation in general in 
Mr. Big stings being abuses of process.  That said, in the interest of brevity we now turn 
to another contentious issue in the abuse of process cases: the use of alcohol during the 
sting. 
 To those possessing even a passing familiarity with the criminal justice system, 
the ever-present and profound influence of alcohol on criminality in general is                                                         
141 Hathway, supra note 9, at para. 164. 
142 (January 15, 2003), Vancouver CC011596 (B.C.S.C.) [Smith]. 
143 Ibid. at para. 13. 
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undeniable.  Many, if not the majority of crimes that are examined before the courts, end 
up being found to be fuelled by alcohol.  Mr. Big stings often employ alcohol in the 
playing out of their scenarios.  Many Mr. Big targets have no particular problem with 
drugs and alcohol.  However, a large minority of the targets do have significant drug and 
alcohol addiction problems.  Not surprisingly, these are the targets who usually also have 
a criminal record.  Possibly the most compelling case with regard to alcohol is that of R. 
v. Cretney.144  Cretney was suspected of having murdered Moffat.  As usual, there was 
insufficient evidence linking him to the crime and a Mr. Big operation was planned: 
 
[6]  Cst. Rolfe and Cst. Neale travelled to Prince George and reviewed the 
available file material before preparing an operational plan for the undercover 
operation.  As a result of their review of available file material the R.C.M.P. were 
aware that the accused and Moffat had met while both were resident in a detox 
facility, that the accused had a problem with alcohol abuse, and that alcohol had 
been a factor in a somewhat stormy common-law relationship between the 
accused and Anna Smeds. 
  
[7]  The operational plan eventually put into effect contemplated an operation 
lasting 112 days and provided for in its budget a $1,500 allowance for liquor.145 
 
Clearly, the police were aware that Cretney had an alcohol addiction problem.  It is 
equally clear that, with fifteen hundred dollars to spend (in 1997 dollars!), the undercover 
operators were prepared to uncork as many bottles as it took to make sure the operation 
was a success. 
 The court summarized the police view as follows: 
 
[13] From the outset alcohol was a significant part of this operation.  The police 
officers in their evidence described it as a "prop" which served a number of 
purposes but was mainly intended to create a natural atmosphere in which the                                                         
144 [1999] B.C.J. No. 2875 (B.C.S.C.) [Cretney]. 
145 Ibid. at paras. 6 to 7. 
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undercover operator could pursue the development of a relationship which could 
lead to admissions which would assist the investigation. 
  
[14] The officers denied that there was any intention to use the accused's alcohol 
"problem" and exploit it to assist their investigation. 
  
[15] Alcohol was made available in hotel rooms and vehicles, in part to create the 
impression that these were criminals not police officers.  Cpl. Clark testified that 
the purpose was to add realism to their contacts and to convince the accused that 
if he was prepared to drink and drive he was obviously not a police officer.  It is 
obvious from some of the taped conversation that this desired affect was 
achieved in this case.  It is equally obvious that achieving a comfort level 
between the undercover operator and the target is a basic part of safeguarding the 
operator.146 
 
The court summarized Cretney’s view as follows: 
 
[16] The accused submits that in this case the R.C.M.P. utilized alcohol as an 
investigative aid and, in doing so, they failed to act in accordance with basic 
principles of decency and fair play.  He submits that condonation of the conduct 
of police officers in this case could bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. 
  
[17] The accused goes on to submit that the R.C.M.P. knew that alcohol played a 
major role in his life and that from some of the conversations with him, that he 
was struggling to deal with that problem, yet they persisted in providing him with 
alcohol and making it available to him.  The provision of alcohol to an alcoholic 
by an agent of the state pretending to be his friend, in the hope that he will 
confide in him, he submits, offends every notion of fair play and decency.147  
 
The court’s conclusion as to whether police conduct had offended principles of fair play 
and decency is set out in these terms: 
 
[28] In my respectful view, the accused has wholly failed in the circumstances of 
this case to establish conduct on the part of the undercover officers that offends 
the relevant principles.  I am satisfied on the evidence, and find that the use of 
alcohol in this investigation was nothing more than a prop which provided a part 
of the "entry point" for Cpl. Clark and a significant measure of protection for the                                                         
146 Ibid. at paras. 13 to 15. 
147 Ibid. at paras. 16 to 17. 
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officer by building his cover and credibility. 
  
[29] It is neither logical nor required in law that police officers investigating 
serious offences such as murder seek to convert their targets from their normal 
activities to afternoon tea and contract bridge parties.  Indeed, what will normally 
be required if undercover operations are to enjoy some opportunity for success is 
for the officer to seek to participate in the normal activities of the target.  What 
the officers did in this case is precisely that, in my view they did nothing more 
than set a stage on which they sought to act out their play in as real and 
believable a manner as they were able to do.  The provision of alcohol and their 
discussions concerning it amount to nothing more than the providing of 
opportunities to an accused who willingly took them. 
  
[30] If there is a line to be crossed which could result in exclusion based on the 
arguments advanced in this case it was not crossed in the present circumstances.  
The accused's application to exclude under s. 7 and 24 of the Charter fails.148 
 
 It is submitted that the Trial Judge’s conclusions in Cretney are somewhat short 
on reasoning.  As is sometimes the case in abuse of process decisions, a decidedly 
whimsical recourse to metaphor is employed, i.e. undercover operators cannot be 
expected to divert targets from their normal activities to “afternoon tea and contract 
bridge”.  Of course all we know of Cretney’s “normal activities” in this case is that he 
had resided in a detox centre in an attempt to overcome what must have been a serious 
alcohol addiction and that he had relationship problems because of his drinking.   
 The trial judge does not recognize alcohol, even fifteen hundred dollars worth of 
alcohol, as an investigative aid.  He only characterizes it as a “prop”, used for “setting a 
stage” and as an “entry point” for the officers to execute their investigation.  Of course 
what alcohol is, in addition to all that Parrett J. has defined it as, is a powerful drug that 
retards brain function, lowers inhibitions, and is well-known to cause people under its 
influence to do and say things which they would not do or say if they were sober.   
                                                        
148 Ibid. at paras. 28 to 30. 
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 The classic definition of abuse of process includes the concrete example of 
injecting a diabetic with sodium pentothal under the pretense that it is insulin in order to 
get a suspect to make an incriminating statement.  Of course alcohol addiction cannot be 
equated with diabetes and alcohol cannot be equated with sodium pentothal.  However, it 
is contended that the dismissal of alcohol as a “prop” used to set a stage may be 
disingenuous with regard to Mr. Cretney’s situation.  Alcohol is a drug that profoundly 
affects behaviour.  Somebody who goes into “detox” for alcoholism can be presumed to 
have experience with behavioural change as a result of alcohol abuse.  One might wish to 
know more about the extent to which alcohol was used in this case and why its use did 
not “cross the line”.  Of course, as in many cases, the relative dearth of facts in this six-
and-a-half-page-long judgment make that determination impossible.  How much did 
Cretney drink and was he drunk when he made incriminating statements?  We do not 
know. 
 R. v. Hathway149 has a more in-depth discussion of alcoholism.  Either the defence 
in this case made a more nuanced and comprehensive argument on the subject or the 
Trial Judge decided to address it more fully in his reasons, or both.  At paragraph 41 of 
the judgment, the Trial Judge notes that “in the early stages [of the sting], Mr. Hathway 
advised Constable Chubbs [the primary undercover operator] that he was a recovering 
alcoholic”.150  Hathway argued that it was an abuse of process for the undercover team to 
have used alcohol in the sting as they did.  At paragraph 130, the Trial Judge summarized 
Hathway’s position as follows in relation to alcohol: 
                                                          
149 Hathway, supra note 9. 
150 Ibid. at para. 41. 
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 The applicant, prior to encountering the undercover operative, had gained control 
of his alcohol consumption; however, after becoming involved with the 
operative, he was provided with alcohol and the means to obtain alcohol on a 
continual basis, adding to the psychological dependence of the applicant on the 
undercover operatives and becoming more susceptible to their influence. This 
conduct of providing alcohol to an individual known to be a recovering alcoholic 
amounted, in and of itself, to an abuse of process. Consumption of alcohol, 
particularly the “fireball”, occurred routinely and was part of virtually every 
scenario. 
 On February 27, 2004, the applicant was tasked with driving a vehicle from the 
coast to Kelowna, and the undercover operative knew or ought to have known 
that he would consume alcohol. On that occasion, the applicant rear‑ended a 
truck operated by another individual and caused damage in excess of $5,000 to 
both vehicles. 
It is the position of the applicant that the undercover operatives either knew (and 
perhaps facilitated) or at least were wilfully blind to the consumption of alcohol 
while operating motor vehicles and thus ultimately allowed him to commit what 
would be a Criminal Code of Canada offence on February 27, 2004. 
…….. 
The undercover operative failed to enforce the provincial statutes of British 
Columbia when Mr. Hathway consumed alcohol in a motor vehicle.151 
 
The primary undercover operator, Chubbs, denied knowingly allowing Hathway to 
operate a motor vehicle while impaired.152   
 In his analysis, Allbright J. gives the following analysis of the role of alcohol in 
the sting: 
 
[165]            The constant theme throughout the undercover operation was the 
consumption of alcohol by Mr. Hathway. His ability to purchase this alcohol was 
either funded by the undercover operation or provided directly to him in social 
settings or in lounge settings. Mr. Hathway has testified that he was managing his 
alcohol issue well at the time of becoming involved in the operation and contends 
that it was highly inappropriate for the undercover operatives to use alcohol as a 
repeated tool in the investigation. There are few judicial pronouncements on the 
propriety of an undercover operation using alcohol, and those limited comments                                                         
151 Ibid. at para. 130. 
152 Ibid. at para. 131. 
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do not suggest that such a use amounts to an abuse of process. Here the applicant 
contends, however, that these pronouncements deal with the effect of giving 
alcohol to a “currently and practising” alcoholic rather than using them, in this 
instance, where the individual in question has been making significant attempts 
to either control or abstain from the use of alcohol. In considering the total 
picture and the impact of alcohol, I am led to the conclusion that Mr. Hathway 
had a choice whether he would or would not consume alcohol, and that he 
exercised the choice to do so. During his testimony, he demonstrated a mature 
and articulate understanding of the issue of personal choice in the use of alcohol, 
and the evidence on the scenarios is to the effect that alcohol was consumed by 
choice. As other courts have commented upon, the criminal organization might 
well be expected to reflect alcohol consumption in its members and simply to the 
extent alcohol was utilized could not be said to be a point of vulnerability to the 
operation. That would, however, not be the case were undercover operatives 
aware of the fact that the target individual was consuming alcohol to such an 
extent that that individual’s mental faculties were influenced in a way that would 
be considered unfair or unscrupulous. In considering the role that alcohol played 
in the videotaped meeting with “the Big Boss”, it is not at all  apparent that there 
was an abuse of alcohol as a prop either by its simple usage or its 
overconsumption. Were there evidence before the Court that Mr. Hathway was a 
reluctant participant in the consumption of alcohol and that it was only after a 
period of persistent pressure that he conceded to the use of alcohol, the 
complexion of the role of alcohol might be viewed differently. However, as I 
have indicated, I am not persuaded that the use of alcohol in the various scenarios 
was excessive or such as to amount, in and of itself, to an abuse of process. 
[166]            The applicant also contends that undercover officers were aware of 
his overconsumption of alcohol and allowed him nonetheless to participate in 
activities such as driving a vehicle when he clearly ought not to have been doing 
so. In considering this aspect, I accept the evidence which has been provided to 
me to the effect that access to alcohol provided to Mr. Hathway was in limited 
quantities and that he was not placed in a position of driving a vehicle when 
undercover officers knew that he ought not to be. Again, as an example, it was 
Mr. Hathway who chose to consume alcohol on the drive from Vancouver to 
Kelowna, leading to the automobile accident.153 
 
 Allbright J.’s reasoning here is more fully fleshed out than in other Mr. Big cases 
in which alcohol played a major factor.  Clearly he found on the facts before him that the 
use of alcohol did not amount to an abuse of process in Hathway’s case, but he did make 
what seems a reasonable observation that a persistent pressure to use alcohol placed on an                                                         
153 Ibid. at paras. 165 to 166. 
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abstaining alcoholic could cause alcohol’s role to be viewed differently in one of these 
stings. 
 Of course one of the most significant factors in Allbright J.’s finding may well be 
the fact that there was very little alcohol consumed at the time of the confession itself.  
This may not have been the case in a British Columbia judgment, R. v. Raza.154 The facts 
surrounding alcohol consumption in Raza are far from exhaustively detailed in this 
judgment, but from what is available it seems to have been the case that the target 
Oliveira was brought to a Radisson hotel room in order for him to have an interview with 
the crime boss.  Defence counsel argued that “Mr. Oliveira was encouraged to drink 
excessive quantities by the undercover operators. Investigators were unable to account for 
the amount consumed, as they usually do.”155  This apparently had something to do with 
a delay in recording equipment installation: 
 
The Crown acknowledges that more alcohol was consumed than was desirable 
before the Radisson scenario involving Mr. Oliveira.  The Crown argues, 
however, that the evidence does not support a finding of intoxication.  Further, 
more alcohol was consumed than otherwise would have been the case because of 
the necessity of awaiting the installation of listening devices in the Radisson 
Hotel.156 
 
 The above quotes do not really help in determining the level of intoxication of 
Oliveira, however it does seem that the question of whether or not Oliveira had attained a 
level of what might be called ‘actual drunkenness’ was in issue in this case.   In any 
event, the statements made by Oliveira were ruled admissible.  At paragraph 80, the Trial 
Judge, Josephson J., cited a previous judgment of the British Columbia Supreme Court:                                                         
154 Raza, supra note 40. 
155 Ibid. at para. 64. 
156 Ibid. at para. 68. 
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[I]n R. v. Peterffy, [unreported] April 1, 1998, Courtenay Registry (B.C.S.C.), 
Callaghan J. dealt with the issue of intoxication by an accused making an 
inculpatory statement during a "scenario".  At p. 4 he stated: 
 
I do not find on the evidence that the accused was intoxicated, but even if 
he was, his intoxication would not affect the admissibility of these 
statements. Truthfulness, discrepancies, or exaggeration in the admissions 
of the accused go to the undercover officers caused by the imbibing of 
alcohol go to weight rather than to admissibility, and accordingly are 
matters properly left for the jury to weigh and consider.157 
 
The use of alcohol was ruled not to be capable of shocking the community.  In his 
conclusion at paragraphs 87 and 88, Josephson J. stated: 
 
With respect to the impact of alcohol consumption before and during inculpatory 
statements on the reliability of those statements, the jury is capable of 
understanding (i) the role played by the undercover operators in encouraging and 
permitting the consumption of alcohol by the accused; (ii) the failure of police to 
keep an account of the liquor consumed during the "Skyline" and "Radisson" 
scenarios; (iii) the assessment of opinion evidence of the undercover operators 
regarding the degree of sobriety of the accused persons; and (iv) the assessment 
of inferences to be drawn regarding sobriety from the conversations that took 
place. 
  
The proposed evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted. It's [sic] probative 
value exceeds its prejudicial effect. The evidence was not gathered in "an abusive 
fashion", nor would its admission as evidence constitute an abuse of process or 
render the trial unfair. In the circumstances, informed members of the community 
would not be shocked by the conduct of police in the investigation of this alleged 
crime.158  
 
 Clearly the use of alcohol in Mr. Big stings in Canada will not be found to be a 
dirty trick capable of shocking the conscience of the community.  In the interest of 
brevity, no more cases will be cited, however, as a closing observation one wonders how 
much worse things might have to get before a judge could be convinced that giving an                                                         
157 Ibid. at para. 80. 
158 Ibid. at paras. 87 to 88. 
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alcoholic alcohol in a Mr. Big sting is a bad idea, if not actually an abuse of process. 
Hathway, for example, was definitely driving a car because he was told to do so by 
Chubbs the primary undercover operator.  Hathway claimed Chubbs knew or ought to 
have known he was impaired.  Chubbs denied this.  Hathway got into an accident.  
Nobody was hurt, but if somebody had been injured or killed as a result of Hathway’s 
drunk driving, one wonders what effect this might have had on the conscience of the 
community and the conduct of future Mr. Big stings.159 
 A final and doubly unique case to be discussed in the abuse of process section of 
this thesis is that of R. v. Proulx.160  Proulx is highly significant to a study of Mr. Big 
because it is the only Canadian case to consider in any detail the law of the United 
Kingdom as it pertains, or might pertain, to these types of undercover operations.  In fact 
the sting was conducted entirely within the United Kingdom, by Canadian police officers, 
but under the strict supervision of British law enforcement.  
 As far as abuse of process is concerned,161 Proulx is unique in that undercover 
operators in this case worked towards breaking up a relationship in order to get the 
confession they were looking for: 
 
[12]   A feature of this operation resulted from the fact that Proulx was engaged 
to a young British woman and was living in her family’s home.  He disclosed to 
W. that he felt trapped by that relationship, was unhappy in it, but could not                                                         
159 Another case in which alcohol played a very large role is Griffin, supra note 10.  The 
target was described as a heavy drinker, capable of consuming over twenty ounces of 
vodka at a sitting with the undercover operators.  That said, drunkenness was not ruled to 
be a significant factor in that case. 
160 2005 BCSC 184, 29 C.R. (6th) 186 [Proulx]. 
161 R. v. Proulx is one of those Mr. Big judgments in which the words “abuse of process” 
do not appear, and from which it cannot be determined if abuse of process was actually 
pleaded.  However, abuse of process language is used and shocking the community is 
clearly the issue. 
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extricate himself because he had little money and nowhere to go. 
[13]   W. and the other undercover officers were of the view that the control 
Proulx’s fiancé had over him was interfering with their operation.  They decided 
to work on breaking up that relationship, or at least distancing Proulx from his 
fiancé.  They brought in a second British policewoman undercover who acted as 
if she might be interested in Proulx. 
[14]   W. acted in such a manner as to demonstrate that he did not let his woman 
push him around and neither should Proulx.  He held out the prospect of financial 
gain and a good life for Proulx if he became part of their organization.  W. made 
it clear to Proulx that if Proulx were to join them he would be checked out by a 
person superior to W. in the organization, a man called “Mack” who resided in 
Canada. 
[15]    The undercover officers were good actors.  Proulx fell for the story.162 
 
This tactic was apparently objected to by the defence, but the trial judge, Williamson J., 
disagreed: 
 
[44]   The suggestion that somehow it was unacceptable for the undercover 
officers to interfere not only with the actions of Proulx, but of his then girlfriend 
by deliberately manipulating things so that he would leave her, thus enabling 
them to have more access to him, falls when one notes that it was Proulx himself 
who volunteered that he was unhappy in the relationship and wished to get out of 
it, but could not for what appeared to be principally economic reasons.163 
 
This would seem to be the only case in Canadian Mr. Big jurisprudence where such a 
tactic was employed and as such it cannot be subject to criticism on the grounds of stare 
decisis.   
 That said, the tactic does not seem entirely tenable from a logical or ethical 
perspective.  Spousal relationships, as well as the relationships between sweethearts or 
lovers, are certainly well known for, arguably defined by, the fact that they are difficult to                                                         
162 Ibid. at paras. 12 to 15. 
163 Ibid. at para. 44.   
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maintain and prone to instability.   Probably nobody would argue against the proposition 
that many, if not most, of the participants in a long-term relationship at one time or 
another feel dissatisfied and consider leaving the partnership.  It is a fairly universal and 
common experience.  This being the case, it seems somewhat harsh for a judge to opine 
that a Mr. Big target’s expression of dissatisfaction with his partner triggers a right on the 
part of the police to try and break up his relationship in order to achieve their goal of 
gathering evidence.  This is more a Soviet-style State Security trick than a Canadian 
undercover police tactic.   
 In any event, Williamson J. ruled that the tactic was not shocking: 
 
[52]   I am satisfied, as was Mr. Justice Hall in the Roberts case cited above, that 
a reasonable, dispassionate person in this country, aware of the circumstances 
surrounding this case, would not consider the activities of the undercover police 
officers shocking.  What happened here is hardly so grossly unfair as to repudiate 
the values underlying our trial system.  I conclude the statement is admissible.164 
 
 As previously stated, Proulx is a case of first instance with regard to what we 
might term “the break-up scenario”.  This being the case one can now only conclude that 
it is permissible for undercover police to attempt to break up relationships between 
targets and their partners, spouses, boyfriends or girlfriends; provided the target expresses 
dissatisfaction about his relationship. 
 In conclusion, the abuse of process argument has never been successful in 
Canadian courts when put forward by the defence in Mr. Big cases.  Obviously, it is 
contended in this thesis that judgments in relation to this doctrine have sometimes been 
wrongly decided or simply not thought through all the way to their logical conclusions.  It 
                                                        
164 Ibid. at para. 52. 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is submitted that probably the biggest single legal error made is judicial over-reliance on 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s one-paragraph decision in R. v. McIntyre165 as firm 
authority for concluding that Mr. Big sting evidence does not shock the community.  
There is simply not enough information available from the law reports to determine 
whether this New Brunswick case is a Mr. Big case or not.  It likely would not be, since 
the sting occurred in 1990, roughly five or six years before the classic Mr. Big stings 
began to be implemented in British Columbia.  That said, it would probably be necessary 
to review the transcripts and the court file to make an accurate determination. 
 Although they have failed, abuse of process arguments are likely to continue to be 
made in Mr. Big cases.  This is so because, unlike the common law involuntariness 
argument, which is universally held to be absolutely foreclosed because of the lack of a 
person in authority, the abuse of process argument has been ruled to be capable of 
succeeding under the right circumstances.  Rosenberg J.A., for example, for a unanimous 
Ontario Court of Appeal, stated that “I should not be taken as holding that the manner in 
which the Mr. Big strategy is executed could never shock the conscience of the 
community and lead to exclusion on common law grounds”.166  The British Columbia 
Court of Appeal has recently cited this statement with approval.167  Of course there is also 
the fact that The Supreme Court of Canada in Grandinetti, which was definitely was a 
Mr. Big case, ruled unequivocally and specifically that abuse of process can act as a filter 
in such cases.  So targets and defence counsel can at least be thankful for small mercies. 
 
                                                        
165 Mcintye (S.C.C.), supra note 103. 
166 R. v. Osmar (C.A.), supra note 8 at para. 48. 
167 R. v. Bonisteel, supra note 33 at para. 93.  
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CHAPTER FIVE – EXPERT EVIDENCE 
 
 In some resepects, expert evidence may be the area of criminal evidence least 
susceptible to overlap with other areas of evidence in the Mr. Big context.  It appears to 
have little to do with the Charter, with common-law voluntariness or with abuse of 
process.  On the other hand, one should not lose sight of the fact that social science 
research was cited extensively by the Supreme Court of Canada in their ruling on 
voluntariness in R. v. Oickle.168  Furthermore, expert evidence has also been ruled 
admissible in some cases, at the instance of the defence, and even in one of the rare cases 
resulting in an acquittal. 
 Of course the major difference in an examination of this area of the law of 
evidence is that while in all of the other areas defence counsel is arguing against 
admission of evidence and crown counsel is arguing for inclusion, in the case of expert 
evidence it is the defence who is arguing for admission while the crown is opposed.  An 
examination of the cases shows that the defence is almost as unsuccessful in its 
endeavours to call expert witnesses to the stand as it is in its efforts to have confessions 
excluded.  That said, as mentioned above, there is definitely some degree of success in 
this area.  Nevertheless, as a general rule defence counsel do not attempt to lead expert 
evidence in Mr. Big cases.  The reasons underlying the relative lack of attempts to do so 
are open to speculation. It may be that, given the impecunious state of most targets, there 
are concerns about expense involved in the decision not to call or try to call an expert 
witness. 
                                                        
168 Oickle, supra note 57. 
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 The leading case on the admissibility of expert evidence in Canada is R. v. 
Mohan.169  Sopinka J. states the law of admissibility of expert evidence briefly at page 
20: 
 
Admission of expert evidence depends on the application of the following 
criteria: 
(a) relevance; 
(b) necessity in assisting the trier of fact; 
(c) the absence of any exclusionary rule; 
(d) a properly qualified expert.170 
 
Although all four of these factors are required to be met by the party attempting to 
introduce expert opinion evidence, in reality the first two factors, relevance and necessity, 
are the only contentious ones in the Mr. Big cases.   
 Sopinka J., who delivered the judgment of the Court in Mohan, defines these two 
concepts relatively succinctly at pages 20 to 25 of that judgment.  Relevance is defined 
by Sopinka J. as generally consisting of a cost benefit analysis: is the cost of admitting 
the evidence more than it is worth to the administration of justice?  Furthermore, he 
defines relevance in the context of expert evidence as being something more than simple 
logical relevance; rather it is legal relevance that is most important to determine.  The 
questions that the trier of law needs to ask him or herself is whether or not the expert 
evidence has the potential to confuse or mislead the trier of fact, or take up too much 
time, or be given too much weight out of deference.  In short, will it distort the fact-
finding process, i.e. cost more than it is worth?171 
                                                        
169 Mohan, supra note 63. 
170 Ibid. at page 20. 
171 Ibid. at pages 20-22. 
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 Necessity, as Sopinka J. defines it, is the determination of whether or not the 
expert opinion evidence proffered is truly necessary in order for the trier of fact to reach 
the proper conclusion in the case.  The trier of law must determine whether the subject 
matter of the expert opinion evidence is of such a complex or arcane or specialized nature 
that the trier of fact requires help in order to understand it and understand it correctly.  It 
appears as though this determination ought to be made on a balance of probabilities, as 
Sopinka J. cites earlier authority in stating that the evidence should be admitted only if its 
lack would cause ordinary people to be “unlikely to form a correct judgment”.172  In 
essence the trial judge as trier of law here engages in a limited pre-determination of the 
weight of the evidence before deciding whether it should be placed before the jury or him 
or herself as evidence for consideration. 
 As was the case with regard to abuse of process in Mr. Big cases, the leading 
judgment in this area is arguably the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. 
Osmar.173  The Court Of Appeal summarized the trial judge’s ruling on the issue of 
expert evidence as follows: 
 
[20]         Dr. Richard Ofshe is a social psychologist and a leading expert on the 
phenomenon of false confessions.  His work was referred to by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in R. v. Oickle 2000 SCC 38, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321.  The defence 
sought to call Dr. Ofshe to testify about the reasons that suspects falsely confess 
and the proper method of evaluating the reliability of a confession.  On a voir 
dire, Dr. Ofshe explained that, where the reasons not to confess are sufficiently 
reduced by making the suspect believe that resistance is hopeless and that some 
advantage may come from confession, both the likelihood of confession and the 
risk of false confession will rise.  It may eventually become attractive to a 
suspect to admit a crime.  Dr. Ofshe had not studied the Mr. Big strategy but 
believed that his analysis of statements to known persons in authority could be 
adapted to the Mr. Big method.  He testified that the inducements held out to the                                                         
172 Ibid. at page 23, emphasis added. 
173 Osmar (C.A.), supra note 8. 
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appellant were similar to the inducements held out in normal police 
interrogations.  
[21]         Dr. Ofshe also pointed out that, while the phenomenon of false 
confessions is very well known to social psychologists, most people presume that 
innocent people will not confess falsely.  Finally, he testified that the way to 
evaluate the reliability of the confession is to compare the details in the 
confession with the facts of the murder not given to the suspect by the police.  He 
also testified about the danger of contamination in this case, that is, the risk that 
details of the killings as conveyed to the undercover police officers by the 
appellant came from the investigating officers who had earlier interrogated him. 
[22]         The trial judge held that Dr. Ofshe’s evidence was not admissible as it 
did not meet the test for admission of expert evidence. The trial judge held that 
evidence was neither relevant nor necessary. I will expand on Dr. Ofshe’s 
evidence when I deal with the ground of appeal relating to the exclusion of his 
evidence.174 
 
Although this is merely a brief précis of the situation in a particular case, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in this passage touches on three major points besides necessity and 
relevance in relation to expert evidence.  Firstly, they refer to what might be termed the 
‘upside versus downside’ dynamic evident in most Mr. Big cases.  Secondly, the 
existence of a bias or presumption among laypersons that innocent people will not falsely 
confess is posited.  Thirdly, the court acknowledges the reliance upon social science 
evidence by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Oickle, and particularly upon Dr. 
Ofshe’s own work. 
 Although not entirely unsympathetic, as we shall see, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
ultimately upheld the trial judge’s decision to exclude Dr. Ofshe as a witness.  Rosenberg 
J.A. describes Dr. Ofshe as a social psychologist who has engaged in years of study of 
police interrigation methods.  He further notes Dr. Ofshe’s familiarity with the court 
system as an expert witness and the fact that he has authored many works in the area of 
                                                        
174 Ibid. at paras. 20-22. 
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false confessions.  He also notes that Dr. Ofshe has done no study of the Mr. Big sting 
specifically.175 
 Rosenberg J.A. also noted that Dr. Ofshe proposed to testify on three separate but 
related topics.  Firstly, he proposed to testify as to the existence of the belief among 
laypeople that an innocent person would not falsely confess to a crime he had not 
committed.  Secondly, he proposed to testify as to what might motivate a person, guilty 
or innocent, to confess having committed a crime to a person in authority.  The third topic 
on wich Dr. Ofshe would testify was how to evaluate whether or not a confession was 
false.176  The Ontario Court of Appeal continued: 
 
 [57]         As to the first theme, unfortunately Dr. Ofshe did not provide any 
information as to why lay people, such as jurors, have difficulty believing that an 
innocent person would confess to a crime they did not commit.  I note, however, 
that the Supreme Court recognized this phenomenon in Oickle at para. 34: 
In this context, it may seem counterintuitive that people would confess to a 
crime that they did not commit. And indeed, research with mock juries 
indicates that people find it difficult to believe that someone would confess 
falsely. 
[58]         Since Dr. Ofshe did not provide any information as to why people have 
difficulty believing innocent people will falsely confess, it is unclear whether the 
information he could provide on that issue, gained from examining confessions 
to people known to be persons in authority, would be of any value in the different 
context of a confession to an undercover officer.  I will return to this issue when I 
consider the admissibility of the evidence. 
[59]         As to the second theme, Dr. Ofshe spoke at length about how police 
interrogators persuade suspects to confess.  Again his work in this area relates to 
interrogations by people the suspect knows to be police officers.  He focused in 
particular on the use of motivators.  Low-end motivators, such as suggesting to 
suspects that they do the right thing, are unlikely to make an innocent person of 
normal mental make-up confess.  Rather, it is only powerful motivators involving 
psychological coercion that are likely to lead to a false confession.  He explained 
that police interrogators will describe the justice system to the suspect in such a                                                         
175 Ibid. at para. 55. 
176 Ibid. at para. 56. 
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way that even an innocent person may be persuaded that it makes sense to 
confess to minimize punishment.  This can be enough to overcome innocent 
persons’ obvious reluctance to admit to a crime and place themselves in jeopardy 
from the formal justice system.  One way this strategy works is by setting up 
alternatives.  The suspects are told that if they continue to deny their involvement 
they will be charged (in the United States) with capital murder and executed, but 
if they agree to what the interrogator thinks happened, for example a killing in 
self-defence, then the punishment will be less. 
[60]         Dr. Ofshe testified that in an undercover operation like the Mr. Big 
strategy the possibility of being punished for confessing falls to zero since the 
suspect perceives the situation as one in which the state is not involved.  As he 
said:  “The significant question would be what’s the motivator that is being 
offered to elicit the compliance.  If the motivator is strong, if there is a powerful 
inducement, then depending on the power of that inducement, the risk of possibly 
eliciting a false confession goes up.”  He considered the Mr. Big strategy to be a 
potentially dangerous one because there is no downside to making the claim of 
involvement in criminality. 
[61]         Finally, Dr. Ofshe testified that the way to test whether a confession is 
true or false is to compare the information provided by the suspect with the 
known facts.  If the confession demonstrates actual knowledge of the crime that 
can be confirmed and is known only to the police and the actual perpetrator, it is 
likely to be true.  Thus, “errors” by the suspect in describing the crime are 
significant.  He also testified that contamination is a very serious problem in 
interrogation.  Contamination occurs because the suspect has acquired 
information about the crime from other sources, including the police 
interrogators.  As he said, “If you can’t eliminate contamination, you cannot 
know that if someone gets a fact right, and that’s an objectively knowable fact, 
you cannot know that they acquired that [fact] because they were present.  It’s 
always possible they acquired it because they were told about it.”  He described 
this part of his evidence as “very straight forward, it’s the basic principle of all 
investigation, looking for evidence that supports the existence of a fact”. 
[62]         In cross-examination, Dr. Ofshe provided a helpful summary of the 
assistance he could give to the jury.  He said that because the phenomenon of 
false confession is badly understood he could put the jurors “in a better to 
position to make their own judgment about how to evaluate the interrogation and 
also by focusing on the product of the interrogation, the confession itself”.  His 
role was “to try to dispel certain myths that are widely held, and also to make 
clear a simple analytic structure for understanding this particular interrogation 
strategy”.177 
 
 Having given the above assessment of Dr. Ofshe’s evidence, the Ontario Court of                                                         
177 Ibid. at paras. 57 to 62. 
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Appeal then went on to summarize the Trial Judge’s ruling on admissibility; specifically, 
the Trial Judge had ruled that the expert evidence did not meet the Mohan criteria for 
relevancy or necessity.  The Trial Judge also ruled that the proposed evidence was subject 
to more than usual scrutiny as it was novel in nature, being an attempt to apply 
psychological phenomena observable in traditional police interrogations to the type of 
questioning that occurs in undercover operations.  The Court of Appeal pointed out the 
Trial Judge’s finding that Doctor Ofshe’s evidence went only to credibility and therefore 
was not legally relevant.  Furthermore, they referred to the Trial Judge’s finding that the 
practice of comparing known facts with what a target says in a confession is what any 
ordinary juror was expected to do anyway, and that Dr. Ofshe’s opinion on that matter 
was therefore not legally necessary.178 
 Rosenberg J.A’s ruling for the unanimous Court of Appeal begins as follows:  
 
(iii) Analysis 
[66]         I agree with the trial judge’s conclusion that Dr. Ofshe’s evidence was 
not admissible in the circumstances of this case.  What I say here should not be 
taken as a finding that this kind of evidence could never be admitted in other 
circumstances.  I also intend to limit my analysis to whether the evidence meets 
the necessity requirement for admission of expert evidence.  I tend to agree with 
the appellant that the trial judge may have taken too narrow a view of the 
possible relevancy of the evidence by focusing solely on its value in determining 
the appellant’s credibility.  Dr. Ofshe’s evidence was broader than that and went 
to the question of the reliability of the appellant’s statements to the undercover 
officers in the context of the Mr. Big strategy.  This would have been an issue in 
the case, even if the appellant did not testify.179 
 
Significantly, the Court of Appeal here notes that the expert evidence may indeed pass 
                                                        
178 Ibid. at paras. 63 to 65. 
179 Ibid. at para. 66. 
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the test of legal relevance.  That said, Rosenberg J.A.’s ruling on necessity was 
unfavourable towards the accused: 
[67]         As is well known, in Mohan, Sopinka J., speaking for the court, held 
that the admission of expert evidence depends on relevance, necessity in assisting 
the trier of fact, the absence of any exclusionary rule and a properly qualified 
expert (p. 411).  He described necessity in these terms at p. 413: 
What is required is that the opinion be necessary in the sense that it provide 
information “which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of 
a judge or jury”: as quoted by Dickson J. in R. v. Abbey, supra. As stated by 
Dickson J., the evidence must be necessary to enable the trier of fact to 
appreciate the matters in issue due to their technical nature. In Kelliher v. 
Smith [1931] 4 D.L.R. 102, at p. 116, [1931] S.C.R. 672 (S.C.C.), this court, 
quoting from Beven on Negligence, 4th ed. (1928), p. 141, stated that in 
order for expert evidence to be admissible, “[t]he subject-matter of the 
inquiry must be such that ordinary people are unlikely to form a correct 
judgment about it, if unassisted by persons with special knowledge”. 
[68]         In my view, the three areas about which Dr. Ofshe proposed to testify 
did not meet this test.  In particular, given the particular circumstances, his 
evidence was not about matters on which ordinary people are unlikely to form a 
correct judgment.  
[69]         I start with his evidence about the bias among lay people against the 
idea that someone who is indeed innocent might falsely confess.  As I have said, 
unfortunately Dr. Ofshe did not explain the reason for this phenomenon.  I 
suspect that it comes from the difficulty that lay people have in applying their 
own experience to the circumstances of police interrogation.  While most people 
would understand how a person could come to admit to almost anything, true or 
false, under torture or physical coercion, they would find it hard to understand 
why someone would admit to a crime they did not commit and thus place 
themselves in greater legal jeopardy than they would encounter from simply 
tolerating the psychological coercion of interrogation.  If that is the explanation, 
Dr. Ofshe’s evidence would not be helpful to the jury since it was anchored in 
formal police interrogation.  If there is some other explanation for this bias, it 
was not forthcoming from Dr. Ofshe. 
[70]         Similar considerations apply to Dr. Ofshe’s evidence concerning the 
manner in which interrogations are conducted and the motivators for false 
confessions.  I repeat a portion of Dr. Ofshe’s evidence quoted above:  “The 
significant question would be what’s the motivator that is being offered to elicit 
the compliance.  If the motivator is strong, if there is a powerful inducement, 
then depending on the power of that inducement, the risk of possibly eliciting a 
false confession goes up.”  In this case, the motive for a possible false confession 
was obvious, as was the fact that there was no downside to confessing to men the 
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appellant believed were criminals.  There were no myths to be dispelled; Dr. 
Ofshe would simply be describing what was obvious from the testimony of the 
police officers and, indeed, from the appellant’s own evidence.  The jury did not 
require Dr. Ofshe’s evidence to arrive at a correct conclusion on this issue.  He 
did not purport to offer an opinion as to how powerful the inducement was in this 
case nor whether it could have led to a false confession. 
[71]         The final theme of Dr. Ofshe’s evidence was that the way to determine 
whether the confession was true or false was to compare it to the known facts 
about the killing.  He would also testify about the risk from contamination.  Dr. 
Ofshe’s evidence would have been helpful on this issue, but, as the trial judge 
observed, helpfulness is not enough.  The entire defence was focused on this very 
issue.  The defence theory was that the details in the confession came from the 
police.  The defence also pointed out that some details that the killer would have 
known about were not contained in the confession.  The jury did not need help 
understanding this point.  As Dr. Ofshe testified, this is a straight-forward 
element of police investigation. 
[72]         Accordingly, I would not give effect to this ground of appeal.180 
 
It is submitted that the analysis undertaken in the above passages is somewhat flawed, 
logically and in terms of fairness, in a few areas.  Firstly, it is somewhat troubling that 
Rosenberg J.A. invokes the law on necessity in the test for admissibility, but seems to add 
an extra hurdle without precisely explaining why.  At paragraph 57 he expresses regret 
that Dr. Ofshe did not explain why innocent persons would confess to crimes they did not 
commit and then thereafter directly quotes Iacobucci J.’s statement in Oickle that mock 
juries have difficulty believing in the phenomenon.   
 The basic problem here is that Rosenberg J.A. asserts that the problem of people 
being unaware of the phenomenon of false confessions exists, and that our highest court 
explicitly recognizes it, but insists on further explanation for some undefined reason.  It is 
respectfully submitted that although the ‘why’ Rosenberg J.A. is inquiring about is or 
                                                        
180 Ibid. at paras. 55-72. 
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may be ultimately relevant, it is not in keeping with the law of evidence to insist upon the 
answer at the voir dire stage.   
 Requiring reasons as to why a phenomenon occurs could end up being unfair to 
the parties and, it is argued, raises the threshold for admission on the basis of legal 
relevance in the absence of any demonstrable need to do so.  What is important is a) the 
existence of the phenomenon; b) how it occurs; and c) the results of the phenomenon.  
The “why” insisted upon opens up a never-ending avenue of inquiry. 
 Lest this objection be considered a flight of petulant sophistry, it is submitted that 
the following analogy may be apt: a trained and qualified accident re-constructionist 
proposed as an expert witness states during a voir dire that he has examined skid marks at 
an accident scene made by a particular vehicle. He states that skid marks of such an 
appearance made by a vehicle of that weight indicate, or are consistent with, a rate of 
speed of 80 kilometres per hour and a sudden slamming on the brakes. The expert has 
demonstrated a phenomenon, how it occurred and the results.  The knowledge is outside 
normal laypersons’ knowledge.  However, it is submitted that it would be extremely rare 
for a judge in Canada to go further and ask the expert in the accident case to explain why 
the skid mark length indicates an 80 kilometre per hour rate of speed followed by a 
slamming on the brakes, or to deny admissibility for want of an explanation.  For 
example, the expert in the accident case is not required to explain the chemical 
composition of the rubber of the particular tires in the accident or of the asphalt.  This 
posited situation can be compared to what is asked of Dr. Ofshe in Osmar.  The Mr. Big 
social science expert can explain the phenomenon – “people confess falsely when 
questioned by a skilled interrogator” and “laypeople have a hard time understanding how 
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it happens”.  He can explain how it occurs by referring to previous wrongful convictions 
and explaining psychological experiments like mock-jury studies.  The false confessions 
expert can also show the court statistics on wrongful convictions as a result of false 
confession, i.e. the results. 
 It is submitted that for some reason the expert witness in this case and other Mr. 
Big cases is unfairly held to a higher standard of necessity.  This is especially 
confounding when one considers the fact, previously pointed out as significant, that the 
existence of false confessions and their being given undue credit by juries is 
acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Canada.  The ‘why’ line of inquiry proposed by 
Rosenberg J.A. initiates a technically endless, and therefore prejudicial process in what is 
meant to be a threshold determination of admissibility.  Must the expert propound the 
cultural anthropological reasons behind false confessions?  Must he explain neurological 
aspects of the brain relating to human abilities to deceive and to detect deception?  One 
can imagine what would be the outcome if police accident reconstruction experts were 
required to explain gravity, Newtonian physics and fundamental laws of motion to a voir 
dire judge every time they just wanted to say that an accused ran a stop sign. 
 Of course all of this is not to say that a defence expert ought not to be subjected to 
a vigorous cross-examination at trial.  It is at that point that deeper and more probing 
‘why’ questions can be asked.  But at the point of determining admissibility of expert 
opinion evidence it seems obtuse of the Ontario Court of Appeal to have held Osmar’s 
defence to such a high standard, especially in a murder trial where the consequences for 
misinterpretation of evidence by a jury of laymen and laywomen are so perilously high. 
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 Also of note in the passages cited is the ruling at paragraph 66 that the voir dire 
judge’s exclusion of Doctor Ofshe’s evidence on the basis of lack of relevancy may have 
been incorrect and that the Court of Appeal tended to side with the target on that issue.  
Equally interesting from that same paragraph is the ruling that it was definitely incorrect 
for the voir dire judge to rule that Doctor Ofshe was attempting to provide evidence only 
regarding credibility of the target, and that he181 was in fact attempting to provide 
evidence on the larger issue of reliability.  In a Canadian jurisprudence that seems so 
uniformly stacked against Mr. Big targets it is something of a shock to see a dictum this 
favourable to the defence. 
 It is submitted that a further contentious issue arises in paragraph 69: in essence 
Rosenberg J.A. states that Doctor Ofshe’s evidence is not about “matters on which 
ordinary people are unlikely to form a correct judgment” and also that what the 
psychologist was attempting to provide evidence on, i.e. the motive for a false 
confession, was “obvious” and that there were “no myths to be dispelled” arising from 
the Mr. Big evidence to be presented in Osmar’s case.   
 Here it is emphasized again that the problem with this assessment, as with the 
assessments made by other judges in their rulings to exclude expert evidence in other Mr. 
Big cases,182 is that it is in direct conflict with the succinct finding of law made by 
Iacobucci J. which, ironically, the Court of Appeal cites in this very judgment:   
 
As to the first theme, unfortunately Dr. Ofshe did not provide any information as 
to why lay people, such as jurors, have difficulty believing that an innocent 
person would confess to a crime they did not commit.  I note, however, that the 
Supreme Court recognized this phenomenon in Oickle at para. 34:                                                         
181 i.e. Doctor Ofshe. 
182 such as R. v. Bonisteel which will be examined later. 
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In this context, it may seem counterintuitive that people would confess to a 
crime that they did not commit. And indeed, research with mock juries 
indicates that people find it difficult to believe that someone would confess 
falsely.183 
 
How can it be said that the motivations for falsely confessing in a Mr. Big sting are 
obvious, that there are no myths to be dispelled and that it is unlikely that people will not 
form a correct judgment?  How can these blanket statements stand unqualified in the face 
of the Supreme Court of Canada statement? 
 One might argue that as a matter of fact all natural phenomena, whether physical 
or social, are ‘obvious’ when they are elucidated by an expert.  It is, for example, obvious 
that the earth travels around the sun when that phenomenon is properly explained by 
astronomers and physicists.  However, for millennia it was assumed in many cultures that 
the sun travelled around the earth because that was the way it appeared.  Among people 
living in Canada today it is well-known that the earth revolves around the sun.  The 
geocentric myth has been dispelled even though it may appear to the untutored that the 
sun is a disc or ball that travels across the heavens.  However, to say that the heliocentric 
model is obvious would be something of a stretch.  Only with the proper scientific 
explanation does it become clear and obvious to the layman that certain principles of 
astronomy and physics prove that the earth in fact revolves around the sun.   
 In the same way a trier of fact is capable of knowing on one level that a false 
confession could occur in a Mr. Big sting.  Everybody knows that people tell lies.  
However, without proper expert opinion evidence it is too much to say that the 
phenomenon is “obvious”.  False confessions are a complex subject.  The judgment in 
                                                        
183 Osmar (C.A.), supra note 8 at para. 57. 
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R.v. Oickle makes it clear that there are myths that need to be dispelled about false 
confessions, it is indeed necessary to face up to what is counterintuitive to use Iacobucci 
J.’s word.184 To dismiss expert evidence as unnecessary in the manner in which the 
Ontario Court of Appeal did in Osmar is an untenable decision both in light of logic and 
stare decisis. 
 Another contentious Mr. Big expert evidence issue that the Ontario Court of 
Appeal touches on appears in paragraphs 59, 64 and 69 of the lengthy passage cited 
above.  In essence this issue is the fact that while significant social science research has 
been conducted on the topic of false confessions in the context of formal police 
interrogation, quantitative and controlled study or experimentation has never been done 
on the existence of false confessions as they may happen in a sting situation like Mr. Big. 
 This state of affairs has been detrimental to the defence’s ability to call expert 
evidence.  Like Rosenberg J.A. in paragraph 69 of Osmar, judges may rule that expert 
evidence that is rooted in a formal police interrogation context simply has no application 
in a Mr. Big sting.  Also, as the Voir Dire Judge in Osmar found, it may be that Mr. Big 
expert evidence may be regarded as “novel science” and hence subject to closer scrutiny.  
Rosenberg J.A. noted this in paragraph 64. 
 The ramifications of this problem are significant.  In short, it would seem to be 
nearly impossible to simulate a Mr. Big sting for the purpose of psychological 
experiments.  Only a few of the salient features of this problem will be touched upon in 
this thesis; partially in the interests of brevity; but mostly because the problem has been 
so thoroughly and intelligently discussed in a fairly recent scholarly article entitled 
                                                        
184 Oickle, supra note 57 at paras. 34-46. 
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“Deceit, Betrayal and the Search for Truth: Legal and Psychological perspectives on the 
“Mr. Big” Strategy” by Timothy E. Moore, Peter Copeland and Regina A. Schuller.  
 In the part of the article that focuses on the psychological problems inherent in a 
Mr. Big sting, Moore et al note that manipulation and social control have been the subject 
of scientific research for decades.185  They also comment on the apparent willingness of 
individuals to perform any manner of inhumane acts when commanded to do so by an 
authority figure, such as occurred in the infamous Milgram experiments.186   
 With respect to the question of scientific research on Mr. Big, the writers note that 
any proposed experiment to simulate a Mr. Big sting would inevitably raise significant 
ethical problems along the lines of those that dogged Stanley Milgram’s experiments 
after the fact.  Milgram convinced unwitting volunteers to administer what the subjects 
thought were electric shocks to third parties visible through a glass window.  Milgram 
would convince the volunteers to give larger and larger shocks to the third party subjects 
until the third party subjects appeared to be in real agony or even unconscious.  The 
people being apparently shocked were actually actors and the people being ordered to 
give the shock were the real subjects of the experiment.  In a nutshell, Milgram, within 
whatever margin of error was present in his study, proved that most people (a minority of 
subjects would not comply with his commands) will follow the orders of an authority 
figure even under bizarre and immoral circumstances. 
 The willingness to obey an authority figure, either in the defined Canadian legal 
sense or using a looser definition, could be said to have ramifications in any discussion of                                                         
185 Timothy E. Moore, Peter Copeland & Regina A. Schuller, “Deceit, Betrayal and the 
Search  for Truth: Legal and Psychological Perspectives on the “Mr. Big” Strategy” 
(2009) 55 C.L.Q. 348 at 379. 
186 Ibid. at page 380. 
  105 
the law of admissions, however, the point that Moore et al are more keen to make is that 
experimentation relating to Mr. Big will entail many of the same ethical problems 
Milgram experienced.  After his study was completed it became clear that many of his 
volunteer subjects had been harmed by the experience because they had been tricked into 
committing acts that were immoral – of course this caused psychological distress.187 
 The point is that Mr. Big stings are extremely manipulative and any attempt on 
the part of a psychologist to simulate one would be equally manipulative.  Moore et al 
note that 
 
[t]he impossibility of setting up an ethical experiment that replicates the effects 
of Mr. Big is itself a commentary on this extraordinarily manipulative technique.  
It is, therefore, appropriate for psychologists to reason by analogy and 
experience, where they cannot ethically conduct direct experiments.  The 
inability to do a proper experiment should in no sense disqualify psychology 
from making a contribution to the issue.188 
 
It is submitted that Moore et al’s argument for inclusion is sound.  It is further submitted 
that the reasoning underlying the courts’ reluctance to admit expert evidence because of 
its status as novel science is specious.  Essentially, judges state that the evidence of a 
psychologist who specializes in false confessions lacks relevance or value because it is 
grounded in studies of formal police interrogations or, in any event, interrogations that 
are not Mr. Big stings.  One could again consider the analogy of an accident re-
constructionist who has much experience examining the remains of accidents at standard 
four-way ninety-degree intersections.  In a case involving a T-intersection or an 
unusually angled intersection or an intersection on a hill or land that is otherwise not flat 
                                                        
187 Ibid. at pages 395-396. 
188 Ibid. at page 398. 
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it is hard to imagine a judge in Canada refusing to admit the evidence on the ground that 
it is novel science and subject to special scrutiny because the landscape in which the 
accident occurred was out of the ordinary. 
 The lasting effects that can be visited upon the psyche, and which thus make 
conducting ethical, controlled, experimental simulations of Mr. Big difficult for 
psychologists are evident in the recent Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal 
Judgment Re Jennifer Hart.189  Jennifer’s husband, Nelson Hart, was convicted in 2006 
of murdering his two daughters. His appeal is presently underway.  Apparently the 
revelation that he had been the target in a Mr. Big sting came as a considerable shock to 
Hart.190 The unmasking of the undercover operation has considerably hampered Hart’s 
defence in that he has apparently become deeply paranoid, trusting nobody, to the point 
that the Court of Appeal has found it necessary to appoint amicus curiae on Hart’s behalf:  
 
[14]         Although Mr. Hart gave an indication in writing that he intended to 
attend the January hearing and oppose the appointment for amicus, he in fact 
again refused to leave his cell or participate.  The Court heard and granted the 
Crown’s application to appoint an amicus, notwithstanding Mr. Hart’s written 
objections.  In reasons for decision filed on February 12, 2009, Wells, C.J.N.L. 
explained: 
[29]      The record establishes, as significant relevant circumstances, the 
following: 
•           Mr. Hart’s acknowledgment of his inability to prepare for 
and present his appeal; 
•           Mr. Hart’s seeming inability or unwillingness to identify 
counsel he is prepared to accept and who will be 
prepared to represent him; 
•           Mr. Hart’s demonstrated apprehensions that virtually all                                                         
189 2011 NLCA 64, 312 Nfld. and P.E.I.R. 44 [Re Jennifer Hart]. 
190 Ibid. at para. 7. 
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activities undertaken by anybody in connection with 
this appeal is somehow participating in another sting 
being undertaken by the police; 
•           The concerns expressed by Mr. Hart’s mother and Mr. 
Hart’s wife about his inability to proceed properly 
with his appeal and his desire that it proceed; and 
•           The concerns expressed by the Crown that if there are 
valid grounds of appeal they be properly presented to 
the Court. 
 I am satisfied that those circumstances warrant this Court appointing amicus 
curiae to ensure that the proposed appeal is, in fact, presented, and that all 
possible arguments in support of the proposed grounds of appeal, as well as any 
further appropriate grounds of appeal, are properly presented to the Court.  In 
doing so, amicus may make such submissions and further applications to the 
court as amicus considers appropriate to the circumstances.191 
 
Clearly the negative effects on Mr. Hart were significant and they show why traditional 
experimentation in this area is seemingly impossible.  It is therefore submitted that the 
proposed reasoning by analogy and experience is appropriate when undertaken by 
psychological experts in the area of false confessions. 
 Once again, this is not to say that these experts should not be subject to rigorous 
and comprehensive cross-examination by crown counsel when the time comes at trial.  It 
is then that a prosecutor can and indeed should point out the weaknesses in the evidence, 
i.e. that no actual Mr. Big psychological experiments have taken place and that the 
psychologist may be reasoning by analogy. 
 Another reasoning flaw apparent in some of the Canadian jurisprudence on 
admissibility of expert evidence in Mr. Big trials relates to the proposed reliance on 
proper jury instructions in the place of expert evidence.  A few cases address this issue, 
                                                        
191 Ibid. at para. 14. 
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but this thesis will focus on only one example, the judgment of the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal in R. v. Bonisteel.192  The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s ruling 
that the expert opinion evidence was inadmissible and his decision instead to issue a 
“clear, precise, sharp warning”193 to the jury about the dangers of Mr. Big confessions; 
including their inherent unreliability and the necessity of comparing the details of the 
confession with the known details of the crime in order to conclude whether or ot he 
confession was genuine.194 The Trial Judge’s warning was as follows: 
 
Central to the Crown’s case is a submission that you should be 
convinced that when the accused told the undercover officer, [Buck], 
playing the roll of the Big Boss, on October 26th, ’02, at Whistler, that he 
was the killer, that he was telling the truth. 
The law has had experience with false confessions of crime 
generally and with undercover confessions such as the alleged undercover 
confession of the accused here made on October 26th, 2002, to the Big 
Boss.  It is a fact known to those immersed in the criminal law that 
sometimes, even those who know they are speaking to a police officer, 
confess to a crime they have not committed.  It happens.  Do not think it 
doesn’t.  Do not start with the premise that people only confess to crimes 
they have actually committed.  Such a premise is simply wrong and utterly 
divorced from the reality of what hard experience has brought home to those 
of us privileged to toil in Her Majesty’s courts on a daily basis. 
I now move closer to the situation in the case at bar.  The law has 
had experience with the manipulating of targets during an undercover sting 
such as the sting in the case at bar.  Manipulating the target, inducing the 
target to speak and drawing as much detail as possible from the target, is the 
essence of an undercover operation of the sort or kind employed here which 
resulted in the accused’s stating to Buck on October 26th, ’02, that he killed 
the girls.  I instruct you that great care must be taken by you in considering 
the veracity or credibility of the accused’s statements to Buck on October 
26th, pointed to by the Crown as a confession as having killed the victims. 
                                                        
192 Bonisteel, supra note 33. 
193 Ibid. at para. 65. 
194 Ibid. at para. 66. 
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As a kind, sort or class of evidence, confessions produced by an 
undercover operation such as this are viewed as inherently unreliable.  They 
are taken in an atmosphere that makes them highly suspect without 
independent confirmation of the truth of what the accused has had to say.  
You must assess the evidence with that starting point in mind and focus on 
the specific evidence in this particular case, always keeping in mind that, 
depending upon what you make of the evidence, the evidence throws up a 
number of reasons why the accused would say to Buck on October 26th, ’02, 
what he did say…. 
What the circumstances were in … this particular case under 
which the accused came to say what he did say to Buck on October 26th, 
’02, is for you.  A confession obtained under oppressive or fearful 
circumstances may not be reliable.  Whether that was the situation in this 
case is for you.  You must be very careful and consider the context, the 
circumstances and atmosphere in which the October 26th, ’02, statement by 
the accused was made.  This accused may have lied to Buck on October 26th 
for any of a number of reasons, depending on what you make of the 
evidence. 
. . . 
You must proceed with caution, consider everything and be slow 
to conclude that the accused confessed to a crime he had actually committed. 
. . . 
Even more particularly, did the accused tell the Big Boss on 
October 26th, ’02, one or more things that only the killer would know?   The 
other side of that coin is, did the accused get something wrong in his story to 
the Big Boss – such as the difference you may find it to be between his 
version of the number of the stab wounds inflicted on the girls and reality – 
that you would expect the accused to get right on October 26th, ’02, if he 
was, in fact, the killer back in early 1975. 
When you are considering information offered to the Big Boss on 
October 26th, ’02, about the killings as perhaps tending to hurt the accused 
in your eyes, you must take into account the evidence that is before you 
about sources of information available to the accused other than his having 
been the killer.  Looked at in context, there may, in your eyes, be no sting to 
what he offered up at all. … 
…You look at what the accused got right and what the evidence 
says about sources of information for him, or the lack of them, other than his 
being the killer.  You look at what he got wrong, be it the presence or 
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absence of a chain at the site, presence or absence of houses on the road, or 
the number of stab wounds, …195 
[Emphasis added.] 
 The British Columbia Court of Appeal then cited the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 
decision to exclude Dr. Ofshe’s evidence in R. v. Osmar on the basis that it did not meet 
the test of legal necessity.196  Following that judgment, the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal then ruled thusly with regard to the issue: 
[69]           I would adopt the reasoning of Rosenberg J.A. in agreeing with the 
trial judge in this case that the evidence of the expert was not necessary, in that it 
did not deal with the specific nature of the evidence in this case, but only with 
matters about which the jury could form a judgment based on their own 
experience, assisted by instructions from the trial judge.  The reasoning of both 
Rosenberg J.A. and the trial judge is consistent with the statement of Major J. for 
the majority in R. v. D.D., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275, 2000 SCC 43 at para. 584, where 
he said that expert evidence that “was not unique or scientifically puzzling but 
was rather the proper subject for a simple jury instruction” was not necessary.   
See also R. v. Rogers, 2005 BCCA 377 at paras. 60-61, 198 C.C.C. (3d) 449. 
[70]           This decision of the trial judge is entitled to deference:  see R. v. 
K.(A.) (1999), 137 C.C.C. (3d) 225 at para. 93 (Ont. C.A.), where Charron J.A. 
for the Court (on this issue) commented that where the proposed opinion 
evidence is not technical, such as the engineering principles involved in the 
construction of a bridge, but is about human behaviour, it is up to the trial judge 
to make a judgment call about whether the opinion will provide information that 
is likely to be outside the experience of the trier of fact.   
[71]           The trial judge in this case made no error of principle and his decision 
to reject the expert evidence was not unreasonable.197 
  
Here again we see admissibility denied on the basis of necessity.  There are some 
plausible reasons given in this passage to exclude the evidence.  However, after                                                         
195 Ibid. 
196 Ibid. at paras. 67 to 68. 
197 Ibid. at paras. 69 to 71. 
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subjecting those reasons to further analysis, it is submitted that the case was arguably 
wrongly decided. 
 To give the Trial Judge his due, it is clear that the warning to the jury about the 
inherent unreliability of Mr. Big confessions was clear, thorough and not lacking in 
gravity.  Upon reading it one is left with no doubt that he brought home to the jury to the 
best of his ability the need to view the target’s confession to Buck with great scrutiny.  
Indeed, it may well be hard to argue that this particular accused did not receive a fair trial 
in that respect. 
 However, despite the admonition of this conscientious Trial Judge, it is submitted 
that the courts are headed down an inappropriate path in relying on jury warnings with 
respect to this issue.  As previously stated, in an area of law where the existence and 
danger of false confessions are acknowledged by all, the question arises as to why it is 
necessary on one hand to warn the trier of fact of their existence, while simultaneously on 
the other hand excluding all expert evidence opinion about them?  What we end up with 
in a case like R. v. Bonisteel is a trial judge, however learned and well intentioned, in fact 
taking upon him or herself the role of the provider of expert opinion, essentially giving 
evidence him or herself from the bench.   
 No doubt the Trial Judge in Bonisteel knew what he was talking about, but the 
fact remains that our courts are committed to the adversarial system.  If there is a right to 
trial by jury then it is submitted that there surely must be a right to have all of the 
important evidence submitted to the adversarial approach.  When a judge essentially 
gives expert opinion from the bench, neither the defence nor the prosecution have the 
ability to flesh out all of the important information.  Neither have the ability to cross-
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examine to show the evidence to the best advantage of their client.  Indeed, in the final 
analysis, if the extant information on false confessions is of such gravity, what defensible 
reason can there be to exclude it, especially when one concedes, as the Ontario Court of 
Appeal appeared to do in Osmar, that it likely meets the test of legal relevance. 
 Another problem with the approach in Bonisteel is that it opens up the contentious 
area of proper jury instructions.  It is a truism that the area of jury instruction has become 
fraught with debate over propriety and formality over the years, giving rise to a need for 
lengthy tomes containing lists of formulaic juridical incantations, not to mention years of 
appeals over unfortunate slips of the judicial tongue.  It is submitted that adding yet 
another duty, i.e. the crafting of a thorough jury instruction on an important evidentiary 
issue, to the trial judge’s long list of grave responsibilities in a lengthy and contentious 
Mr. Big murder trial is not warranted when a qualified psychological expert can be called 
to the witness stand, examined, cross-examined and listened to by the jury.  Indeed, even 
then a trial judge may choose to bring to the jury’s attention those points raised by the 
psychologist which he or she considers most salient during his or her final address to 
them.  With all due respect to the Courts of Appeal of British Columbia and Ontario, it 
seems as though there is no reason not to do this. 
 As previously alluded to, there are a very few Mr. Big cases where expert 
evidence has been admitted at the instance of the defence to give an opinion on the 
reliability of the Mr. Big confession evidence.  In R. v. O.N.E.198 E.R.A. Edwards J. 
considered expert evidence from both the Crown and the defence on a voir dire to 
determine the admissibility of the target’s statements to Mr. Big, but the jury did not hear 
                                                        
198 O.N.E., supra note 13. 
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the expert evidence.  Another case, a judge-alone trial in which the judge admitted expert 
evidence, was R. v. C.K.R.S.199   
 R. v. C.K.R.S.  is a truly comical read concerning a Mr. Big target who made such 
outlandish claims about his abilities and experiences to undercover police officers during 
his sting that one wonders how the matter ever made its way to trial.  Significantly, 
Morrison J. considered the expert opinion evidence of Doctor Shabehram Lohrasbe in 
reaching her verdict of not guilty, although even without the expert evidence a verdict of 
guilty seems nearly impossible on the facts of the case.  Morrison J. summed up Doctor 
Lohrasbe’s evidence as follows: 
 
[86]           The position of the defence is that Mr. Smith did not do this, that he is 
a pathological liar. 
[87]           Mr. Smith himself did not testify.  However, the defence did call Dr. 
Shabehram Lohrasbe, an expert forensic psychologist with special expertise in 
the area of false confessions. 
[88]           It is the position of the defence that Mr. Smith is someone who tells 
whoppers, big lies; that he is grandiose and flamboyant, and cannot be believed.  
That he was trying to please someone he considered to be Mr. Big of a crime 
family, and he was prepared to answer to whatever he thought they wanted to 
hear. 
[89]           Dr. Lohrasbe interviewed Mr. Smith, but he was not called to give any 
opinion with regard to whether or not the accused himself had made a false 
confession.  The doctor was called to testify only as to the nature of a false 
confession, and to confirm that they do exist. 
[90]           His evidence was that there are three types of false confessions:  ones 
made voluntarily; ones that are coerced compliant, often in the context of a 
police interview, where a person might be worn down; and third, coerced 
internalized, where a person may have a low IQ or be brain damaged or 
psychotic.                                                         
199 C.K.R.S., supra note 13. 
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[91]           What is the likelihood of a false confession?  Dr. Lohrasbe said there 
are three variables that must be looked at.  First, the character of the individual in 
that some people have characteristics that make them more likely or suggestible.  
Second, the circumstances, is the person tired, on drugs, alcohol; and third, does 
the interviewer have certain expectations and/or desire for a particular outcome.  
In such a circumstance, shaping the answers may occur, by the nature and the 
timing of the questions asked and the answers that are flowing from the previous 
questions. 
[92]           With regard to the character of the individual, a person may have a 
degree of cognitive dysfunction, as in low intelligence or poor memory, or may 
have a propensity to lie and lie habitually.  That person may be comfortable in 
doing so in order to gain something.  The reward may be spelled out or indicated. 
[93]           In his interview with Mr. Smith, Dr. Lohrasbe saw no indication of 
any gross cognitive dysfunction.  He was asked if substance abuse might play a 
role in truth telling, and said that if someone were seriously addicted, they might 
do anything to get their substance of choice.  He confirmed that economic status 
might play a role and possibly a criminal background where someone might not 
wish to go back to jail. 
[94]           Dr. Lohrasbe spoke of grandiosity, describing it as “boastful to the 
extreme”.  He said that Clarence Smith is “clearly grandiose”; that he also 
borders on being delusional.  For example, he believes he has mystical healing 
powers over others. 
[95]           When asked if poverty and addiction could increase the likelihood of 
someone giving false information, he agreed. 
[96]           On the concept of shaping, Dr. Lohrasbe explained that in a normal 
discourse, people talk without a preconceived agenda as to where the 
conversation might go and there would be no power differential between the two 
speakers.  However, where there is a clear power difference, and the person in 
power has a preconceived agenda as to what the answers he or she may want, 
there are ways of shaping an answer consciously or unconsciously.  The person 
may be asked, “Are you sure?”  The person answering may want to give an 
answer that pleases.  The more shaping there is, the less reliable are the answers. 
[97]           In viewing the video and the transcript of the lengthy conversations 
between the accused and Mr. Big, there is certainly evidence of shaping, 
although here I confess my sympathy for the job that Mr. Big was trying to do.  
On the one hand, showing extreme courtesy and respect to Clarence Smith, who 
was doing some bizarre rambling at times, and on the other hand, trying to get 
Mr. Smith to focus in a certain direction. 
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[98]           In his interview with Clarence Smith, Dr. Lohrasbe found Smith to be 
a real character and a raconteur, someone who obviously enjoys people and is 
flamboyant.  He seemed to have a tremendous confidence in himself and was 
unquestionably grandiose.  However, it was difficult to get information directly 
from him.  Smith was evasive generally and would drift off to other areas. 
[99]           Clarence Smith told Dr. Lohrasbe he had knowledge of the murder 
from information given to him by police in the prison.  However, two senior 
officers testified that they were with Smith less than a minute in 1997 when they 
went to Matsqui Prison to interview him, and no information was given out by 
the police officers at that time.  However, the defence points to Exhibit 30, which 
was several pages sent by one of the detectives to Mr. Smith’s parole officer in 
March 1998.  Those pages outline the evidence from Mr. Zytaruk and Lawrence 
Kowalko.200 
  
 It is submitted that it is difficult to see how opinion evidence such as that put forth 
by Doctor Lohrasbe is inimical to principles of fundamental justice.   
 A final judgment in which expert opinion evidence played a part is Unger v. 
Canada (Minister of Justice),201 which was actually a ruling on an application for habeas 
corpus.  In this case Unger was released on conditions imposed by the Manitoba Court of 
Queen’s Bench pending a ministerial review of his conviction for the murder of Brigitte 
Grenier.  This case does not include a ruling on the admissibility of expert evidence.  
Rather, it considers a decision taken by the Federal Minister of Justice to enlist the aid of 
an expert on false confessions to determine whether or not Unger confessed falsely to 
Grenier’s murder and use that expert’s opinion in determining whether or not the 
conviction should be overturned pursuant to section 696.1 of the Criminal Code.  The 
Court’s observations on the use of the expert are as follows: 
 
                                                        
200 Ibid. at paras. 86-99. 
201 2005 MBQB 238, [2005] M.J. No.396 [Unger v. Canada]. 
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[6]              The crown continues to rely on Mr. Unger’s confession to the police 
during the undercover operation to support its position that it has a strong case 
against Mr. Unger and that he should not be released pending his review.  The 
Criminal Conviction Review Group of the Department of Justice, which is 
conducting the investigation into Mr. Unger’s application for ministerial review, 
has suggested that Mr. Unger’s confession be reviewed by Dr. Gudjonsson, an 
expert on false confessions, and Mr. Unger has agreed to co-operate.  Due to Mr. 
Gudjonsson’s schedule, it is expected that this review will take many months. 
 
……. 
 
[14]         The crown takes the position that the confession is unaffected by the 
removal of the other evidence.  Contrary to that position, however, the reliability 
of the confession is being questioned by the committee undertaking the 
investigation on behalf of the Minister, at least to the extent that the investigators 
have suggested, and will be paying for an expert in false confessions to review 
and provide an opinion on its reliability. 
 
……. 
 
[48]         There is, however, strong evidence that the applicant’s conviction may 
not be sustainable, which I have already reviewed.  Two pieces of evidence, 
being the hair sample and the confession to the jailhouse informant, have been 
withdrawn by the crown.  The only remaining evidence is the accused’s 
confession to the undercover police, which is fraught with serious weaknesses 
and which the investigators have suggested should be assessed by an expert in 
false confessions.  If that report concludes that the confession was false, there 
will be no evidence against Mr. Unger.202 
  
 As has been evidenced by subsequent events, i.e. the quashing of Unger’s guilty 
verdict and his release from prison, it seems apparent that his confession was found not to 
be reliable enough to ground his conviction.   
 Of course the findings of Dr. Gudjonsson and subsequent decisions of the 
Minister of Justice regarding Kyle Unger’s guilt or innocence do not carry any weight as 
binding precedent upon the courts.  However, it is of some gloomy significance that only 
when all appeals have been exhausted and enormous amounts of time and energy have 
                                                        
202 Ibid. at paras. 6, 14 and 48. 
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been expended will the federal executive branch of the criminal justice system intervene 
to ensure that a falsely accused and wrongfully convicted target has the benefit of the 
weight of a qualified expert’s opinion on the phenomenon of false confessions. 
 It is submitted that Kyle Unger is ironically quite fortunate in that the Mr. Big 
confession he gave was not the only evidence against him at trial.  As previously 
mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis, the case against Unger also included DNA 
evidence of a hair left at the scene of the crime that ultimately tuned out to be faulty, as 
well as jailhouse snitch evidence to the effect that he admitted the crime to one of his 
cellmates.  The effect of the collapse of the other two components of the case against 
Unger threw the verdict onto far shakier ground and led to renewed public scrutiny of his 
confession as well as of the validity of the conviction itself.  It is arguable that had he 
been initially convicted of the crime on the basis of the Mr. Big confession alone, as is 
the case with so many targets now serving life sentences in Canada for murder, Kyle 
Unger would still be in prison for a crime that he did not commit. 
 Indeed, Unger’s ultimately fortunate position as a target who had been found 
guilty on the basis of weak and unreliable evidence beyond his Mr. Big confession is 
underscored when one considers the problematic nature of proving such confessions false 
as identified by Moore et al in their article.  They point out that in the context of usual 
false confessions arising from traditional police interrogations there is an at least 
somewhat measurable incidence of “demonstrated false confessions”.203  E.g. and 
hypothetically, we can consider a case involving an accused confessing to raping and 
strangling a murder victim.  It may be that further investigation reveals that the accused’s 
                                                        
203 Moore et al, supra note 185 at 401. 
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DNA does not match the DNA of the flesh and skin of the attacker found under the 
victim’s fingernails or of the semen in her vagina.  In this way the confession is proved to 
be false.  The problem in Mr. Big cases is that, since there is no other physical evidence 
in the vast majority of the situations in which the sting is used, it is nearly impossible for 
researchers to demonstrate a false confession and, therefore, a quantifiable rate of false 
confessions.  This, along with the ethical limitations outlined above, contributes to the 
dearth of established scientific research on Mr. Big.204  That said, it is surely not 
debatable that absence of evidence of a false confession is not evidence of its absence, 
especially in a criminal justice system that so freely admits the phenomenon of their 
existence.  
 As a coda to the discussion on expert evidence in Mr. Big stings it is necessary to 
note a further obstacle to admissibility that appears to have arisen in the very recent 
British Columbia Court of Appeal judgment in R. v. Earhart.205  In this case Madam 
Justice Bennett stated as follows for the court: 
 
[82]           Ms. Earhart argues that expert evidence should be permissible on the 
threshold question of whether the statements should be admitted.  Ms. Earhart 
did not attempt to tender expert evidence, no doubt because the issue was 
determined by this Court in Bonisteel at paras. 67-69.  Following Osmar, this 
court held that expert evidence on the topic of false confessions was not 
admissible in the context of the “Mr. Big” scenario.  As Ms. Earhart did not seek 
to tender expert evidence in the trial court or as fresh evidence on appeal, I need 
not say anything further about this submission. 
 
It is submitted that the court may well have made the right decision in the particular 
circumstances of Earhart’s case.  However, the general statements of law contained in                                                         
204 Ibid. 
205 2011 BCCA 490, 2011 B.C.J. No. 2286 [Earhart]. 
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this passage, i.e. that the issue of admission of expert evidence in Mr. Big cases was 
determined in R. v. Bonisteel and that that determination is that it is not admissible in 
keeping with the Ontario Court of Appeal’s ruling in R. v. Osmar, are broadly erroneous.  
In the first place, although the British Court of Appeal in Bonisteel did follow Osmar and 
indeed did not overturn the trial judge’s decision to exclude expert evidence,206 they did 
not use the sort of language that indicates a “determin[ation]” that expert evidence in Mr. 
Big cases should thenceforth be considered inadmissible in the province of British 
Columbia. 
 Furthermore, the ruling in R. v. Osmar, upon which the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal relies, is even more equivocal and less determinative of the issue.  As previously 
mentioned, Rosenberg J.A. was not entirely unsympathetic to the target’s attempt to have 
Doctor Ofshe’s evidence admitted.  Here it is necessary to repeat a segment of the 
judgment in that case: 
 
[66]         I agree with the trial judge’s conclusion that Dr. Ofshe’s evidence was 
not admissible in the circumstances of this case.  What I say here should not be 
taken as a finding that this kind of evidence could never be admitted in 
other circumstances.  I also intend to limit my analysis to whether the evidence 
meets the necessity requirement for admission of expert evidence.  I tend to agree 
with the appellant that the trial judge may have taken too narrow a view of the 
possible relevancy of the evidence by focusing solely on its value in determining 
the appellant’s credibility.  Dr. Ofshe’s evidence was broader than that and went 
to the question of the reliability of the appellant’s statements to the undercover 
officers in the context of the Mr. Big strategy.  This would have been an issue in 
the case, even if the appellant did not testify.207 (emphasis added) 
 
                                                        
206 which, incidentally, probably says more about the deference owed to trial judges’ 
findings by appellate tribunals than it does about the law of expert evidence per se.  
207 Osmar (C.A.), supra note 8 at para. 69. 
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Clearly the Ontario Court of Appeal leaves the door open for admission of expert 
evidence in cases underlain with different circumstances.  Furthermore, it is necessary to 
recall that Rosenberg J.A. found specific fault with Doctor Ofshe’s testimony, i.e. his 
failure to explain why lay people have difficulty believing that accused persons may 
falsely confess.  If Doctor Ofshe’s evidence had been different, it stands to reason that his 
evidence may well have been admissible. 
 Bearing the above observations in mind, it is submitted that Madam Justice 
Bennett’s ruling that the issue is determined, i.e determined that expert evidence on false 
confessions in Mr. Big cases is inadmissible, is incorrect.  That said, her ruling on the 
issue is quite brief and may indeed be subject to some elucidation in the future. 
 In conclusion, previously in this thesis it was proposed that expert evidence may 
prove to be the “chink in the armour” of Canadian Mr. Big jurisprudence.  When one 
considers that the evidence has been admitted in some cases,208 that the Ontario Court of 
Appeal has surmised that it may well be relevant and possibly even necessary based on 
what kind of evidence the expert plans to give,209 and that the Supreme Court of Canada 
                                                        
208 Possibly including the aforementioned contentious case of McIntyre (C.A.), supra note 
79, in which passing reference to the evidence of a “Doctor MacKay” and his testimony 
relating to the target’s statements during Operation Javelot is made at page 16 thereof.  
Of course, as previously stated, R. v. McIntyre is likely not a Mr. Big case at all even 
though it is cited as such by our courts in their rulings that Mr. Big stings should not be 
held to be abuses of process.   
209 With regard to the question of what kind of evidence an expert plans to give, the fairly 
recent case of R. v. Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624, 246 C.C.C. (3d) 301 may also end up being 
relevant in future Mr. Big cases.  In Abbey, a murder case, the Crown proposed to call 
expert evidence from a sociologist, Dr. Totten, about the meaning of a teardrop tattoo 
under the respondent’s eye, with a view to establishing that it meant he had killed 
someone.  The Trial Judge excluded the evidence.  The Ontario Court of Appeal 
unanimously ruled that this was an error, stating, among other things, at para. 109, that 
most expert evidence can’t be scientifically validated and that all kinds of experts do not 
“support their opinions by reference to error rates, random samplings or the replication of 
  121 
has yet to rule on its admissibility, that characterization may prove to be true.  Indeed, it 
is submitted that Moore et al in their article are quite correct in their exhortation to 
defence counsel to continue their efforts to have expert evidence admitted.210 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
test results.  Rather, they refer to specialized knowledge gained through experience and 
specialized trining in the relevant field”. 
 Furthermore, the Court of Appeal noted at paragraph 117 that the question of 
admissibility should not be decided on the basis of its quantitative scientific validity, but 
rather on the basis of the existence of specialized knowledge.   
 Finally, it was also noted, at paragraph 121, that “The study of cultural mores 
within particular communities or groups in a community is a well-recognized field of 
study within the broader academic and professional disciplines of sociology, criminology 
and anthropology”. This statement could be applied to the research of Drs. Leo and Ofshe 
on deception, coercion and obedience to authority.   
 It will be interesting to see how much impact this judgment has on future attempts 
to introduce expert evidence in Mr. Big cases. 
210 Moore et al, supra note 183 at pages 402 to 403. 
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CHAPTER SIX – HEARSAY AND ADMISSIONS 
 
 The issue of whether or not Mr. Big evidence should be admissible or 
inadmissible based on how it stands up to scrutiny under the law of hearsay and 
admissions definitely merits some examination. 
 As is the case with other areas of law in relation to Mr. Big, this question of 
admissibility has mostly been addressed in and by the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia and the British Columbia Court of Appeal.  That said, the courts of other 
jurisdictions have also weighed in on the matter, resulting in some apparent divergence in 
the law between provinces. 
 In examining this aspect of Canadian legal treatment of the Mr. Big sting it is 
initially necessary to identify exactly what the nature of the evidence is. The issue is 
whether the highly inculpatory statements made by the target to undercover operatives 
are properly admissible when one considers the following facts.  Firstly, they are out-of-
court statements put forward by the prosecution as evidence of the truth of their contents.  
Secondly, they are also admissions made by a party to the proceedings and are therefore 
presumptively admissible as evidence by operation of law. 
 The questions often raised by judges are whether or not admissions are hearsay, 
whether they should be treated differently than other forms of hearsay, and whether or 
not they should be subject to the same relatively recent developments in hearsay law 
known as the “principled approach”.  To put it in the briefest possible terms, the 
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principled approach to hearsay was first established in R. v. Khan.211  Since then it has 
been expanded and fleshed out in cases such as R. v. Starr212 and R. v. Khelawon.213   
 In Khan it was established that in addition to instances in which it falls under a 
traditional exception to the hearsay exclusion, a hearsay statement may be admitted into 
evidence if the party adducing the statement can prove that it is both necessary and 
reliable.  In the interests of brevity, detailed discussion of how to define those two terms 
will not be undertaken. 
 Starr expanded this rule.  The Court in this case ruled that, in addition to 
previously inadmissible evidence now acquiring the possibility of admission if it finds 
approval under the principled approach, it would thenceforth be necessary for hearsay 
evidence fitting within the traditional exceptions to pass the test of the principled 
approach as well.  That said, the traditional exceptions were still to be accorded 
significant weight, and hearsay statements falling within them were still to be considered 
presumptively admissible. 
 In Mr. Big cases the proposition put forward by defence counsel is that statements 
made by targets during the sting constitute hearsay, that they are therefore subject to the 
principled approach and that they do not pass the test of reliability due to the 
circumstances surrounding their making.  Specifically, the statements are made in an 
atmosphere of oppression and the threat of violence.  Additionally, the statements are 
also arguably induced in an atmosphere of the expectation of wealth, power and social 
acceptance.  
                                                        
211Khan, supra note 59. 
212 2000 SCC 40, 2 S.C.R. 144 [Starr]. 
213 2006 SCC 57, 2 S.C.R. 787 [Khelawon]. 
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 Having briefly commented on214 the law of hearsay and the principled approach, 
it is also necessary to say something about the species of evidence known as the 
admission.  The admission fits into the Canadian legal taxonomy much as the platypus 
fits into the mammalian taxonomy; it has enough characteristics to be defined by scholars 
as one thing, but it looks and acts like a lot of other things as well.215  Sopinka J. in R. v. 
Evans216 made the following statement, which is often cited in admissions cases and is 
arguably the controlling definition today: 
 
The rationale for admitting admissions has a different basis than other exceptions to 
the hearsay rule.  Indeed, it is open to dispute whether the evidence is hearsay at all.  
The practical effect of this doctrinal distinction is that in lieu of seeking independent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, it is sufficient that the evidence is 
tendered against a party.  Its admissibility rests on the theory of the adversary system 
that what a party has previously stated can be admitted against the party in whose 
mouth it does not lie to complain of the unreliability of his or her own statements.  
As stated by Morgan, "[a] party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to 
cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when speaking under 
sanction of oath" (Morgan, "Basic Problems of Evidence" (1963), pp. 265-66, 
quoted in McCormick on Evidence, supra, at p. 140).  The rule is the same for both 
criminal and civil cases subject to the special rules governing confessions which 
apply in criminal cases.217 
 
The above statement is rich in context and meaning, and it is important to understand it 
fully in order to accurately assess how Mr. Big target statements should be viewed in 
light of the law of hearsay and admissions.   
 In the second sentence of the passage Sopinka J. suggests that admissions are not 
hearsay at all.  Such uncertainty is unusual and has given rise to much subsequent judicial 
speculation.  However, the sentence preceding it would seem to establish that it is indeed                                                         
214 one hesitates to say ‘defined’. 
215 Also like the platypus, the admission appears to be in no danger of extinction.  
216 [1993] 3 S.C.R. 653, 85 C.C.C. [3d] 97 [Evans cited to S.C.R.]. 
217 Ibid. at page 664. 
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a hearsay exception, just one that is distinct from the others.  The distinction means that 
independent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness are not sought out to justify its 
admission.  That said, it is important to point out that the guarantees adverted to by 
Sopinka J. here are almost certainly not the same as those sought out in today’s courts 
under the reliability arm of the “principled approach”.  Sopinka J.’s statement was made 
seven years before the release of R. v. Starr which determined that traditional hearsay 
exceptions should be subject to the principled approach.  What Sopinka J. is referring to 
as guarantees of trustworthiness are those that are assumed to inhere in the traditional 
hearsay exceptions.  R. v. Khan  was not cited by His Lordship in R. v. Evans as it and the 
principled approach it promulgated simply were not relevant at the time. 
 In 1993 admissions were undoubtedly admissible due to their relation to the 
theory of the adversary system.  The theory of the adversary system does not comprehend 
independent guarantees of trustworthiness.  Its rationale with regard to admissions is that 
it is unfair to the opposing side for a declarant/party to claim a disadvantage because he 
or she cannot cross-examine him or herself, or to claim that his or her statements are not 
believable except when made under oath.    
 R. v. Khan initiated a dramatic change in the law of hearsay in its creation of the 
principled approach.  R. v. Starr initiated a further significant change in the area by 
applying that principled approach to traditional exceptions.  The question then arose as to 
whether or not it ought to apply to admissions by a party.  Pre-Khan and -Starr they were 
admissible in the absence of any circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, but post-
Khan and -Starr can they truly be said to be admissible in the absence of any indicia of 
reliability under the principled approach?  The ‘theory of the adversary system’ would 
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certainly seem to be one of the rigid and inflexible categories that the principled approach 
was meant to modify.  Furthermore, despite his apparent misgiving, Sopinka J. does 
indeed identify the admission as a hearsay exception.  As such should it not be included 
in the principled approach? 
 A final Supreme Court of Canada judgment to be touched upon before examining 
the relevant Mr. Big cases is R. v. Khelawon.218  Although concerned with hearsay and 
the principled approach, this case makes the following one-paragraph-long reference to 
admissions: 
 
Some of the traditional exceptions stand on a different footing, such as 
admissions from parties (confessions in the criminal context) and co-
conspirators’ statements:  see Mapara, at para. 21.  In those cases, concerns 
about reliability are based on considerations other than the party’s inability to test 
the accuracy of his or her own statement or that of his or her co-conspirators.  
Hence, the criteria for admissibility are not established in the same way.  
However, in cases where the exclusionary rule is based on the usual hearsay 
dangers, this distinction between the two principal ways of satisfying the 
reliability requirement, although not by any means one that creates mutually 
exclusive categories, may assist in identifying what factors need to be considered 
on the admissibility inquiry.219 
  
Although this passage affirms the status of admissions as different from other types of 
hearsay and states that concerns about its reliability are based on “other considerations”, 
it is a fairly oblique statement of law – e.g. it does beg the question as to what those other 
considerations are.  It does not help that the Court is commenting here on admissions 
from an accused and admissions by a co-conspirator in the same judicial breath.  
Furthermore, although the passage does state that admissions are a different breed of 
hearsay it does indeed assume “concerns about reliability”.  This of course is in                                                         
218 Khelawon, supra note 213. 
219 Ibid. at para 65. 
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significant contrast to Sopinka J.’s pre-Starr statement that admissions of a party are 
admissible without any examination of their “circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness”.  It may be that the passage causes confusion on a peripheral matter220 
and should simply be regarded as obiter dicta. 
 In examining the Mr. Big cases it is helpful to point out initially that, regardless of 
whether targets’ statements to undercover officers are considered to be true hearsay 
exceptions or not, the defence arguments that they should be excluded have failed in 
every jurisdiction in which they have been put forth at both trial and appeal levels.  
However, they have failed at different times and in different places for different reasons. 
 When hearsay arguments were made in the Alberta Court of Appeal in the case of 
R. v. Wytyshyn,221 the new modifications to the law of hearsay set out in R. v. Starr were 
very new.  Indeed, Wytyshyn was released only 46 days after Starr: 
 
[6]               Wytyshyn argues that even though the statements are presumptively 
admissible under one of the common law exceptions to the hearsay rule, the trial 
judge was still required to go on, given the Supreme Court of Canada decision in 
R. v. Starr, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144, and consider whether they met the required 
degree of threshold reliability. Wytyshyn claims that the statements did not. He 
asserts that the circumstances under which they were made raise the issue of 
threshold reliability. In the end, this assertion rests mainly on two arguments: 
first, that Wytyshyn had a motive to lie, namely to prove himself to the criminal 
organization, and second, that he was offered inducements, that is assistance in 
framing Wes Arnold and thereby exonerating himself.  
  
[7]               We cannot agree with these claims. We do not see anything in the 
circumstances of this case which diminishes the presumptive admissibility of 
Wytyshyn’s statements. It must be remembered that we are dealing with 
threshold reliability of the subject statements and not their ultimate reliability. 
The former is for the trial judge (and thus this Court), and the latter for the trier 
of fact. While there will be rare cases in which the principled approach will result                                                         
220 i.e. peripheral to Mr. Khelawon and his situation. 
221 2002 ABCA 229, 55 W.C.B. (2d) 654 [Wytyshyn]. 
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in the exclusion of statements, even though they fall within one of the recognized 
common law exceptions, this is not one of them. 
  
[8]               To put this another way, Wytyshyn has not met the evidentiary 
burden on him to justify excluding these otherwise admissible statements. The 
circumstances in which the statements were made lend sufficient credibility to 
allow a finding of threshold reliability. In this regard, we cannot ignore the fact 
that Wytyshyn made these inculpatory statements knowing that it was important 
that the information he disclosed be accurate and consistent with the results of 
the police investigation. In other words, from Wytyshyn’s perspective, he had a 
motive to tell the truth, that is a reason to talk about what happened but not to lie 
about it. Thus, even had the trial judge had before him the Starr decision, a 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada released after trial, it would have not 
changed the result on this issue. We therefore dismiss this ground of appeal.222 
   
The Alberta Court of Appeal does not refer to Sopinka J.’s statement about the nature of 
admissions and whether they should be dealt with as distinct from other forms of hearsay.  
They do, however, clearly state that the statements made by the target in this case pass 
the test of threshold reliability and that they were properly admitted.  The finding of 
threshold reliability is made on the basis of what the Court found to be a strong 
motivation to tell the truth, which is of course in contrast with the defence’s argument 
that the target in fact had a strong motivation to lie.   
 Ultimately, this rather spare judgment serves mainly to point up the obvious 
conundrum faced by the court that is required to determine threshold reliability of Mr. 
Big statements.  The prosecution says that the statements are highly reliable hearsay 
because of the numerous admonitions made to the target to tell the truth, be honest, be 
open and not lie to Mr. Big.  The defence says the statements are highly unreliable 
hearsay because the target is under so much pressure to tell Mr. Big what he wants to 
hear, so that the financial and social rewards can continue to come his way, but more 
                                                        
222 Ibid. at paras. 6 to 8. 
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importantly because he is afraid of the violence that will be visited upon him if he incurs 
the kingpin’s wrath and suspicion by not confessing.  It bears mentioning that the 
defence’s argument is bolstered by the existence of numerous instances wherein Mr. Big 
denies, sometimes angrily, protestations of innocence made by the target during the final 
interview scenario.  Other than the issue discussed directly above, the Wytyshyn case also 
stands for the principle that in the province of Alberta, the admissions exception to the 
hearsay rule should indeed be subjected to the pricipled approach to hearsay. 
 A good place to begin an examination of the history of Mr. Big statements as they 
relate to the law of hearsay in British Columbia is R. v. MacMillan.223  R. v. Starr had 
only recently been decided, and Singh J. was alive to the issue of whether or not that 
changed the admissibility status of Mr. Big sting admissions: 
 
12     Did Starr and Oickle open the door for the application of the principled 
approach to hearsay evidence to admissions made to undercover authorities? This 
is possible given the general statements made in Starr and the references in 
Oickle in paragraphs 28 and 65 to 67. 
 
13     There is uncertainty among legal academics and authors, including 
Wigmore, McCormick and Morgan as to whether admissions are truly hearsay, 
although all authors discuss admissions under the rubric of hearsay evidence.224 
 
 
Singh J. continued on to devote considerable attention to the theories and opinions of 
different legal scholars on the issue, ultimately deciding that the status of admissions with 
regard to hearsay had still not been determined.225 He concluded as follows: 
 
                                                        
223 2000 BCSC 1614, B.C.J. No. 2907 [MacMillan (2000)]. 
224 Ibid. at paras. 12 to 13. 
225 Ibid. at paras. 14 to 20. 
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21     It is hoped that this uncertainty, perceived or otherwise, as to whether 
statements made to persons not in authority fall under hearsay evidence and are 
therefore subject to the principled approach will be resolved by a definitive 
pronouncement by a higher court.226 
  
 With regard to the fairly typical Mr. Big sting evidence before him, Singh J. did 
not ultimately furnish an explicit opinion as to whether or not the target’s statements 
needed to meet the standard of the principled approach.  However, for reasons not stated 
outright, but perhaps simply to err on the side of caution, he did in fact subject the 
statements to a reliability analysis and found that the threshold had been met: 
 
59     The following circumstances satisfy me that the threshold test of reliability 
has been met: 
 
(a) The accused knew he had to be truthful because it had been repeatedly 
impressed upon him that the boss of the organization was a powerful 
individual, was not to be lied to, and that he had means (including police 
contact) to find the truth, that the condition precedent for membership in 
the organization was trust, honesty and loyalty and the accused 
acknowledged this and confirmed that he would not lie; 
 
(b) Throughout the three week undercover operation, the interaction 
between Cpl. McAndie and the accused was friendly and relaxed. This 
developed into a bond of trust and closeness to the extent that the accused 
looked upon Cpl. McAndie as a brother; 
 
(c) Throughout the interaction between the undercover operators and the 
accused, there was no atmosphere of oppression, intimidation, threats or 
threats of violence directed against the accused; 
 
(d) No false or fabricated evidence was presented to the accused, nor was 
the accused overborne by any suggestions that would induce him to lie. 
The inter-police memo contained factual information; 
 
(e) On many occasions the accused himself initiated contact with Cpl. 
McAndie which is clearly indicative of his desire and anxiousness to 
belong to the organization;                                                         
226 Ibid. at para. 21. 
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(f) When requesting false identification, the accused voluntarily disclosed 
that he had a "beef" hanging over his head and the beef was the murder he 
committed in November 1997; 
 
(g) The atmosphere in the final interview in which the accused made full 
disclosure of the murder to Cpl. Knoll was friendly, relaxed and factual. 
The conversation was skilfully and amicably conducted by Cpl. Knoll so as 
to eliminate any motive to lie to the accused; 
 
(h) Before every involvement by the accused in the scenarios he was given 
every opportunity to withdraw without any repercussions. 
  
60     Finally, I have considered paras. 34 to 45 of Oickle in which Iacobucci J. 
canvassed the large body of literature and research concerning false confessions. 
None of the four kinds of false confessions as stated in para. 37, namely, stress 
compliant, coerced complaint, non-coerced persuaded, and coerced persuaded 
occurred in this case.227 
 
It is an interesting feature of this decision that Singh J. would appear to be the only judge 
in a Mr. Big case to ascribe any significance to the fact that Starr and Oickle were 
released on the same day. 
 MacMillan had been charged with a second murder and convicted on 
fundamentally the same evidence in a separate trial.  However, that trial had taken place 
before Starr, whereas the trial heard before Singh J. had taken place afterwards.  
MacMillan successfully appealed this second murder conviction on an unrelated issue 
and it was re-tried before McEwan J. in 2003.  The same argument that the principled 
approach should apply to Mr. Big admissions was made at this re-trial with the same lack 
of success. 
 Like Singh J. in MacMillan’s previous trial, McEwan J. cites much authority and 
learned commentary in his decision, although the commentary is exclusively from 
                                                        
227 Ibid. at paras. 59-60. 
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English sources and hence, it is submitted, perhaps somewhat lacking in persuasiveness.  
As far as case law goes, McEwan J. notes that Evans is the leading case in Canada with 
regard to admissions, citing the previously reproduced well-known paragraph in which 
Sopinka J. questions whether or not admissions are hearsay before affirming their pre-
Starr admissibility.228  He then considers a passage from Starr, and then a further 
judgment from the Ontario Court of Appeal, R. v. Foreman.   
 McEwan J. then notes that Evans was released prior to Starr and that Iacobucci J. 
did not specifically address it in his reasons in the latter case, but that in any event the 
instances in which the principled approach would require exclusion of evidence fitting 
within a traditional exception would be rare.229  McEwan J. also comments on the 
different situation in Alberta, referring to the Wytyshyn case.230  
 Ultimately, McEwan J. goes further than Singh J. and states that Starr does not 
apply to the target’s statements: 
 
[32]        I do not think Starr should be applied to the sort of statement made by 
Mr. MacMillan. The generalizations in Starr which rationalize the traditional 
exceptions to the hearsay rule within the “principled” approach do not, in my 
view, override the clear language in Evans identifying the rationale for treating 
admissions by a party differently from other exceptions to the rule. The simple 
fact that admissions of this kind can be analytically described as hearsay does not 
bring them under Starr in the face of the explicit language in Evans. If there 
were any doubt about this limitation on Starr, it is clear from Foreman. There is 
therefore, in my opinion, no need to apply the Starr analysis to the statement in 
this case and it is admissible. 
[33]        If I am incorrect in that finding and Starr does apply, I am mindful of 
the rule in In Re Hansard Spruce Mills (cited above) to the effect that I should 
not differ from a ruling by another judge of this court, particularly one on the 
same set of facts, although I am not sure a voir dire ruling is a form of final                                                         
228 R. v. MacMillan, 2003 BCSC 1705 at para. 13 [MacMillan (2003)]. 
229 Ibid. at para. 14. 
230 Ibid. at para. 18. 
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judgment. Mr. Justice Singh did not address the Evans and Foreman analysis, so 
I am able, in any event, to depart from his judgment to address that argument. 
Respecting the Starr analysis, Mr. Justice Singh’s summary of the material facts 
does not differ significantly from the facts I would have identified.231 
 
Bearing in mind the finding of Singh J., McEwan J. ultimately finds that in any event 
Macmillan’s statements would indeed pass the test of threshold reliability under the 
principled approach.232  One wonders if this immediate ‘hedging of bets’ evident in 
McEwan J.’s judgment arguably serves to heighten rather than lower the uncertainty 
surrounding the status of admissions as hearsay in Mr. Big stings. 
 A final interesting feature of the second MacMillan case is the question of 
whether the admissions made are truly admissions against interest: 
 
[23]        Going back to basics, the defence submits that the premise behind the 
“admissions” exception in the first place was that people would normally not say 
something inculpatory about themselves unless it were true. In the present case, 
however, they submit it was clearly in Mr. MacMillan’s perceived interest to 
convince the “organization” that he was in fact a bad person, capable of killing. 
There were obvious financial benefits to becoming a member. Cpl. McAndie 
certainly gave the impression that, while the organization was a “business”, there 
was a premium on cold-bloodedness. One need only think of Cpl. McAndie’s 
remarks to Mr. MacMillan that he enjoyed the violent parts of the job in 
connection with the scenario where he “roughed up” another police operative; or 
of the conversations about contract killing being “the ultimate trust”; or of the 
supposed fact that Cpl. McAndie had a ring inscribed with the date on which he 
suggested he had himself been given that “trust”. 
[24]        This, the defence submits, completely inverts the presumed reliability of 
the admissions exception and makes this a clear example of one of those “rare” 
cases Iacobucci, J. posited in Starr, where an established exception would not 
meet the requirements of the principled approach. 
[25]        The defence submits that Wytyshyn (quoted in [paragraph] 17 above) 
exemplifies the approach and is materially distinguishable on its facts, such that 
by applying the same reasoning to the present case the result would be in Mr. 
MacMillan’s favour. There, the police undercover scenario centred on a                                                         
231 Ibid. at paras. 32 to 33. 
232 Ibid. at para. 36. 
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supposed need for accuracy in the information they were eliciting so that another 
person could be framed for the crime. As the Alberta Court of Appeal noted, 
there was a motive to tell the truth. In the present case, the defence submits that 
there was no such qualification built into the scenario: apart from telling “the 
Boss” what he understood the Boss probably knew, they say there was no 
circumstantial guarantee of reliability respecting the details Mr. MacMillan gave, 
and some considerable motive to embellish, given the supposed nature of the 
enterprise as described by Cpl. McAndie.233 
  
This question of whether or not the admissions made in the course of a Mr. Big sting are 
truly against the declarant/target’s interest is raised in various other judgments as well.   
 For example, in R. v. Lowe, another British Columbia Supreme Court decision, 
C.L. Smith J., after briefly referring to the “open question”,234 of whether or not 
admissions are hearsay and deciding to follow McEwan J.’s decision in MacMillan made 
the following observation about whether or not targets’ statements are indeed against 
their interest: 
 
[227]                       A crucial factor in the determination of that issue is whether 
Mr. Lowe's statements to the undercover police officers are confirmed by other 
evidence.  There is a high standard to be met.  Statements made by someone who 
is in the grip of a sophisticated undercover operation, subject not only to 
psychological manipulation and financial inducements but also to threats of 
physical harm, are highly suspect without independent confirmation.  It is the 
reverse of the usual approach to admissions, which are accepted in evidence, in 
part, because it is generally assumed that when people make statements against 
their own interest they are not lying.  Here, the statements were made in a context 
in which Mr. Lowe may have seen it as against his interest not to make them.  
The Court of Appeal for this province has made clear that such statements should 
be viewed as inherently unreliable and that it is dangerous to base a conviction 
upon such statements unless they are confirmed by independent evidence:  R. v. 
McCreery, [1998] 8 W.W.R. 699 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Forknall, (2003), 172 C.C.C. 
(3d) 61 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. G.W.F., 2003 BCCA 230, and R. v. Skiffington, 2004 
BCCA 291.235                                                         
233 Ibid. at paras. 23 to 25. 
234 Lowe, supra note 14 at para. 225. 
235 Ibid. at para. 227. 
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This point was also acknowledged by Williams J. in R. v. Perovic, another Mr. Big case 
from British Columbia: 
 
[25]           I am fully cognizant of the extreme caution which must be exercised 
in dealing with statements of persons made to undercover operators in situations 
of this nature.  I recognize that such undercover operations tend to encourage 
false bravado and boastfulness in the targets.  There is a real concern that the 
targets will exaggerate their role in any activity.  I am aware that the statements 
thus made are not contrary to the penal interest of the subject but, rather, occur in 
an atmosphere where there is a pressure upon the subject to claim credit for 
criminal activity.  I recognize that the undercover operators often make generous 
payments to targets for their performance of apparent criminal activities, that 
they hold out a powerful inducement of membership in a sophisticated and 
wealthy organization, and that the target engages in dealings with individuals 
who are made to appear powerful and capable of great violence. 
[26]           In summary, I recognize fully that these carefully structured 
relationships provide substantial inducements to targets to make confessions to 
crimes and that they create very real concerns that false confessions may be 
offered.236 
 
 
 In a previous decision in the same case, Williams J. followed the lead of McEwan 
J. among others in ruling that the target’s admissions were admissible in any event 
following Sopinka J.’s statement of the law in Evans and its subsequent treatment in 
lower courts.237  That said, like other judges, Williams J. embarked upon a threshold 
reliability analysis anyway, presumably due to the general uncertainty surrounding 
admissions.  Like other judges he considered many factors that militated in favour of a 
finding of threshold reliability.  For example, Williams J. considered that the target’s 
statements were not coerced or the product of intimidation; that he willingly participated                                                         
236 2004 BCSC 1823, 79 W.C.B. (2d) 752 at paras. 25-26 [Perovic (Ruling No. 2)]. 
237 R. v. Perovic 2004 BCSC 643, [2004] B.C.J. No. 3037 at paras. 19 to 20 [Perovic 
(Ruling No. 1)]. 
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in gang activities with no apparent reluctance; that he was subject to the continued 
emphasis on truth, honesty and loyalty that is common in Mr. Big stings; that he 
apparently had close bonds with the undercover officers, believed that they were 
criminals and wanted to show them respect; that, in his confession to Mr. Big, his 
purpose was to provide accurate details so that inculpatory evidence could be eradicated 
and not to boast.238 
 Williams J. also considered a factor that rarely appears in evidence in Mr. Big 
stings.  Apparently the target in this case discussed his position with regard to the 
undercover operatives with an unrelated third party, a friend named Sharpe: 
 
After the defendant met with L., he had a discussion with his friend, Adam 
Sharpe.  In that conversation, he described his intense satisfaction that he 
was being accepted into the gang.  While Sharpe expressed a certain degree 
of concern or suspicion about these men and the wisdom of being so 
disclosive with strangers, the defendant was unrestrained in his enthusiasm, 
explaining how completely he trusted and respected them, how he had no 
doubt they were the real thing, and emphasizing the importance of being 
truthful with them.  It is significant in my view that Sharpe was obviously a 
person that the defendant valued greatly as a friend.  The defendant’s 
statement to Sharpe seems genuine and quite convincingly articulates the 
defendant’s position.239 
 
Ultimately, Williams J. found that the statements passed the test of threshold reliability 
and they were admitted.240 
 Boyd J. in R. v. Ciancio also referred to the statement cited above in Perovic 
(Ruling No. 2), noting the inherent or manifest unreliability of Mr. Big sting statements 
                                                        
238 Ibid. at para. 22. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Ibid. at para. 23. 
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and the fact that they are not admissions against interest.241  It is necessary to note, 
however, that Ciancio, while definitely a Mr. Big case, did not specifically deal with the 
law of hearsay and admissions. 
 It is submitted that it is indeed a peculiarity in Canadian law, and particularly in 
the law of British Columbia, that judges will hold that Mr. Big statements are absolutely 
admissible in murder trials as admissions, without recourse to the principled approach; 
while at the same time stating that they are manifestly unreliable and that they are not 
“against interest”.  It is also interesting that some judges conduct threshold reliability 
analyses anyway in case they are found to be in error.  Judges at the trial level appear to 
be pulled in two ways.  On one hand the doctrine of stare decisis points in the direction 
of admissibility without any test whatsoever.  However, the recognition of the manifest 
unreliability of the statements seems to mandate a threshold reliability analysis in any 
event.  One can hardly fault the trial judge for exercising an abundance of caution. 
 The British Columbia Court of Appeal addressed the hearsay/admissions issue in 
R. v. Terrico242 in 2005.  At first glance the judgment would seem to settle the question of 
whether or not admissions should be treated as other hearsay exceptions and subjected to 
the principled approach.  The majority judgment, delivered by Huddart J.A., Lowry J.A. 
concurring, states that admissions should be allowed into evidence without a reliability 
analysis.  However, it is respectfully submitted in this thesis that just as the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal erred in Earhart in its reading of Bonisteel from the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal and of Osmar from the Ontario Court of Appeal, so too in 
                                                        
241 R. v. Ciancio 2006 BCSC 1673 at paras. 267 to 268 [Ciancio]. 
242 Terrico, supra note 11. 
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Terrico did the majority err with regard to its reading of some Supreme Court of Canada 
cases. 
 Newbury J.A.’s opinion, which concurred in the result with that of the majority 
also invites some examination.  Like other judges she raises the question of whether or 
not admissions should be subjected to the principled approach.  In her minority opinion 
Newbury J.A. points out the particular circumstance in the case at bar that at the voir dire 
stage of the trial defence counsel had argued, and the prosecution had conceded, that a 
Starr analysis of the Mr. Big statement should be undertaken.243  After himself 
commenting on whether or not admissions should be treated like other hearsay, the Trial 
Judge concluded that the target’s statements did pass the test of threshold reliability.  He 
cited the many other cases in which Mr. Big statements were admitted and he adverted to 
the undercover officers’ admonitions to be truthful.244   
 Newbury J.A. noted that although the trial prosecutor had conceded to the 
defence’s request for a Starr analysis, the appeal prosecutor did not.  In addressing the 
question of whether or not admissions should be treated the same as other hearsay 
exceptions Newbury J.A. cited some passages from Starr on the difficulty of defining 
hearsay and and then stated as follows:  
 
[21]           There is no doubt that the question is a longstanding one among 
learned authors: see, e.g., Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn rev. 1972), v. 4, at 
§1048-49; J.W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence (5th ed., 1999) v. 2, at §254; J. 
Sopinka, S.N. Lederman and A.W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada 
(2nd ed., 1999), at §6.292; E.H. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence (Joint 
Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the American Law Institute and 
the American Bar Association, 1962), at 265-66; M.N. Howard, Phipson on                                                         
243 Ibid. at para. 14. 
244 Ibid. at para. 16. 
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Evidence (15th ed., 2000), at 28-03; and that it is one about which different 
courts have made different assumptions at different times.  As Ms. Duncan points 
out, the Supreme Court of Canada in cases such as R. v. Fliss, supra, and R. v. 
Grandinetti, supra, considered the admissibility of the statements in question 
made by the accused, without any reference to Starr or the threshold analysis it 
mandates; while in R. v. Evans, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 653, Sopinka J. for the Court 
observed that it is "open to dispute whether the evidence is hearsay at all." (At 
664.)  On the other hand, in R. v. Foreman, (2002) 169 C.C.C. (3d) 489, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal recently said that such statements "are admitted without 
any necessity/reliability analysis" and distinguished Starr on this basis.  (Para. 
37.)  None of the courts or academic writers, moreover, has addressed the 
question of an accused's right to silence in this context:  can it truly be said he or 
she is 'available for cross-examination'? 
[22]           These issues are ones on which the guidance of the highest court in 
Canada would be useful — particularly in the context of an accused's right to 
remain silent — but I do not propose to try to resolve them here.  Since the 
Crown at trial took the view that the hearsay rule was engaged and therefore 
Starr was applicable, and the trial judge acceded to that approach, I propose to 
make a similar assumption and turn to the question of whether the trial judge's 
ruling has been shown to be erroneous.245 
 
It is submitted in this thesis that Newbury J.A.’s statement affirming the continued 
uncertainty in this area of law is correct.  Admissions against interest in general do indeed 
inhabit a twilit section of the landscape of evidence law.  This being the case, she elected 
to err on the side of caution and review the Trial Judge’s finding on the threshold 
reliability issue: 
[25]           Accordingly, although the appellant's admissions were prima facie 
hearsay and "presumptively inadmissible" as such, it would appear from the 
second sentence of para. a. that they were instead presumptively admissible as 
coming within the traditional exception for admissions against interest.  The 
appellant argues, however, that he did have a clear motive to lie, being afraid he 
would be treated violently by the "biker gang" if he was seen as a "rat" or 
otherwise displeased them, and that his statements were therefore unreliable.  
(The requirement of necessity was not dealt with specifically by the trial judge in 
his Reasons and was not argued before us on appeal.)  Mr. Arbogast submitted                                                         
245 Ibid. at paras. 20-22. 
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that the undercover officers' efforts to impress the appellant as violent criminals 
may be taken to have created sufficient fear in his mind as to overcome the usual 
presumption that people do not normally lie about having committed murders.  
As has been seen, Mr. Terrico attested later in the trial proper as to his fear, as 
did the female undercover officer who observed him during the staged beating of 
"John".  The defence submits that these amounted to indirect threats against the 
appellant which in their effect were little different from direct threats of violence. 
 Accused persons are of course protected by the rules regarding voluntariness 
from having inculpatory statements made in the latter circumstance admitted into 
evidence against them. 
[26]           But the fear which had been instilled in the accused by the "biker 
gang" was seen by the trial judge as operating in a different way:  instead of 
being motivated to lie about his past deeds, Mr. Terrico was told repeatedly that 
it was necessary for him to be absolutely truthful in his statements to the 
undercover officers, and that they had access to police records and the ability to 
check on whatever he told them.  Consistent with this, the appellant told "Tom" 
that he had lied to him regarding how much time he had served for armed 
robbery, but that now he was coming clean and was being a "straight shooter".  
In his conversation with Sergeant "B", the appellant said he had planned the 
murder and had agreed to pay Mr. B.B. $25,000 for doing it, but he (the 
appellant) had not been present at the scene or hit his father in the head — a 
change from what he had told "Tom" previously.  In all these circumstances, and 
bearing in mind that the question is one of threshold admissibility, I cannot say 
that the trial judge erred in concluding that that level of reliability was met.  The 
appellant was given every reason to believe that any untruth of which he might 
boast in his eagerness to join the "bikers", or in which he might be tempted to 
take refuge because of fear, would be quickly found out and that he would be 
punished.  Bearing in mind that the question was one only of threshold reliability, 
I cannot say that the trial judge erred in these circumstances in finding that the 
requisite level of reliability was met.246 
 
 
 The import of the presence of fear, intimidation and other significant emotional 
variables inherent in the elicitation of a Mr. Big statement is undeniably quite relevant in 
an examination of this evidence in the context of hearsay.  Some judges obviously argue 
that the evidence should be admitted without a necessity/reliability analysis by operation 
of the law as stated by Sopinka J. in Evans.  However, it is submitted in this thesis that 
such an approach, arguably mechanistic and definitely automatic, runs counter to the                                                         
246 Ibid. at paras. 25-26. 
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spirit of the law as expressed in Starr.  It seems fair to state that there is an unanswerable 
psychological question in play in many of the Mr. Big judgments.  Is the atmosphere of 
greed or fear or desire created by the sting likely to induce deception or honesty?  Are the 
targets, in the face of a rising tide of manipulation, more likely to tell the truth or to tell 
lies when it comes to statements about their guilt or innocence?  It is clearly impossible to 
say.  The defence typically says the target was scared or greedy or otherwise influenced 
so he must have been lying.  The prosecution says those same visceral forces can only 
have resulted in the targets telling the truth.  In an abstract sense, it is submitted that this 
is a debate that neither side can win; however, in a practical sense the prosecution’s 
argument is prevailing. 
 In this regard it can be noted that in Starr, Iacobucci J. stated that “lower courts 
have recognized the absence of a motive to lie is a relevant factor in admitting evidence 
under the principled approach….[c]onversely, the presence of a motive to lie may be 
grounds for exclusion of evidence under the principled approach”.247    It is worth 
pointing out that Iacobucci J. does not favour indicia of truthfulness over indicia of lying 
or vice versa. 
 Judges and scholars, in their efforts to define hearsay, have necessarily identified 
many ‘hearsay dangers’.  In looking at Mr. Big sting statements in the light of Starr, it 
should be further emphasized that the question of whether the statement admitting guilt 
for murder is a verity or is a lie is the only issue.  There are no other hearsay dangers. 
There is no danger of the original declarant being factually, albeit unintentionally 
incorrect.  E.g. did he really see what he claimed to see?  Was it really the accused’s car 
                                                        
247 Starr, supra note 212 at para. 216. 
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parked outside the victim’s house on the night of the murder?  Might he have been 
mistaken?  Was it dark? Was he wearing his glasses?  No, the declarant in a Mr. Big sting 
knows absolutely whether or not he killed the victim.   
 Nor is there any question of whether the declarant took what he was saying 
seriously when he spoke.  E.g. was he engaging in idle gossip at a party?  Was he 
speaking facetiously?  Was he playing a game of truth or dare?  No, the declarant in a Mr. 
Big sting is making a serious statement to one he believes to be a ruthless crime boss.  He 
has been encouraged by the primary officer to be truthful and “straight”.  He is trying to 
appear in deadly earnest.   The only question is whether he is lying or telling the truth. 
 Looking at the statement in isolation it is patently impossible to determine, 
logically or empirically, whether the target was so scared or greedy or eager to please that 
he told the truth, or whether he was so scared or greedy or eager to please that he told a 
lie.  In such a situation the only rational outcome may arguably be to exclude the 
evidence.  But since a blanket exclusion of a recognized hearsay exception like an 
admission is unlikely, a reasonable compromise would be, it is submitted, to subject the 
Mr. Big admission to a Starr analysis, or better yet a rigorous inquiry into its 
voluntariness pursuant to the confessions rule.248   
                                                        
248 Empirically, of course some target statements can be compared to objectively known 
facts such as how the victim was murdered, when the victim was murdered, where the 
body was found, et cetera.  Ususally, however, all of those circumstances are already 
previously known to the police and the target so the point becomes moot.  I.e., Wytyshyn 
knew the landlady had been strangled; Terrico knew his father had been shot and 
bludgeoned; Hart, whose case will be discussed later, knew his daughters had died by 
drowning.  On the other hand, Lowe led his undercover team to the general vicinity of 
where the victim’s body had been found, although at trial he partially denied the police’s 
side of the story and made explanations about rumours he had heard in the community 
about the victim’s demise and where his body had been dumped.   
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 When faced with the question of whether threshold reliability had been met, 
Newbury J.A. was not able to find error with the Trial Judge’s reasoning and so she 
upheld the admissibility of the evidence.  Huddart J.A. for the majority, however, would 
not have bothered with a Starr analysis at all.  She disagreed with the notion that 
admissions should be subjected to the principled approach, citing the previously 
reproduced definition of the admission by Sopinka J. in Evans.  Of that definition she 
then stated: 
 
[47]           Nothing the Supreme Court of Canada has said since has changed that 
fundamental rule. 
 
[48]           Starr was not about an accused's admission against interest.  Its focus 
was police evidence of a civilian witness's prior identification of the accused and 
a statement of intention by a non-party, one of the murder victims.  The majority 
determined the deceased declarant's statement did not meet the reliability 
threshold required by the principled approach to hearsay developed in R. v. 
Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531 and R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915.  The deceased's 
statement to his girlfriend about going with the accused to carry out an insurance 
scam did not meet the threshold, as it was made in circumstances of suspicion.  
He could have been telling his girlfriend about the insurance scam to conceal his 
true purpose of spending time with another woman.  Neither Iacobucci J., writing 
for the majority, nor McLachlin C.J. and L'Heureux-Dubé J., writing in dissent, 
suggested the principled approach to the admission of hearsay should be 
extended to statements of accused persons.  If the Supreme Court intended that 
result, I would have expected a lively discussion of the issue.  In neither R. v. 
Fliss, 2002 SCC 16 nor R. v. Grandinetti, 2005 SCC 5, did the court suggest a 
Starr analysis was required.  In both cases, the court was examining the 
admissibility of an accused's statements to undercover police officers. 
[49]           I agree with Doherty J.A. when he wrote in R. v. Foreman, (2002), 
169 C.C.C. (3d) 489 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 
199 (Q.L.) that the hearsay rule poses no obstruction to the admissibility of a 
statement made by a litigant and tendered as evidence at trial by the opposing 
party.  Such a statement is admitted without any necessity/reliability analysis as 
an admission against interest. 
[50]           The application of this rule does not lead to injustice in this case.  The 
appellant's statements are a confession to murder.  The concerns about an 
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absence of meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the appellant in court under 
oath or solemn affirmation as to the truth of its contents do not arise.  The 
consequences to the accused do not differ from those that flow from admitting 
evidence from a third party witness about an accused's voluntary statement to a 
person in authority.  Defence counsel can cross-examine the witness as to what 
the accused said.  If that is not sufficient, the accused can testify and call the 
witness's version of the statement into question.  An accused is never available as 
a witness.  He cannot be compelled to testify. 
[51]           It follows the only analysis required of the trial judge was to weigh 
the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect.  The trial judge 
saw no basis for excluding the appellant's statements.  I agree there was no 
barrier to their admission.249 
 
 It is submitted that Huddart J.A. makes some errors here that reduce the 
persuasiveness of her judgment.  In the first place, her statement that nothing the 
Supreme Court of Canada has done since Evans has changed the law of admissions does 
not take into account all of the debate and controversy that has occurred as a result of the 
Supreme Court’s judgment in Starr.  The very question at issue is whether or not Starr 
should apply to admissions. 
 That said, the question raised by Starr is clearly uppermost in her mind.  
Unfortunately, she makes a fundamental error in logic when she states that because Starr 
was not about an accused’s admissions against interest Iacobucci’s reasons should 
therefore have no bearing upon them.  In fact Iacobucci’s reasons in Starr concerning 
application of the principled approach to established hearsay exceptions can only be 
taken to be inclusive of all hearsay exceptions.  Iacobucci J. did not differentiate.  It is 
submitted that it would be unreasonable to have expected the Supreme Court of Canada 
to have made a statement like ‘and this new rule shall also include admissions’.  To 
expect courts to itemize to such an extent would grind our legal system to a halt.                                                          
249 Ibid. at paras. 47 to 51. 
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Following Huddart J.A.’s logic, it would be arguable that the principled approach should 
only extend to those forms of hearsay that were specifically under review as disclosed by 
the facts in Starr.  Clearly that result would be perverse.  To cherry-pick admissions for 
exclusion from the principled approach as has been done in the cited passage seems 
unfair. 
 A further logical error occurs when Huddart J.A. invokes Fliss and Grandinetti as 
authority for the proposition that no Starr analysis of target statements is required in Mr. 
Big cases.  Simply put, neither of these cases, although they were Mr. Big cases, dealt 
with admissions of a party as hearsay.  Fliss dealt mainly with the use an undercover 
officer could make on the stand with regard to transcripts of recordings and notes he had 
taken.  The judgment in Grandinetti contained only one passing reference to hearsay as it 
related to voir dire statements made by the accused’s relative.250 
 Furthermore, it is, of course, a well-known feature of the Canadian criminal legal 
system, that judges as a rule do not address in their written decisions those issues that are 
not raised by parties.  Again, if this were not the case the legal system would grind to a 
halt.  Indeed, appellate panels will generally refuse to address issues that were not raised 
by counsel at trial, or worse, were not pleaded in notices of appeal or other documents.  
Consent by appeals courts to consider or address issues not properly raised by parties or 
their counsel is very much the exception not the rule.  Of course, obvious dereliction of 
duty or blindness to legally relevant issues are occasionally remedied by judges on their 
own motions.  However, for the most part they focus only on those issues properly raised 
in a timely manner by parties and counsel. 
                                                        
250 Grandinetti, supra note 2 at para. 18. 
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 This being the case, it is submitted that it seems somewhat specious for Huddart 
J.A. to rely on Fliss and Grandinetti, cases that have nothing to do with admissions by a 
party as hearsay, to support her proposition that Mr. Big target statements should not be 
subject to the principled approach to hearsay as a traditional exception because of their 
special status as described in Evans.    
 It is submitted that in relation to the two above criticisms, the majority of the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal has fallen into the logical error of mistaking absence of 
evidence for evidence of absence.  It is not intended in this thesis to single out for 
criticism, or to make an unduly harsh assessment of, the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal.  Indeed, as has been illustrated thus far, and as will be illustrated further, this 
judicial habit of taking the most meagre view possible of the justice of excluding Mr. Big 
target statements is the norm throughout all levels of courts and across all jurisdictions in 
Canada.  It is only because so many of these cases are within British Columbia’s 
jurisdiction that British Columbia judgments tend to be the most scrutinized. 
 Indeed, in the Ontario Court of Appeal the defence argument for application of 
the principled approach also failed. In R. v. Osmar, Rosenberg J.A. for the court stated: 
 
[52]         The other submission for exclusion of the statements based on the 
common law rests on a hearsay analysis.  The appellant submits that in light of R. 
v. Starr (2000), 147  C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.), it is open to this court to revisit 
the established hearsay exceptions, including the admissions exception, on the 
basis of whether the particular evidence meets the requirements of necessity and 
reliability.  The appellant argues that the admissions exception to the hearsay rule 
rests on the theory that admissions against interest are inherently reliable.  He 
points out that in the Mr. Big scenario the statements are not against interest 
since the suspect believes that it is in his interest to admit to a crime to fellow 
criminals. 
[53]         In my view, the hearsay issue has been determined against the appellant 
by this court’s decision in R. v. Foreman (2002), 169 C.C.C. (3d) 489.  As 
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Doherty J.A. pointed out in Foreman at para. 37, by reference to R. v. Evans 
(1993), 85 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.), the rationale for admitting admissions by a 
party rests on the theory of the adversary system, not a necessity/reliability 
analysis.  As in this case, the accused’s admission in Foreman was not made to 
someone whom the accused believed was a person in authority.  In Foreman, the 
admissions were made to the victim.  The admissions were admissible even 
though they had not been subjected to a reliability analysis such as would be 
required if the statements had been made to persons in authority and therefore 
had to be shown to be voluntary.251 
  
The hearsay/admissions issue was much less to the fore in this case, which was much 
more focused on abuse of process, constitutional issues, and expert evidence.  However, 
the result was the same as in Terrico in that the Ontario Court of Appeal found, based on 
the ruling in Foreman, that Sopinka J.’s definition of admissions in Evans meant that 
admissions were exempt from the principled approach or Starr analysis.   
 Once again, it is submitted that some reasoning underlying this exemption is 
necessary.  Undeniably, the analysis in Starr spoke to all hearsay exceptions equally 
without singling any of them out for special treatment.  Why a previous judgment, i.e. 
Evans, should unfailingly stand up against this is not explained.  It is submitted that a 
definitive statement from the Supreme Court of Canada is by this point not only desirable 
but absolutely necessary. 
 A final jurisdiction to be examined is Newfoundland and Labrador.  In this 
province it would appear that the question of whether or not admissions of a party are 
subject to the principled approach is still open.  In addressing the hearsasy issue in R. v. 
Hart, W.G. Dymond J. considered the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. 
Mapara and opined that in that case: 
                                                         
251 Osmar (C.A.), supra note 8 at paras. 52 to 53. 
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The result is that McLachlin, C.J., for the majority, seemed to confirm what 
Sopinka, J. stated in Evans (supra) about oral statements and their admission as a 
party.  This, however, can only be inferred because in the case of Mapara the 
Supreme Court of Canada is clearly dealing with the hearsay exception of the co-
conspiracy rule.  At paragraph 27 the court states: 
  
“In sum, the conditions of the Carter rule provide sufficient circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness necessary to permit the evidence to be 
received.”252 
 
It is submitted in this thesis that W. G. Dymond J. is correct and that any effort to 
conflate the co-conspirators’ exception rule with the admissions rule can be based only 
on inference.  Furthermore, W.G. Dymond J. also cites the dissent in Mapara: 
 
[100]  LeBel and Fish, JJ. disagreed with the majority and concluded that the 
principled approach should be used even in hearsay evidence.  LeBel, J. quotes 
Lamer, C.J. in R. v. U (F.J.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 764 at paragraph 45 of the Mapara 
case as follows: 
  
"’[a]s the goal of our modifications of the principles governing hearsay has 
been to end the rigid artifice of pigeon-hole exceptions, it is important that 
new criteria remain flexible.’ 
  
LeBel, J. continues: 
  
“Reliability and necessity have thus become the predominant criteria 
governing the admissibility of hearsay evidence.”253 
 
W. G. Dymond J. also comments on the law in other jurisdictions, for example Manitoba 
and Alberta, where Mr. Big statements would appear to be considered the same as other 
hearsay exceptions and subject to the principled approach.254   
 The general importance of Khelawon in the development of hearsay law is also 
considered, although W.G. Dymond J. points out that:                                                         
252 Hart (voir dire), supra note 127 at para. 97. 
253 Ibid. at para. 100. 
254 Ibid. at paras. 101 to 104. 
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[113]  It is important to note that in Khelawon the court is again dealing with 
hearsay evidence and does not say much about admissions against interest in a 
criminal trial.  The reliability issue has not been addressed directly when the 
admissions are allegedly the result of psychological threats, intimidation and 
inducements by persons not in authority, resulting in admissions of guilt in a pre-
detention setting.  
….. 
 
 [118]  The Supreme Court of Canada has thus made a change in the direction as 
it relates to evidence admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule.  It does not do 
much to clarify the position as to statements or admissions which may or may not 
have the protection of threshold reliability.255 
 
 In addition to commenting on the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Terrico,256 W.G. Dymond J. also recognizes the ambiguous nature of the admissions as 
being arguably both in the target’s interest and against the target’s interest.257  Like other 
judges, he also expresses a desire for the issues he has raised to be fully addressed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada.258  Having considered the legal arguments presented, he 
concludes that 
 
[128]  As for a resolution of the issue at this stage, I have no clear guidance, 
except in light of the Khelawon (supra) decision, which now allows the court to 
look outside the taking of the statement.  In this case the voir dire is completed 
and I intend to direct the decision as closely as possible to the Starr criteria.  If it 
becomes necessary to reargue Khelawon at a later time, so be it.259 
 
Having determined that it was at least provisionally necessary to conduct a threshold 
reliability inquiry, the Trial Judge ruled as follows: 
                                                         
255 Ibid. at paras. 113 and 118. 
256 Ibid. at paras. 121 to 125. 
257 Ibid. at para. 127. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Ibid. at para. 129. 
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[136]  The Crown’s position on threshold reliability is that the Accused could not 
lie to the “boss” because the “boss” had means of finding out.  The Crown states 
the big “boss” scenario meets the threshold reliability test because the Accused 
had made an admission to “G”, which Mr. Hart denies or says he could not 
remember on the voir dire.  Mr. Hart was aware that the big “boss” stated to Mr. 
Hart that he had to come down hard on “G” because he had not told the “boss” 
about what Mr. Hart had told  “G”.  Mr. Hart, however, has denied making that 
statement to “G” on the voir dire.  Yet when Mr. Hart meets the crime “boss”, 
Mr. Hart knows that the crime “boss” was on “G’s” case because he had 
forgotten to tell the crime “boss” about what Mr. Hart told “G” about the death of 
the children.  The Crown takes the position that Mr. Hart did not have to tell 
anyone on April 10th about the children being drowned, because he was 
continually told he did not have to try and impress “G”.  The Crown argues the 
fact that this statement was given to “G” without pressure, unprompted and took 
place one month before the crime boss scenario, is evidence of reliability of the 
crime “boss” admission.  This statement to “G” is now being denied by Mr. Hart 
on the voir dire, saying he never told “G”.  However, the issue of whether his 
admission to “G” in April was or was not made is clearly a trial issue.  
  
[137]  Yet, the video-taped statement to the crime “boss” is about the “boss” 
wanting to know about Mr. Hart’s daughters’ death. 
  
[138]  If Mr. Hart is now saying that these admissions to the crime “boss” were 
lies and he only made these admissions because of fear, intimidation, 
psychological stress and fear for his life, the question is whether he would risk 
lying about the drownings to someone who is saying I want to help you with this 
issue and make it go away.  Would Mr. Hart risk being caught in his own lie to 
the “boss” in an attempt to gain the confidence of the organization, after being 
warned of what the consequences of lying would be by “G” shortly before the 
interview? 
  
[139]  The Defence argues that the statements to the crime “boss” and the 
narrative leading up to it are so fraught with untrustworthiness that they should 
not be admitted.  The motive to lie was real.  I have already reviewed earlier the 
Defence’s position as to the trustworthiness on a review of the s. 7 Charter 
arguments that were presented in the earlier part of the decision dealing with 
threats, psychological threats, intimidation and fear and whether this constitutes a 
s. 7 Charter breach as a principle of fundamental justice. 
  
[140]  When the court examines the oral admissions to the crime “boss” and the 
alleged admissions to “G” and “I” as to whether these latter statements were 
actually made, it is difficult to assess one without referring to the other.  It was 
also stated earlier that Mr. Hart had given exculpatory statements to the police 
earlier in the investigation.  On the voir dire it is not the trial judge’s job to assess 
the credibility of Mr. Hart or to determine the truthfulness of the statements or 
whether they were actually made.  All that is required on the threshold reliability 
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test is to look at the trustworthiness issue and the circumstances surrounding the 
taking of the statement.  It is true that Mr. Hart wanted into the organization and 
he did have a motive to lie, but there was reason for him to come clean with the 
“boss”, especially when coming clean meant any potential problem Mr. Hart may 
have had could be eliminated by the very person he was telling the problem to.  It 
is interesting to note that Mr. Hart actually went to a WalMart store and stood in 
front of a video camera to have his photo taken at a designated time.  This 
designated time was supposed to be the time when a particular individual who 
witnessed the drowning was supposed to have been taken care of by one of the 
crime gang members. 
  
[141]  The purpose of the picture was to provide an alibi for Mr. Hart as it related 
to taking care of the individual that supposedly had seen Mr. Hart commit the 
crime. 
  
[142]  The video-taped admission to the crime “boss” based on the surrounding 
circumstances of the narrative and the circumstances surrounding its taking, I 
conclude, would pass the threshold test of reliability.  It should be admitted as 
part of the evidence in front of the jury.260  
 
Once again the determination of threshold reliability necessarily focuses on whether or 
not the statements are the truth or are lies.  Also once again the statements are found to 
meet the principled approach test of threshold reliability.   
 Hart was convicted of murder.  His appeal is ongoing, but, as previously noted, 
has been plagued by procedural troubles.  Apparently something of a simpleton at the 
best of times, he has become convinced that the entire legal system; including the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Courts, the Crown prosecutors, Newfoundland and 
Labrador Legal Aid, and of course the police; are still engaged in an undercover sting 
designed to perpetuate his imprisonment.  He apparently finds the entire process to be 
unreliable.261 
                                                        
260 Ibid. at paras. 136 to 142. 
261 R. v. Hart 2009 NLCA 10, 242 CCC (3d) 31 at para. 19 [Hart (C.A.)].  Hart’s 
problems are discussed in many other Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador 
Appeal Division judgments as well. 
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 In concluding this examination of the law of hearsay and admissions in Mr. Big 
cases, it is submitted that in any event the admission of targets’ statements seems to be a 
foregone conclusion.  Whether admissions as hearsay are ultimately ruled to be subject to 
a threshold reliability analysis or not, the point is arguably moot since judges in all 
jurisdictions never fail to find that the threshold reliability standard is met.   
 In the final analysis, it is submitted that what is much more important, from both a 
practical and a more philosophical view, is why the statements are found to meet the 
threshold reliability standard.  Many judges have found that as a general rule Mr. Big 
target statements are manifestly or inherently unreliable.  Many judges have pointed out 
the incentive to lie as well as the incentive to tell the truth.  Indeed, the only hearsay 
danger is whether or not the statement is a lie.  Furthermore, in many if not most cases 
involving a jury, the judge will warn the jury that the statement could be false or 
unreliable.   
 Will an emotional cocktail of greed, fear and the promise of social acceptance 
make a person falsely confess to murder or will it make him tell the truth?  Do threats 
from a crime boss promote truth-telling or story-telling?  What if those threats are only 
implicit, always under the surface, and are interspersed with guarantees that the target can 
‘walk away at any time’?  Arguably, the Mr. Big interview scenario starts to look less and 
less like a hearsay scenario, and more and more to look like a carnival funhouse mirror 
image of an aggressive and formal police interrogation, with the law enforcement 
authority figure interspersing demands for the truth with repetitions of a formal right to 
refuse to answer questions.  Clearly, reliability is a concept that is far from being clearly 
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defined in Mr. Big cases.  Perhaps the answer, as previously proposed in this thesis, is to 
submit the evidence to a formal voluntariness inquiry. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN – VOLUNTARINESS, INCLUDING RELIABILITY, 
PERSON-IN-AUTHORITY AND THE HODGSON WARNING 
 
 Although the topic of voluntariness and reliability was sequentially the first to be 
discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, “Some Introductory Matters and 
Observations Arising from a Legal Analysis of the Sting”; it has been left for further 
discussion in this, the last chapter of the thesis.  The main reason for this structural choice 
is the submission that it is the application of the voluntariness test that presents the most 
obvious and workable solution to the problem of possible wrongful convictions as a 
result of the sting. 
 As has been mentioned previously, it is a fact that this area of law is the most 
clearly decided one in the Mr. Big jurisprudence.  The Supreme Court of Canada’s 
unanimous decision in the case of R. v. Grandinetti262 stands as unassailable authority for 
the admissibility of Mr. Big statements without any recourse to the common law 
confessions rule.  This being the case, it is not surprising that there is relatively little 
mention made in Grandinetti or in other Mr. Big cases regarding the actual voluntariness 
test itself as described in R. v. Oickle.263 
 Grandinetti settled decisively the legal proposition that undercover officers in a 
Mr. Big sting cannot be considered persons in authority, and that there is therefore no 
triggering of the voluntariness test.  The judgment to which the Court referred to most in 
coming to this decision was the previous Supreme Court of Canada decision, R. v. 
                                                        
262 Grandinetti, supra note 2.  
263 Oickle, supra note 57. 
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Hodgson.264  However, the Supreme Court did not, in Grandinetti, advert to or discuss 
the Hodgson warning.   
 It is also worthwhile within the scope of this thesis to point out that Grandinetti 
was an appeal as of right from the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision in the same 
matter.265  That being the case, this chapter will also examine the dissenting judgment of 
Madam Justice McFadyen from that Court.    
 Cases decided prior the the Supreme Court’s decision in Grandinetti are also 
uniform in their decisions to admit the statements of Mr. Big targets without recourse to a 
consideration of voluntariness.  Many of the judgments also consider reliability in 
general, as well as the applicability of the Hodgson warning.  As is the case with 
examinations of case law from other chapters in this thesis, most but not all of the 
judgments originate in the courts of British Columbia. 
 One of the major factors influencing possible views of the legal rules surrounding 
voluntariness in an examination of the Mr. Big sting is the question of whether or not the 
undercover operators present themselves as having such great power as to be able to 
influence the course of the actual murder investigation through corrupt influence.  This 
facet was addressed as one of the scenarios in the first chapter of this thesis.  With regard 
to this state of affairs, defence counsel has argued that when undercover police officers 
claim to the target that they can influence a prosecution or a police investigation through 
corrupt contacts, that essentially puts the sting operators in the position of a person in 
authority.  The Supreme Court summed this up fairly succinctly in Grandinetti: 
                                                         
264 Hodgson, supra note 60. 
265 R. v. Grandinetti 2003 ABCA 307, 178 C.C.C. (3d) 449 [Grandinetti C.A.] 
  156 
13  The defence position at trial was that the undercover officers were “persons 
in authority” because Mr. Grandinetti believed they could influence the 
investigation into the murder of his aunt through the corrupt police officers they 
claimed to know.  This, the defence argued, shifted the burden to the Crown to 
prove either that Mr. Grandinetti did not reasonably believe the undercover 
officers were persons in authority, or that the statements were made voluntarily.  
The Crown, on the other hand, argued that the undercover officers could not be 
persons in authority because the accused must believe that the recipient of a 
confession can influence the investigation or prosecution by aiding, not 
thwarting, the state’s interests. 
  
14  The trial judge held a voir dire to determine the threshold issue, namely 
whether Mr. Grandinetti had met his evidentiary burden of showing that there 
was a valid issue about whether the undercover officers were or could be persons 
in authority.  For this purpose, the defence called three witnesses:  Corporal 
Rennick, Constable Johnston, and Mr. Grandinetti. 
  
15  The trial judge ruled that the undercover officers could not be persons in 
authority, that no voir dire on voluntariness was necessary, and that the 
statements were admissible.  She found that Mr. Grandinetti was totally unaware 
of the true identity of the undercover officers, and, in fact, had a collegial 
relationship with them.  She emphasized that the “person in authority” test is 
largely a subjective one, based on the reasonable beliefs of the accused.  She 
concluded that logic and reason required that the definition of “person in 
authority” be limited to people the accused believes are acting in collaboration 
with the authorities.  In her view, the undercover officers could not be considered 
persons in authority because Mr. Grandinetti viewed them not as acting for or in 
collaboration with the interests of the state, but rather against those interests.266 
 
 This was not the first time that the argument for a modification of the person-in-
authority rule had been made.  From the beginning of Mr. Big’s tenure in the arsenal of 
Canadian law enforcement, this area has been an issue.  For example, in a very early case, 
R. v. McCreery,267 defence counsel argued on a voir dire that the person-in-authority 
                                                        
266 Grandinetti, supra note 2 at paras. 13 to 15. 
267 McCreery, supra note 129.  [1999] 8 W.W.R. 699, 16 C.R. (5th) 71 (B.C.C.A.) 
[McCreery C.A.] 
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requirement ought to be expanded.  The unconstitutionality of the requirement under ss. 7 
and 11(d) of the Charter was also raised and addressed: 
 
[46] Defence counsel submit that a "person in authority" should be expanded to 
include undercover officers, like Constable Doran or Corporal Stenhouse, who 
induce or coerce a confession from the accused.  In addressing this issue, I have 
instructed myself on the law as enunciated in R. v. B.(A.), (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 
17 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused, (1986), 
26 C.C.C. (3d) 17n (S.C.C.) at p. 29, Cory J.A. (as he then was) stated that the 
question of whether or not a person is a person in authority is a question of fact.  
At p. 27, in his summary of the principles derived from the authorities on this 
issue, he stated in part: 
  
(5) The question as to whether the statement was made to a person in 
authority will be viewed subjectively, that is to say, from the point of view 
of the accused person who made the statement.  The proper test is that 
given in Kaufman, Admissibility of Confessions in Criminal Matters, 3rd 
ed. (1979), p. 81, to the effect that did the accused truly believe, at the time 
he made the declaration, that the person he dealt with had some degree of 
power over him?: see Rothman v. The Queen, supra, at p. 36. 
  
  
 [47] In the case at bar, I can find no evidence that at the time the accused made 
the statements to Constable Doran or Corporal Stenhouse, he felt either of them 
had any degree of power over him.  Apart from this, I also see no justification 
whatever for expanding the rules enunciated in R. v. B.(A)., supra. 
  
[48] In rejecting this argument of counsel for the accused, I also follow the 
rulings of my learned brothers in R. v. Eggleston (January 19, 1996) unreported, 
Dawson Creek Registry No. 5394, (B.C.S.C.) per Wilson J. and R. v. Copeland 
and Forknall (April 30, 1996), Prince George Registry No. 17165, (B.C.S.C.) 
per Singh J.  In rejecting the argument of Counsel for the accused with respect to 
the unconstitutionality of the common law rule relating to confessions and their 
submission that the person in authority requirement should be abolished, as 
contrary to s. 7 and s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, I 
also follow the decisions of my learned brothers in Eggleston and Copeland, 
supra.268 
 
                                                        
268 Ibid. paras. 46 to 48. 
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 In this early sting, which appears somewhat rudimentary yet nonetheless effective 
in its design, there appeared to be no attempt made to convince the target that the 
undercover officers had connections with the police or prosecution through which they 
could influence the target’s circumstances.  It is also apparent that the Trial Judge found 
that it was important to look into whether or not the declarant truly believed that the 
undercover officer had power over him, and that that inquiry had to be looked at 
subjectively, from the point of view of the declarant.  As is apparent from the above 
extract, this principle was identified in a quotation from Cory J.A. (as he then was) who 
went on to be the Supreme Court of Canada judge who wrote the decision in Hodgson. 
 In McCreery the officers did not pretend to have corrupt influence with the police.  
This was not the case in R. v. Redd, in which the Voir Dire Judge noted that: 
 
the defence says that the admissions should be excluded because the undercover 
police officers held themselves to be persons who could influence members of 
the justice community, police officers, Crown counsel and even members of the 
judiciary, and so became persons in authority.  Therefore, the defence argues, the 
admissions made without police or Charter warnings are inadmissible.269 
  
 In response to this argument, the Voir Dire Judge noted the general admissibility 
of statements made to undercover agents: 
 
Many challenges to this type of evidence have focused on the argument, now 
rejected, that the undercover operators were persons in authority and that 
statements made to them in the absence of standard warnings were therefore 
inadmissible.  In R. v. Eggleston, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2948 (C.A.) Mr. Justice 
Hall, referring to R. v. McIntyre, supra, R. v. Moore (1997), 94 B.C.A.C. 281 
and R. v. French (1997), 98 B.C.A.C. 265, held that the body of authority was 
"conclusive against that position".270 
                                                         
269 Redd, supra note 133 at para. 156. 
270 Ibid. at para. 165. 
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 As far as the added factor of having undercover police claiming to the target that 
they are able to influence the outcome of a police investigation due to corrupt influence 
with law enforcement is concerned, the Voir Dire Judge stated as follows: 
 
[178]     Defence counsel submitted that this undercover operation was unlike 
others described in the cases dealing with "person in authority" because the 
police officers held themselves out as having a corrupt influence with all levels 
of the criminal justice system.  They say that having indicated their power 
reached to police, prosecutors and judges, they operators clothed themselves in 
the trappings of authority.  They say the police officers went too far, and the 
evidence should be rejected. 
  
[179]     In R. v. Hodgson, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449, 127 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.) at 
p.467 (C.C.C.) Mr. Justice Cory discussed the limits of the person in authority 
requirement and said at p. 468: 
 
Since the person in authority requirement is aimed at controlling coercive 
state conduct, the test for a person in authority should not include those 
whom the accused unreasonably believes to be acting on behalf of the state. 
  
                                   [emphasis added] 
  
[180]     In this case any belief Mr. Redd had that "Tim" and "Al" were acting 
against the state, and any belief he had that these persons had influence with 
elements of the criminal justice system was a belief that they could thwart 
legitimate state authority, or engage in anti-state activity.  This does not meet the 
test described in R. v. Hodgson, supra.271 
 
 Vincent Redd was eventually convicted and his conviction was upheld by the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal.272  R. v. Redd attracts some notice as a possible 
wrongful conviction because of the many lies he told to Mr. Big operatives throughout 
the sting.  This issue will be addressed later in this thesis.  
                                                        
271 Ibid. at paras. 178 to 180. 
272 R. v. Redd 2002 BCCA 325 [Redd C.A.] 
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 In terms of the question of what constitutes a person in authority, it is to be noted 
that the trial judge in the Redd voir dire gives special significance to the fact that the 
undercover operators were specifically pretending to be “acting against the state….could 
thwart legitimate state authority, or engage in anti-state activity”.  The significance of the 
pretended “anti-state” design is not readily apparent in Hodgson.  In fact, it is probably a 
good idea to examine the larger passage in Hodgson from which the extract cited above 
in Redd originates: 
 
33    The subjective approach to the person in authority requirement has been 
adopted in this Court.  See Rothman, supra, at p. 663.  The approach adopted by 
McIntyre J.A. (as he then was) in R. v. Berger (1975), 27 C.C.C. (2d) 357 
(B.C.C.A.), at pp. 385‑86 is, in my view, a clear statement of the law: 
  
The law is settled that a person in authority is a person concerned with the 
prosecution who, in the opinion of the accused, can influence the course of 
the prosecution.  The test to be applied in deciding whether statements 
made to persons connected in such a way with the prosecution are 
voluntary is subjective.  In other words what did the accused think?  Whom 
did he think he was talking to? . . .  Was he under the impression that the 
failure to speak to this person, because of his power to influence the 
prosecution, would result in prejudice or did he think that a statement 
would draw some benefit or reward?  If his mind was free of such 
impressions the person receiving this statement would not be considered a 
person in authority and the statement would be admissible. 
  
 
34   However, to this statement I would add that the accused’s belief that he is 
speaking to a person in authority must also be reasonable, in the context of the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement.  If the accused were 
delusional or had no reasonable basis for the belief that the receiver of the 
statement could affect the course of the prosecution against him, the receiver 
should not be considered a person in authority.  Since the person in authority 
requirement is aimed at controlling coercive state conduct, the test for a person in 
authority should not include those whom the accused unreasonably believes to be 
acting on behalf of the state.  Thus, where the accused speaks out of fear of 
reprisal or hope of advantage because he reasonably believes the person 
receiving the statement is acting as an agent of the police or prosecuting 
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authorities and could therefore influence or control the proceedings against him 
or her, then the receiver of the statement is properly considered a person in 
authority.  In other words, the evidence must disclose not only that the accused 
subjectively believed the receiver of the statement to be in a position to control 
the proceedings against the accused, but must also establish an objectively 
reasonable basis for that belief.  For example, if the evidence discloses a 
relationship of agency or close collaboration between the receiver of the 
statement and the police or prosecution, and that relationship was known to the 
accused, the receiver of the statement may be considered a person in authority.  
In those circumstances the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
statement was made voluntarily.273 
  
 The above two paragraphs from Hodgson, and indeed the entire case, are subject 
to a myriad of interpretations for the examiner of Mr. Big jurisprudence.  For one thing, 
there is absolutely no doubt from the above passage that the subjective belief of the 
declarant is highly significant; i.e. his opinion of the person who received his statement, 
whom did he think he was talking to, what were the impressions of his mind?  Also, with 
regard to the reasonableness of the belief, it should be noted that the belief referred to is 
not whether or not the receiver is real law enforcement, rather it is the belief that the 
power to affect the course of the prosecution was real. 
 Another concept here is that of influence.  Does the declarant believe that the 
receiver can influence the prosecution?  Does he have the power to do so?  Can he affect 
the course of the prosecution?  Does the evidence disclose a relationship of agency or 
close collaboration between the receiver and the police or prosecution and was that 
relationship known to the accused?   
 So, in one sense, a subjective belief in the ability of Mr. Big to influence a 
prosecution should arguably be enough to make the receiver of a Mr. Big confession, 
who is actually a police officer, a person-in-authority.  It is true that Cory J. also makes                                                         
273 Hodgson, supra note 60 at paras. 33 to 34. 
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reference to the exclusion from the category of people whom the accused unreasonably 
believes to acting on behalf of the state.  However, that is not really the situation in a Mr. 
Big context.  In these stings the question is one of a declarant’s arguably quite reasonable 
belief that a non-police actor can influence or control a prosecution. 
 There is no doubt that Cory J.’s conception of who can be a person-in-authority is 
not limited to known police officers.  He notes that, depending on the circumstances, 
many different private citizens can be persons-in-authority, including a complainant’s 
parent, a social worker, or the victim of a crime.  What is important is the accused’s 
perception of the receiver’s relationship with the state and his belief that the receiver of 
the statement was allied with authorities and capable of exerting influence over an 
investigation of prosecution.274  Cory J. goes on to state that  
 
36   The important factor to note in all of these cases is that there is no catalogue 
of persons, beyond a peace officer or prison guard, who are automatically 
considered a person in authority solely by virtue of their status.  A parent, doctor, 
teacher or employer all may be found to be a person in authority if the 
circumstances warrant, but their status, or the mere fact that they may wield some 
personal authority over the accused, is not sufficient to establish them as persons 
in authority for the purposes of the confessions rule.  As the intervener the 
Attorney General of Canada observed, the person in authority requirement has 
evolved in a manner that avoids a formalistic or legalistic approach to the 
interactions between ordinary citizens.  Instead, it requires a case‑by‑case 
consideration of the accused’s belief as to the ability of the receiver of the 
statement to influence the prosecution or investigation of the crime.  That is to 
say, the trial judge must determine whether the accused reasonably believed the 
receiver of the statement was acting on behalf of the police or prosecuting 
authorities.  This view of the person in authority requirement remains 
unchanged.275 
 
                                                        
274 Ibid. at para. 35. 
275 Ibid. at para. 36. 
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 The Supreme Court of Canada decided Hodgson at about the same time that Mr. 
Big cases were first starting to come to trial in British Columbia.  Cory J.’s judgment 
really does not precisely determine what should be done with a Mr. Big statement.  He 
refers to receivers of statements being seen as allied with the state authorities or as acting 
on behalf of the police or prosecuting authorities.  The Mr. Big paradigm is arguably 
capable of fitting into such a paradigm.  Clearly Mr. Big presents himself as ‘allied with’ 
corrupt police officers, prosecutors or even judges.  It is, however, admittedly less tenable 
to say that Mr. Big purports to act ‘on behalf of’ police or prosecuting authorities 
(although one could say that the fictitious corrupt police are purported to act on Mr. Big’s 
behalf).  Nevertheless, the repeated emphasis placed by Cory J. on the importance of the 
subjective belief of the declarant that the receiver can influence the prosecution is hard to 
ignore. 
 All of the above being the case, it is now proposed to return to the situation in R. 
v. Redd.  It is submitted that the Trial Judge missed the point in that case to conclude that 
Redd held an unreasonable belief that the receivers of his statement were acting on behalf 
of the state.  Instead, like the majority of targets in his situation, what he really held was 
an arguably quite reasonable belief, based on the highly manipulative nature of the sting, 
that a powerful crime boss could influence the prosecution against him by exerting his 
power over corrupt justice system participants. 
 As far as Mr. Big stings are concerned, Hodgson is clearly not entirely on point 
and, without more, leaves some important questions unanswered on how exactly the fake 
gang and the fake crime boss should be viewed.  The unanimous ruling in Grandinetti 
settled this issue and will now be looked at more fully. 
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 The Supreme Court of Canada judgment is not terribly long, only 62 paragraphs, 
and the Court had more than just the issue of determination of person-in-authority status 
to address.  All in all defence counsel throughout the trial and appeal process had 
attempted to rely on several grounds for exclusion of the target statements, including 
abuse of process, and whether or not there was a psychological detention and subsequent 
section 7 Charter violation.276  That said, by the time the appeal reached the Supreme 
Court of Canada only two issues were left.  The main question to be addressed in this 
inquiry is that of whether or not the undercover officers should have been accorded the 
status of persons-in-authority.   
 However, the second issue, one which sets Grandinetti apart from the majority of 
other Mr. Big cases, is the fact that there really seemed to be a viable second suspect in 
the murder: a violent cocaine dealer named Rick Papin who was involved in the drug 
trafficking business with the victim, Connie Grandinetti.   At the voir dires on 
admissibility of third party evidence, much evidence was led to show that there had been 
a falling out between Papin and the victim.  It was alleged that there had been some 
dispute over whether the victim was selling drugs in Papin’s territory, that Papin had 
broken into her home and threatened her with a knife about a year before the murder, that 
both Papin and the victim were police informers and that the victim had been planning to 
expose Papin while he was still incarcerated, and that Papin had been released from 
prison only a few days before her murder.277  Ultimately, Abella J.A. found that there was 
                                                        
276 Grandinetti (C.A.), supra note 265 at para. 2. 
277 Grandinetti, supra note 2, paras. 16 to 32. 
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insufficient evidence of motive, opportunity and access to the victim to allow the 
evidence of Papin’s relationship with her to be placed before the jury.278 
 The Trial Judge’s ruling on the person-in-authority issue, as restated by Abella J., 
has already been adverted to above.  As stated before, voluntariness per se was not the 
precise issue in this case, but rather the person-in-authority rule. The unanimous 
judgment relied almost entirely on Cory J.’s judgment in Hodgson in deciding the issues 
in Grandinetti.   
 Among other things the Court noted that, although Cory J. explicitly considered 
doing away with the person-in-authority requirement, he declined to do so, at least 
partially out of a concern that it would render all statements made to undercover police 
officers subject to the voluntariness test.279  The Court also noted that a person in 
authority is “generally someone engaged in the arrest, detention, interrogation or 
prosecution of the accused”.280    
 After making these observations, Abella J. turned to what, in the view of this 
thesis, is the crux of the issue, the belief of the target regarding the status of the person 
with whom he speaks: 
 
38    The test of who is a “person in authority” is largely subjective, focusing on 
the accused’s perception of the person to whom he or she is making the 
statement.  The operative question is whether the accused, based on his or her 
perception of the recipient’s ability to influence the prosecution, believed either 
that refusing to make a statement to the person would result in prejudice, or that 
making one would result in favourable treatment. 
                                                          
278 Ibid. at paras. 58-61. 
279 Ibid. at para. 35. 
280 Ibid. at para. 37. 
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39   There is also an objective element, namely, the reasonableness of the 
accused’s belief that he or she is speaking to a person in authority.  It is not 
enough, however, that an accused reasonably believe that a person can influence 
the course of the investigation or prosecution.  As the trial judge correctly 
concluded: 
  
[R]eason and common sense dictates that when the cases speak of a person 
in authority as one who is capable of controlling or influencing the course 
of the proceedings, it is from the perspective of someone who is involved 
in the investigation, the apprehension and prosecution of a criminal offence 
resulting in a conviction, an agent of the police or someone working in 
collaboration with the police.  It does not include someone who seeks to 
sabotage the investigation or steer the investigation away from a suspect 
that the state is investigating. 
  
(Alta. Q.B., No. 98032644C5, April 30 1999, at para. 56)281 
 
 
 There are a couple of points worth making with regard to the above statement.  In 
the first place, the Trial Judge appears to identify specifically a category of person who 
will not be considered a person–in–authority, i.e. someone who seeks to sabotage an 
investigation or steer attention away from a suspect.  Abella J. identifies this approach as 
correct.  Of course there is nothing plainly objectionable in this statement, especially 
since Cory J. more or less declared that the categories should remain open on the person-
in-authority issue. 
 The really glaring problem is the more plainly logical one, i.e. the fact that Mr. 
Big does not fit into the category described.  Mr. Big is involved in the investigation of 
the criminal offence.  Furthermore, Mr. Big decidedly is not trying to sabotage the 
investigation or steer police scrutiny away from the target.  Indeed, he is trying to 
intensify it.  What the trial judge is describing, and Abella J. is endorsing, is the exclusion 
of a real crime boss from person-in-authority status.  Mr. Big does not fit into this                                                         
281 Ibid. at paras. 39-40. 
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definition. 
 The above quotation and comment constitute a good example of the type of 
logical conundrum the courts can get caught up in when attempts are made to justify the 
massive deception that the sting entails. 
 Of course throughout an examination of the Mr. Big jurisprudence attention is 
periodically drawn to the necessity and value of undercover police operations and the 
reasonable expectation that undercover officers should not normally be considered 
persons-in-authority.  This was unsurprisingly the case in Abella J.’s decision in as well: 
  
40    Although the person in authority test is not a categorical one, absent unusual 
circumstances an undercover officer will not be a person in authority since, from 
the accused’s viewpoint, he or she will not usually be so viewed.  This position is 
supported by precedent.  As Cory J. explained in Hodgson: 
  
 
The receiver’s status as a person in authority arises only if the 
accused had knowledge of that status.  If the accused cannot show that he 
or she had knowledge of the receiver’s status (as, for example, in the case 
of an undercover police officer) . . ., the inquiry pertaining to the receiver 
as a person in authority must end. [para. 39] 
  
See also Rothman v. The Queen, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640, at p. 664; R. v. Todd 
(1901), 4 C.C.C. 514 (Man. K.B.), at p. 527. 
  
41    The appellant conceded that undercover officers are usually not persons in 
authority.  His position is that although undercover officers are not usually 
persons in authority, when an undercover operation includes as part of its ruse a 
suggested association with corrupt police, who the accused is told could 
influence the investigation and prosecution of the offence, the officers qualify as 
persons in authority. 
  
42    However, under the traditional confession rule, 
  
a person in authority is a person concerned with the prosecution who, in the 
opinion of the accused, can influence the course of the prosecution. 
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(R. v. Berger (1975), 27 C.C.C. (2d) 357 (B.C.C.A.), at p. 385, cited in 
Hodgson, at para. 33) 
  
43    This, it seems to me, is further elaborated in Hodgson by Cory J.’s 
description of a person in authority as someone whom the confessor perceives to 
be “an agent of the police or prosecuting authorities”, “allied with the state 
authorities”, “acting on behalf of the police or prosecuting authorities”, and 
“acting in concert with the police or prosecutorial authorities, or as their agent” 
(paras. 34-36 and 47).  He amplified this theory as follows: 
  
 
Since the person in authority requirement is aimed at controlling coercive 
state conduct, the test for a person in authority should not include those 
whom the accused unreasonably believes to be acting on behalf of the state. 
Thus, where the accused speaks out of fear of reprisal or hope of advantage 
because he reasonably believes the person receiving the statement is acting 
as an agent of the police or prosecuting authorities and could therefore 
influence or control the proceedings against him or her, then the receiver of 
the statement is properly considered a person in authority. In other words, 
the evidence must disclose not only that the accused subjectively believed 
the receiver of the statement to be in a position to control the proceedings 
against the accused, but must also establish an objectively reasonable basis 
for that belief. . . . 
  
. . . 
  
. . . there is no catalogue of persons, beyond a peace officer or prison guard, 
who are automatically considered a person in authority solely by virtue of 
their status.  A parent, doctor, teacher or employer all may be found to be a 
person in authority if the circumstances warrant, but their status, or the 
mere fact that they may wield some personal authority over the accused, is 
not sufficient to establish them as persons in authority for the purposes of 
the confessions rule. . . . [T]he person in authority requirement has evolved 
in a manner that avoids a formalistic or legalistic approach to the 
interactions between ordinary citizens. Instead, it requires a case‑by‑case 
consideration of the accused’s belief as to the ability of the receiver of the 
statement to influence the prosecution or investigation of the crime. That is 
to say, the trial judge must determine whether the accused reasonably 
believed the receiver of the statement was acting on behalf of the police or 
prosecuting authorities. [paras. 34 and 36]282 
 
                                                         
282 Ibid. at paras. 40-43. 
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Cory J.’s example of an undercover officer not being a person-in-authority is impossible 
to ignore.  However, one must bear in mind that Hodgson was decided before the classic 
Mr. Big sting cases started reaching the courts.   
 Also of note is Abella J.’s comment in introducing Cory J.’s statement that 
“absent unusual circumstances an undercover officer will not be a person in authority”.  It 
is submitted that it would be helpful to have an example of an undercover operation more 
unusual than a Mr. Big sting.   
 Abella J. concluded; 
 
  
44    The appellant believed that the undercover officers were criminals, not 
police officers, albeit criminals with corrupt police contacts who could 
potentially influence the investigation against him.  When, as in this case, the 
accused confesses to an undercover officer he thinks can influence his murder 
investigation by enlisting corrupt police officers, the state’s coercive power is not 
engaged.  The statements, therefore, were not made to a person in authority.283 
 
 At this juncture it is necessary point out, or perhaps concede, that in fact the 
Supreme Court of Canada is the highest court in the land and if they choose to rule 
statements made by targets in Mr. Big stings admissible without a voluntariness inquiry 
they may do so.  There may be good policy reasons for doing so, although in researching 
and writing this thesis it has not been possible to identify any.  Clearly, Parliament has for 
the most part left determination of evidence law to the judiciary, and determine it they 
must in order for the legal system to function.   
 That said, the problem as submitted in this thesis is that, as has been argued 
previously with regard to the British Columbia Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of 
                                                        
283 Ibid. at para. 44. 
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Canada has to a degree misinterpreted previous judgments, in this case the previous 
judgment of Cory J. in Hodgson.  It is further submitted that McFadyen J.A.’s dissenting 
judgment at the Alberta Court of Appeal is more in keeping with Cory J.’s analysis than 
Abella J.’s.   
 In recounting the history of the case, McFadyen J. points out that the Trial Judge 
considered that there was insufficient evidence even to embark on a voir dire to 
determine whether or not he undercover officers were capable of being considered 
persons-in-authority.  She noted the Trial Judge’s ruling that the Mr. Big operatives  
 
cannot be perceived as persons in authority. In my view, it is not 
enough that an accused reasonably believe that the person can 
influence the course of the investigation or the prosecution. It must be 
to obtain the object of the state and not the object of the criminal.284 
       (emphasis in original)  
 
 McFadyen J. went on to consider Cory J.’s definition of person-in-authority, 
noting that he took a broad view of that definition and emphasized the importance of the 
subjective opinion of the declarant.  She continued: 
 
[106]      He acknowledged, however, that an accused’s subjective perception 
must be reasonably held and set out this limitation at para. 34: 
  
... where the accused speaks out of fear of reprisal or hope of advantage 
because he reasonably believes the person receiving the statement is acting 
as an agent of the police or prosecuting authorities and could therefore 
influence or control the proceedings against him or her, then the receiver of 
the statement is properly considered a person in authority. 
  
[107]      I do not take this to mean that the accused must be satisfied that there is 
a formal relationship of principal and agent based strictly upon advancing the                                                         
284 Grandinetti, supra note 265 at para. 99. 
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interests of the principal. Cory J. quickly went on to use other words to describe 
the relationship between a recipient and the state that could make someone a 
person in authority. 
  
 
[108]      At para. 34, for example, he spoke of a “relationship of agency or close 
collaboration between the receiver of the statement and the police or 
prosecution” (emphasis added). At para. 35, he spoke of the accused’s belief that 
the “receiver was allied with the state authorities and could influence the 
investigation or prosecution against the accused” (emphasis added). At para. 45, 
when discussing the circumstances when a trial judge would be obliged to 
proceed to a voir dire on her own motion, he said that the receiver must be 
“closely connected to the authorities” (emphasis added). In para. 47, speaking on 
this same subject, he used the words “acting in concert with the police or 
prosecutorial authorities ...” (emphasis added). Finally, at para. 49, when dealing 
with the facts of the appeal before the court, Cory J. made the following inclusive 
statement: 
  
Indeed, anyone is capable of being a person in authority where a person 
becomes sufficiently involved with the arrest, detention, examination or 
prosecution of an accused, and the accused believes that the person may 
influence the process against him or her. 
(emphasis added) 
  
[109]      In my view, therefore, the test for persons in authority, found in 
Hodgson, requires only that there be a sufficient relationship between the 
recipient of a statement and the investigating or prosecuting authorities, that an 
accused may reasonably infer that the recipient could affect the investigation or 
prosecution of the offence.285 
 
 It is submitted that McFadyen J.’s analysis ought to be the preferred one.  Further 
on in her dissenting judgment she again identifies the two main components of the 
person-in-authority rule.  Firstly, there must be a belief that the recipient of the statement 
must have a connection with and be able to influence the prosecution.  Secondly, that 
belief must be reasonable.  She notes that the test does not require that the declarant 
believe that any promise or inducement made “be for the good of the state” and that 
                                                        
285 Ibid. at paras. 106 to 109. 
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“[t]he law does not require that an accused…make a qualitative analysis of whether any 
promise or inducement furthers the object of the state.”286 
 This seems to be the more faithful interpretation of Cory J.’s judgment.  
Especially when one considers the statement he made in Hodgson (cited above) that 
anyone is capable of being a peson-in-authority.  As another support for her position, 
McFadyen J. notes that “[i]f it is a further qualification that, in fact, an actual relationship 
exists between the recipient and the prosecuting authorities, that fact is met here. The 
police are the recipients of the information.”287  This, of course, is a fact of which sight 
should not be lost. 
 Later, McFadyen J.A.’s concluding statement on the person-in-authority issue 
underlines the sensibility of including Mr. Big operators in the definition: 
 
Here we have actual police officers going undercover to secure a statement from 
a suspect and escape the application of the confessions rule. At the same time, 
however, they wish to make use of the implied power and authority of the state to 
assist them in inducing the appellant to confess. The object of the confessions 
rule is to ensure that statements extracted by the police are reliable and that they 
have not been coerced by inappropriate state conduct. It makes sense, therefore, 
that the rule should apply to the police officers in this case.288 
 
 It is obviously the position of this thesis that Mr. Big operators are at least capable 
of being seen as persons-in-authority, especially in those situations when they pretend to 
be able to influence the justice system.  Furthermore, it may be reasonable to ask what 
exactly is the nature of the justice system or the state in the subjective mind of the target.  
It has already been noted earlier in this thesis that targets tend to be unsophisticated.  The 
                                                        
286 Ibid. at para. 113. 
287 Ibid. 
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views of unsophisticated individuals as to how the legal system and the state operate may 
be different from the views of judges and lawyers. 
 For example, in R. v. Steadman the accused testified that he believed the 
organization he was working for was legitimate and had legitimate connections to the 
prosecuting authorities.289  The trial judge noted that 
 
[Steadman] said that he repeatedly asked K if everything was on the “up and up”, 
and he was repeatedly assured that it was.  He said K told him the “boss had lots 
of high priced lawyers and contacts that could help out in just about anything”.  
In that regard, he said K told him they had contacts at the provincial, federal and 
municipal levels that could help out, although he could not recall anything more 
specific about what he was told about them.  Mr. Steadman said K told him they 
had contacts that owed the organization favours, and by exchanging favours they 
were able to get things done.290 
  
 After having reviewed all of the scenarios in which Mr. Steadman participated, 
including the impressive “blood scenario” referred to in the first chapter of this thesis, the 
Trial Judge responded to Mr. Steadman’s purported belief in the organization’s 
legitimacy as follows: 
 
[48]           All of these events would have led even the most naïve individual to 
the conclusion that the organization and the men involved in it were criminals.  
Mr. Steadman testified that while he was suspicious of the nature of the 
organization’s business, he thought they had legitimate connections with 
government authorities.  He testified he thought they might be police informants 
that were able to parlay information into “favours” from the police.  These 
favours extended to legitimately removing him from any jeopardy for his 
involvement in Mr. Black’s disappearance.  He was not able to explain exactly 
how, or even why, he thought that might be accomplished.291 
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 The Trial Judge in this case probably made the right decision.  It is arguably 
unlikely that the target was as wildly naïve as he claimed to be.  However, the argument 
made raises the question of what exactly the state or the legal system is and what a 
reasonable perception of it is.  It seems as though judges tend to view the state as an 
individual entity similar to a person, or at least to a corporation 
 However, strictly speaking, the state is not an abstract, unidirectional, single-
minded monolith.  It is made up of individual human actors. It is submitted that Abella J. 
and the Trial Judge in Steadman are largely relying in their reasons upon an abstract 
notion of the state that functions as a self-aware organism organism rather than as the 
union of separate consciousnesses that it is. 
 The question arises as to where a line between the state and what might be called 
the non-state begin and end.  Is it so unreasonable to believe that a powerful organization 
would exchange favours with the formal government in order to “get things done” as 
Steadman testified he believed was the case?  And if this is the case where can authority 
really be said to begin or end? 
 The prevailing view also assumes the state to be a virtuous actor, but what would 
be a reasonable view regarding authority to a target who has experienced criminal actions 
or unfairness at the hands of the police or the state?  Would it not be reasonable for that 
target to assume that corruption was normal and that unsavoury arrangements between 
the state and the underworld are the norm in some circumstances?  And if that is indeed 
the case, as it certainly has been in different times and places in the world, we may need 
to ask ourselves who exactly it is who is being naïve. 
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 More could be said on the person-in-authority issue, however, in the interests of 
brevity, the issue of the Hodgson warning will now be addressed.  In many ways an 
uncontentious area, the significance of this area can be discussed in fairly short order.  In 
Hodgson, Cory J. declined to eliminate the person-in-authority rule, but nevertheless 
suggested it would be appropriate in some circumstances for the trial judge to warn the 
jury about the dangers of relying on statements made to persons not in authority, 
especially when those circumstances included elements of violence, threats of violence, 
oppressive treatment, fear or degrading treatment: 
 
29 …… The unfairness of admitting statements coerced by private individuals 
should be recognized.  However, it is the sort of change which should be studied 
by Parliament and remedied by enactment.  See Watkins v. Olafson, [1989] 2 
S.C.R. 750; R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654; Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) 
Ltd. v. Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1210, at para. 93; Winnipeg 
Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 925.  
Because of the very real possibility of a resulting miscarriage of justice and the 
fundamental unfairness of admitting statements coerced by the violence of 
private individuals, I would hope that the study will not be long postponed. 
  
30    In the meantime I would suggest that in circumstances where a statement of 
the accused is obtained by a person who is not a person in authority by means of 
degrading treatment such as violence or threats of violence, a clear direction 
should be given to the jury as to the dangers of relying upon it.  The direction 
might include words such as these:  “A statement obtained as a result of inhuman 
or degrading treatment or the use of violence or threats of violence may not be 
the manifestation of the exercise of a free will to confess.  Rather, it may result 
solely from the oppressive treatment or fear of such treatment.  If it does, the 
statement may very well be either unreliable or untrue.  Therefore, if you 
conclude that the statement was obtained by such oppression very little if any 
weight should be attached to it.”  However, if a private individual resorts to 
violence or threatens violence after the statement has been made, this conduct 
will not as a general rule be a factor affecting the voluntariness of the statement 
and the suggested direction will not be needed.292 
                                                         
292 Hodgson, supra note 60 at paras. 29 to 30. 
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 The significance of this statement in relation to the Mr. Big sting is hard to miss. 
Many stings contain significant elements of threats of violence, violence, oppressive 
conduct and fear.  That said, it is the case that many if not most judges do in fact deliver 
significant warnings to the jury from the bench in their instructions.  Many times as well 
it is simply not a question raised by defence counsel either at trial or on appeal, possibly 
because they wish to concentrate their efforts on different legal issues.  
 That said, it has been the subject of judicial comment on a few occasions.  In the 
previously mentioned case of R. v. Forknall, defence counsel argued that “given the 
pressure of the inducements under which the appellant made his inculpatory statements, 
they were inherently unreliable, and that it was incumbent upon the trial judge to caution 
the jury in clear and strong terms about the dangers of placing any significant weight on 
the statement”.293  There had been no objection made to the actual admission of the 
statements.  
  The British Columbia Court of Appeal quoted extensively from defence counsel’s 
submissions to the jury at trial, in which a significant amount of reference was made to 
the presence of fear and coercion in the “sophisticated and elaborate scenarios” 
orchestrated by the underover operators.294  The Court of Appeal considered that the 
unreliability of the statement was brought to the jury’s attention in concluding a Hodgson 
warning was not necessary: 
 
[42]   I am similarly of the view in this case that it was not necessary for the trial 
judge to provide a Hodgson warning to the jury about the reliability of the 
appellant’s confession to the undercover police officers.  Although the appellant                                                         
293 Skiffington, supra note 38 at para. 37. 
294 Ibid. at paras. 34 to 36. 
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did not testify or call evidence as did the appellant in Carter, supra, the whole 
thrust of the defence in this case was that the confession was inherently 
unreliable.  Defence counsel emphasized the reasons the appellant had to lie to 
B.A., his repeated denials of responsibility both in 1994 and subsequently, his 
financial difficulties, the attraction of easy money, the importance of his being 
trusted by B.A., and the need to admit the murder to him in order to gain his 
trust. 
[43]   The transcript of defence counsel’s closing submissions shows that about 
80% of it was devoted to discrediting the appellant’s confession.  That part of 
counsel’s address concluded in this way: 
So you’ve got a person who has a history of lying. Then you’ve got lies in 
the confession, and inaccuracies and inconsistencies, and then you’ve got 
all the reason in the world to lie in the confession. Well, when you give a 
liar all the reasons in the world to lie, what do you think you get? They 
knew he was a liar, they’d been having problems with him all the way 
along, lying, and then they dangled in front of him all these incredible 
inducements. What do you expect? I mean, really, what do you expect 
when you give a guy with a history of lying every reason in the world to 
lie? He would have been a complete fool not to have lied. He should risk 
his life that W.’s going to blow his brains out? He should give up $50,000, 
the house, the home, all that stuff, just give it all up? He would have been a 
fool not to do what he did. 
So that’s it for the confession. I spent a lot of time on that because it’s 
really, when it comes right down to it, the entire Crown case. That’s all 
they’ve got, is the confession….295 
 Further to the above passage, the Court of Appeal noted that the Trial Judge’s 
charge to the jury contained 21paragraphs reviewing defence counsel’s arguments on 
unreliability, and the fact that defence counsel at trial did not actually request an 
independent warning.  All of that being the case, the Court of Appeal concluded that the 
jury must have been well aware that the confession was the major part of the Crown’s 
case, that it might not be truthful and that it might therefore be dangerous to base a 
                                                        
295 Ibid. at paras. 42 to 43. 
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conviction on it.  Hence, an additional warning was ruled to be “superfluous”.296 
 The issue of a Hodgson warning also arose in the previously mentioned case of R. 
v. Bonisteel.  Defence counsel in this case argued that the Trial Judge’s instructions to the 
jury were not sufficient to bring home the unreliability of the target’s statements, but the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal disagreed, noting that “there is no particular form that 
the trial judge must follow in warning the jury about false confessions”.297  The Court of 
Appeal noted the sufficiency of the Trial Judge’s warning as follows: 
[76]           The trial judge’s instructions in this case went beyond explaining to 
the jury the motives for the appellant to lie.  He discussed the known risk in 
criminal law of false confessions, and warned the jury that it is wrong to assume 
that people confess only to crimes they have actually committed.  He spoke of 
the “manipulation of the target during an undercover sting”, and instructed the 
jury to take “great care” in considering the “veracity or credibility” of the 
appellant’s statements to Buck.  He specifically told the jury that “confessions 
produced by an undercover operation such as this are viewed as inherently 
unreliable” and “highly suspect without independent confirmation of the truth”.  
 He referred the jury to the circumstances in this particular case, including 
whether the appellant “[got] something wrong in his story to the Big Boss – such 
as the difference you may find it to be between his version of the number of the 
stab wounds inflicted on the girls and reality …”.  He expressed the opinion to 
the jury that “the accused got the number of stab wounds wrong”.298 
 
                                                        
296 Ibid. at paras. 44 to 45. 
297 Bonisteel, supra note 33 at paras. 72 to 73. 
298 Ibid. at para. 76. 
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All of the above being the case, the Court of Appeal found that there was “no merit to the 
argument that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury about false confessions were 
insufficient”.299 
 Not much more likely needs to be said about the Hodgson warning’s significance 
to Mr. Big stings.  It is not a heavily litigated area and even if it were it seems as though 
most trial judges are alive to the necessity of warning juries about the dangers of 
unreliable confessions. 
 A final, and more ephemeral subject to be examined in this chapter is reliability in 
relation to Mr. Big sting target statements.  The ephemeral aspect arises in an 
examination of the confessions rule itself and the wider principles underlying it, of which 
there appear to be two: the aforementioned reliability, as well as a concern for the 
administration of justice and fundamental principles of fairness.  Although R. v. Oickle300 
is reasonably considered to be the leading case on voluntary confessions, it is submitted 
that an initial focus on Cory J.’s decision in R. v. Hodgson301 is more helpful in 
identifying these principles. 
 Cory J. notes that in the long history of the confessions rule both of the above 
mentioned wider underlying principles are of some antiquity.  He cites English authority 
from the eighteenth century as a basis for both principles, but he also indicates a 
preference on the part of some judges for basing the confessions rule solely on reliability 
concerns and not on a fairness principle.302  Nevertheless, Cory J. ultimately concludes 
that “from its very inception, the confessions rule was designed not only to ensure the                                                         
299 Ibid. at para. 77. 
300 Oickle, supra note 57. 
301 Hodgson, supra note 60. 
302 Ibid.  at paras. 17 to 18. 
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reliability of the confession, but also to guarantee fundamental fairness in the criminal 
process.”303 
 Expanding upon this, Cory J. continues: 
 
19   Of particular significance is the relationship between these two concerns of 
reliability and fairness.  It must be recognized that the purpose of the confessions 
rule is to exclude putatively unreliable statements, not actually unreliable 
statements.  In other words, the confessions rule excludes statements obtained by 
force, threat or promises as somehow inherently unreliable, but does not inquire 
into the actual truth or falsity of the statement.  If the concern of the confessions 
rule were truly the reliability of the statement, then the court’s inquiry would 
focus on objective corroboration of the confession evidence; if additional 
evidence confirmed the confession was accurate, it should be admitted under a 
reliability rationale. 
20   Instead, the confessions rule asks only if the statement was voluntary, not if 
the statement is true.  DeClercq v. The Queen, [1968] S.C.R. 902.  This focus on 
voluntariness allows a court to analyse the circumstances surrounding the 
statement and effectively acts as a check on the abuse of state power.  In other 
words, if the state were left with the option of simply corroborating forced 
confessions, there would be little incentive to refrain from reprehensible 
investigative measures.  That is why the confessions rule automatically excludes 
involuntary statements, regardless of their veracity.304 
  
 Finally, Cory J. states that “the admission of evidence which may be unreliable 
does not per se render a trial unfair”305 and that 
 
The confessions rule does not force a trial judge to exclude “unreliable” evidence 
that is highly probative of guilt.  Rather it focuses on putative reliability, by 
analysing the circumstances surrounding the statement and their effect on the 
accused, regardless of the statement’s accuracy.  Thus the “reliability” rationale 
and the “fairness” rationale for the confessions rule blend together, so as to 
ensure fair treatment to the accused in the criminal process by deterring coercive 
state tactics.306                                                         
303 Ibid. 
304 Ibid. at paras. 19 to 20 
305 Ibid. at para. 21. 
306 Ibid. 
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 In tackling the problem of voluntariness it is submitted that it is somewhat 
difficult to fully understand the rationale underlying the confessions rule in the way that 
Cory J. identifies it.  The concept becomes somewhat more confusing when he asserts 
that the confessions rule, as it relates to the notion of fairness, is “based upon the 
principle against self-incrimination,”307 but shortly thereafter recognizes the fact that “a 
rationale for the confessions rule extending beyond trustworthiness is not always easy to 
locate.”308  Presumably the principle against self-incrimination as used here fits under the 
rubric of concerns for trial fairness and the administration of justice, while 
trustworthiness is a synonym for reliability.   
 Furthermore, the fact that, as Cory J. states, the confessions rule is more 
concerned with putative reliability than with a larger concept of reliability and that the 
admission of unreliable evidence will not render a trial unfair would seem puzzling to 
many.   
 All of the above being the case, and bearing in mind that Canada’s laws regarding 
voluntary confessions are difficult to parse when not examined in a clear context, it is 
nevertheless respectfully submitted that the tactics used in the Mr. Big sting are so 
manipulative and deceptive that it is impossible not to see them as capable of producing 
false confessions.  This being the case, in addition to what Cory J. had to say about the 
confessions rule in Hodgson, it is also necessary to emphasize what Iacobucci J. had to 
say in Oickle about the confessions rule in relation to false confessions: 
                                                         
307 Ibid. at para. 22. 
308 Ibid. at para. 23  
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68   While the foregoing might suggest that the confessions rule involves a 
panoply of different considerations and tests, in reality the basic idea is quite 
simple.  First of all, because of the criminal justice system’s overriding concern 
not to convict the innocent, a confession will not be admissible if it is made 
under circumstances that raise a reasonable doubt as to voluntariness.  Both the 
traditional, narrow Ibrahim rule and the oppression doctrine recognize this 
danger.  If the police interrogators subject the suspect to utterly intolerable 
conditions, or if they offer inducements strong enough to produce an unreliable 
confession, the trial judge should exclude it.  Between these two extremes, 
oppressive conditions and inducements can operate together to exclude 
confessions.  Trial judges must be alert to the entire circumstances surrounding a 
confession in making this decision.309 
  
Here we see that there is an overriding concern not to convict the innocent and that 
unreliable confessions should be excluded.  This would seem to be slightly at odds with 
Cory J.’s seemingly equal treatment of reliability and trial fairness as well as his 
statement that an unreliable confession is not necessarily inadmissible. 
 Oickle of course did not deal with undercover operations, much less sophisticated 
Mr. Big operations.  Hodgson did not deal with statements made to police at all, focusing 
mainly on the person-in-authority rule.  Also, the main argument of this chapter is still 
that Mr. Big operators ought simply to be categorized as persons-in-authority.  A major 
re-thinking of the common law of confessions may indeed not be desirable for anyone.  
Nevertheless, it is hoped that the discussion of all the different areas of the law covered 
up to this point in the thesis has demonstrated, at least to some degree, the various 
unreliable aspects of the statements that targets make.   
 In the second chapter of this thesis it was contended that the Canadian courts’ 
treatment of Mr. Big confession evidence denotes an attitude towards fundamental 
notions of fairness that seems to have jumped the tracks; and that reliability, or perhaps 
                                                        
309 Oickle, supra note 57 at para. 28. 
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unreliability, should be something determinative, not something determined by resort to 
evidentiary rules that were obviously not designed with tactics like the Mr. Big sting in 
mind.  What, after all, could be more unfair than admitting into evidence a statement or 
confession that, when viewed in the entirety of the problematic context in which it was 
made, may be entirely unreliable. 
 To examine only one significant part of the problematic context of the Mr. Big 
sting, one that has been touched on before in this thesis, it is submitted that the fact that 
Mr. Big sting targets are so prone to tell lies to undercover operatives is an excellent 
example of the determinative nature of reliability or the lack thereof in connection with 
these stings. 
 For example, in the case of R. v. Redd the lies told by the target to the undercover 
operators were significant.  In an attempt to impress the undercover operators he made 
many false claims of criminal activity, most notable of which was a statement that he had 
murdered four people in Alberta.310  This turned out to be untrue. 
 In R. v. Fischer the target apparently lied about a homicide other than the one 
under investigation as well, in order to make himself appear tough and capable, and also 
apparently to make imself appear somewhat righteous and possessed of a sort of criminal 
virtue.  This was because the fabricated killing purportedly had something to do with 
avenging a female of his acquaintance who had been “wronged”.311 
 Not every lie told by targets is about killing.  For instance, in R. v. Lowe the target 
made up a story about having been a diver in the Navy.312  This is a different matter than 
                                                        
310 Redd, supra note 133 at para. 161. 
311 2005 BCCA 265, 197 C.C.C. (3d) 136 [Fischer] at paras. 27 to 29. 
312 Lowe, supra note 14 at para. 251. 
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claiming to have killed someone, but the underlying motivation is arguably the same, an 
attempt to appear tough and capable and accomplished.  It is also arguable that false 
claims are made by the targets in order to appear stereotypically strong and masculine 
and to be engaged in manly pursuits. 
 Of course, it is arguably highly significant in this analysis to point out that the 
wrongfully convicted Kyle Unger also made up false accomplishments and experiences 
in order to impress the undercover officers in the sting in which he was targeted.  These 
included claims that he raced cars and snowmobiles, that he was experienced in 
demolitions, that he had a class one drivers’ licence and that he had taken a course in 
forensic science among other things.313 
 The main point to be made with regard to all of the above falsehoods and their 
relationship with reliability is that the Mr. Big sting, when viewed outside the framework 
of traditional common law approaches to confessions, is designed, intentionally or 
unintentionally, in such a way that it really cannot help but produce false statements. 
 To expand upon the above statement, it is definitely the case that, with one 
exception,314 none of the targets in Mr. Big stings are actual gangsters.  Only a very few 
of them even seem to express any interest in finding out what the name or type of the 
organization they have been recruited into is.  How actual criminal gangs recruit new 
members is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, one hesitates to think it happens in 
the way that it does to the targets in the early Mr. Big scenarios.   
                                                        
313 Unger, supra note 201 at para. 20. 
314 See R. v. Ciancio, supra note 241.  Salvatore Ciancio had apparently had a history in 
organized crime.  He was acquitted due to the inability of undercover operators to get him 
to admit guilt in relation to any crime. 
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 The fact is that the targets are fundamentally impostors in an imaginary world 
from the very beginning.  They know they are not themselves real gangsters but they 
wish to become so.  This being the case, their only real choice is to enter into a sham 
performance, hence the lies so many of them tell in order to appear to be something they 
are not.  The motivation is a promise of power, money and companionship. 
 One should remember that the targets are usually poor and often isolated.  The 
message given by the undercover operators is that the gang has what the target wants: the 
target wants to become one of the group, the gang is powerful and wealthy while the 
target is weak and impecunious.  Furthermore, the underlying message is that the 
gangsters are genuine, but the target knows that he is an impostor.  Whether guilty of 
murder or not, it is absolutely clear that acceptance, and continuing in his own role, 
depends on the target saying what the gang wants to hear.   
 Arguably one of the hardest psychological decisions to make in life is to admit to 
being an impostor, and that is exactly what denying culpability means in a Mr. Big sting.  
The entire point of the sting is to make a target pretend to be something that he is not, or, 
from the point of view of the target himself, to make his newfound companions believe 
he is something that he is not.  The target is not just motivated to lie, he is essentially 
being asked to lie. 
 A traditional application of the confessions rule; with its varying emphases on 
voluntariness, the person-in-authority, reliability and concerns from the administration of 
justice; seems ill-equipped to deal with the carefully orchestrated deception and 
manipulation of the Mr. Big sting.  Contemporary hearsay and admissions rules, with 
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their focus on ‘indicia of reliability’ and ‘circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness’ 
likewise seem unwieldy tools for testing Mr. Big statements.   
 All of the above being as it may, it is nevertheless, in concluding this chapter, 
respectfully submitted that the fairest way to deal with Mr. Big stings and the unreliable 
admissions they generate is to submit them to the traditional voluntariness test as outlined 
bu Iacobucci J. in R. v. Oickle.315   If this were to become the case then the tactics used by 
the police could be subject to judicial discretion, and likely many of the most suspect 
would fall out of use altogether, such as the promise to influence the prosecution and the 
violent scenario.  On the other hand, the sting might very well fall out of use altogether if 
it were subject to such scrutiny. 
 Of course the clearest justification for submitting the sting to the voluntariness 
test relates to the first and main point made in this chapter, i.e. that when undercover 
officers tell the target they can influence the prosecution they become persons-in-
authority under the confessions rule, and as such any statements made to them ought to 
be proven voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.  This is especially the case when one 
considers, as McFadyen J.A. pointed out in her dissent in the Alberta Court of Appeal, 
that  
 
the very policy behind the voluntariness rule [is] that of ensuring fairness in the 
criminal process. The confessions rule serves to discourage police officers from 
engaging in undesirable investigative techniques. A police officer cannot promise 
a prosecutorial favour in return for a statement. To allow an undercover operation 
to rely on its relationship with the police to obtain a statement would be to allow 
the police to do indirectly that which it cannot do directly.316 
 
                                                        
315 Oickle, supra note 57. 
316 Grandinetti (C.A.), supra note 265 at para. 117 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This thesis has examined the Mr. Big sting in Canada in relation to various 
perspectives of criminal evidence law.  In addition, an initial descriptive chapter 
attempted to describe more or less comprehensively all of the different scenarios that the 
undercover teams execute in order to convince their targets that they are being inducted 
into a criminal gang. 
 In each of the evidentiary issues covered; the right to silence, abuse of process, 
expert evidence, hearsay and admssions, and the confessions rule; it is clear that for 
whatever reason, Canadian judges in all jurisdictions and at the Supreme Court of Canada 
as well, seem committed to ensuring the admissibility of inculpatory statements arising 
out of these stings.  This is despite the fact that so many of the sting’s features and tactics 
seem to invite false statements from their targets.  The gravity of these facts are 
compounded when one considers that in the majority of the trials of these targets there is 
no other evidence incriminating the accused and that they stand an excellent chance of 
being convicted solely on the basis of confessions which many judges agree are 
inherently unreliable. 
 Much more could be written about these stings.  One particular omission that has 
been touched on only very briefly is the status of the sting in other common law 
jurisictions.  That said, it appears to be in use only in some states in Australia.317  In the 
United Kingdom it would appear to be unheard of other than as described in the case of 
                                                        
317 See R. v. Tofilau, supra note 4. 
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R. v. Proulx318 in the chapter on abuse of process.  In the State of Washington, at the time 
of writing, Sebastian Burns and Atif Rafay await the decision of the Washington Court of 
Appeal on whether or not the confessions to murder they made during a Mr. Big sting in 
British Columbia ought to have been admitted in their trial nearly eight years ago.  At the 
present time each of them is serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole. 
 In Canada there has been one proven wrongful conviction as a result of the sting, 
that of the Kyle Unger.  Once again it is important to bear in mind that in his case he was 
actually quite fortunate in that he was convicted on the basis of additional evidence that 
was later proved to be faulty.  When the other evidence turned out to be without value, he 
was exonerated.  If he had been convicted on the basis of the confession alone he would 
likely still be in prison.  Only time will tell if future wrongful convictions will come to 
light. 
 In the final analysis, short of the outright abolition of the Mr. Big sting, it is the 
conclusion of this thesis that the best way to ensure its sensible use is to submit it to a 
formal voluntariness inquiry pursuant to the common law confessions rule.  As it stands 
now, the power of the police in relation to the Mr. Big sting seems practically limitless, a 
fundamentally dangerous state of affairs. 
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ADDENDUM ON SECONDARY SOURCES 
 
 As stated in the Introduction, the methodology employed in this thesis has 
consisted almost entirely of an examination of case law without much focus on articles or 
other secondary sources.  The reasoning underlying the decision to proceed in that 
manner is twofold.  Firstly, it is submitted that an analysis based entirely on jurisprudence 
is more persuasive and grounded in the realpolitik of Canadian criminal litigation than 
one based on secondary sources.  The second and far more practical reason is the fact that 
very little has been written on the Mr. Big sting in Canada, especially compared to other 
areas of the law.  That said, there is certainly some commentary worth mentioning and 
this addendum is intended to give some of the other research a brief overview in relation 
to the evidentiary issues discussed in the main body of the thesis. 
 The first work to be discussed is the one monograph available on the subject, 
Keenan and Brockman’s aptly titled Mr. Big.319   Keenan and Brockman’s book is 133 
pages long including all footnotes, references, and appendices.  It is a comprehensive 
overview of how the sting works and the problems it raises.  Admirable points about its 
content include its statistical analysis of the sting.  The authors clearly went to some 
trouble in compiling exact or near-exact figures on various aspects of the sting.  For 
example, they state that the sting has been run approximately 350 times since its 
inception, that the suspects were cleared or charged in 75 percent of cases with 25 percent 
remaining unresolved, and also that those charged face a 95 percent chance of 
                                                        
319 Kouri and Keenan, supra note 19. 
  190 
conviction.320 The authors also appear quite adept at finding out how much the stings cost 
the Canadian taxpayer, citing costs per operation ranging from $137,000 (for Jason Dix, 
acquitted) to $4,000,000 (for Salvatore Ciancio, acquitted).321 
 Another valuable aspect of the book is its examination of those Mr. Big stings 
that, although interesting, were never subjected to judicial scrutiny for one reason or 
another and are hence not discussed in case law.  These include R. v. Rose322 among 
others. 
 As far as the evidentiary issues are concerned, Keenan and Kouri exclusively 
dedicate approximately twenty pages in their book to the issues discussed in this thesis.323  
This being the case, their analysis, although never incorrect, tends to be a little thin in 
places.  For example, their initial analysis of the confessions rule, including the Hodgson 
warning and the person-in-authority requirement, is only a little more than a page long 
and as such does not contain much exposition beyond stating the law as it developed in 
Grandinetti and Hodgson.324 
 Kouri and Keenan’s intial analysis of hearsay in relation to the sting is even 
briefer, less than a page long.  In this short passage they note that the law in this area is 
“fraught with inconsistencies” and also note the dissent in Terrico, in which guidance 
from the Supreme Court of Canada on the issue is requested.325   
                                                        
320 Ibid. at page 23. 
321 Ibid. at pages 23-24.  Further valuable statistical analyses undertaken by the authors 
can be found at pages 52, 53 and 59. 
322 Ibid. at pages 7-10.  R. v. Rose [1991] B.C.J. No. 4026 (C.A.); [1992] B.C.J. No. 279 
(C.A.); [1998] B.C.J. No. 1360. 
323 Ibid. at pages 65-75 and pages 101-111. 
324 Ibid. at pages 68-69. 
325 Ibid. at pages 75-76 
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 At the conclusion of a second, roughly one-page long analysis of the hearsay issue 
in a later remedial section of the book entitled”Reining in Mr. Big”, the authors conclude 
that “[w]ith the exception of extraordinary circumstances, it appears as though the 
judiciary will invariably rule the accused’s confession to Mr. Big meets the required 
degree of threshold reliability”.326 
 Mr. Big the book’s examination of the Charter right to silence is a little more 
fully fleshed out and, indeed, examines some areas not covered in this thesis.  For 
example, Kouri and Keenan discuss the case of R. v. Moore327 in which Mr. Big 
operatives took the target to Jasper, Alberta and put him up in a hotel prior to a meeting 
with the crime boss.  The authors note the argument that this amounted to a detention, as 
Moore would have been unable to return to his home in British Columbia.328 
 Kouri and Keenan also put forth the argument that when a target has been 
previousy arrested or detained in relation to a murder, and has refused to answer police 
questions related to that murder in accordance with his Charter right to silence, it is 
arguably a breach of the Charter for the police to utilize a Mr. Big sting to elicit a 
statement from that target subsequent to his release.  To support this argument, the 
authors cite the dissenting judgment of Rice J.A. in the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal.329  
 Aside from Kouri and Keenan’s book, relatively little of import has been written 
on Mr. Big in Canada or elsewhere that is particularly germane to what has been 
discussed in this thesis.  However, it is also useful to address briefly what some of the                                                         
326 Ibid. at page 102. 
327 Moore, supra  note 79. 
328 Kouri and Keenan, supra note 19 at page 66. 
329 Ibid. at page 67. 
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major scholars in Canadian evidence law have stated about evidentiary issues in general 
and apply it to the sting, although they have not said much in general about Mr. Big and 
its implications. 
 Three scholarly sources will be examined in this undertaking:  McWilliams’ 
Canadian Criminal Evidence, Fourth Edition;330 Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant: The 
Law of Evidence in Canada, Third Edition;331 and “The Confessions Rule and the 
Charter”;332 the first two being well-known textbooks and the latter being an article by 
Hamish Stewart. 
 In an attempt at brevity, only one over-arching legal theme will be discussed in 
this examination.  However, that theme may be the most important one of all in relation 
to evidence: reliability.  Reliability will be looked at in relation to three discrete 
evidentiary areas: hearsay/admissions, the confessions rule and, to a lesser degree, expert 
evidence. 
 To begin with, in examining a Mr. Big statement as an admission or hearsay, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that categorical exceptions such as the admissions exception 
are in any event unlikely to be modified by the courts.  As Hill et al note in Canadian 
Criminal Evidence:  
 
To date, the courts have been very conservative in re-thinking the wisdom of the 
exceptions. Starr stands as the only case where a categorical exception was 
modified to conform to the principled approach. For example, as we will see later 
in this chapter, challenges to the co-conspirators and past recollection recorded 
                                                        
330 S. Casey Hill et al, McWilliams’ Canadian Criminal Evidence, loose-leaf (consulted 
on 1 November 2012), 4th ed (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2003). 
331 Alan W. Bryant et al, Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant: The Law of Evidence in Canada, 
3d ed (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc. 2009). 
332 Hamish Stewart, “The Confessions Rule and the Charter” (2009) 54 McGill LJ 517. 
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exceptions have failed.  This has led Don Stuart to write that "there seems little 
likelihood that existing exceptions will be re-configured".333 
 
 Despite the seeming unassailability of the law as it relates to admissions, the 
practice of admitting admissions without any recourse to the principled approach is not 
without some criticism.  Later on in their discussion of hearsy, the authors of Canadian 
Criminal Evidence note that 
 
in R. v. Mapara , while the Supreme Court cited Evans in its discussion of the 
rationale for the co-conspirators exception and noted the link between admissions 
and the co-conspirators rule, the court nevertheless considered whether the co-
conspirator's exception satisfied the principled approach and also held that the 
"rare case" analysis applied to that exception. This would suggest that in rare 
cases, admissions by an accused could be subject to a necessity/reliability 
analysis.334  
 
It is, of course, the contention of this thesis that there is no species of admission more 
amenable to a reliability analysis than that given by a Mr. Big target.  To echo a 
proposition put forth earlier in this thesis, if one considers “rare” as roughly synonymous 
with “unusual”, it is difficult to think of a rarer case than a Mr. Big sting and its attendant 
admissions. 
 Earlier in their discussion, Hill et al note that the central reason for the exclusion 
of hearsay evidence is its lack of reliability and, closely related, the inability to test its 
reliability.335  Although other concerns exist, which they identify as perception, memory 
and narration/transmission; clearly the most important aspect of the reliability issue is the 
sincerity of the declarant, i.e. was he or she honest when he or she made the out-of-court 
                                                        
333 Hill et al, supra note 330 at para. 7:40:20:30, page 42. 
334 Ibid. at para. 7:160:10, page 125. 
335 Ibid. at para. 7:20:10, page 8 
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statement.336  Later the authors discuss the importance of determining the presence or 
absence of a motive to fabricate on the part of the declarant.337 
 The centrality of sincerity and the presence or absence of a motive to fabricate is 
all fairly elementary at this stage of this thesis’ analysis.  However, it is a fact of which 
sight should not be lost.  The Mr. Big sting is a quite anomalous technique.  This is 
especially so when one considers that it is impossible to say whether there is a presence 
or absence of a motive to fabricate in a Mr. Big sting without knowing in advance 
whether the target is factually guilty or factually innocent.  The crime boss is playing on 
the target’s fear and greed to get him to admit that he has committed a murder.  If he is 
guilty he has no motive to fabricate.  But if he is innocent he does have a motive to 
fabricate. 
 This state of affairs makes it difficult to decide what to do about Mr. Big 
evidence.  It is arguable that the bizarre nature of the sting serves to stymie the 
underlying assumptions of the rules of evidence.  In fact it is arguable that, although our 
rules of evidence have evolved to comprehend undercover operations, it is doubtful that 
one can properly call a Mr. Big sting an undercover technique at all.   Until this sting 
developed, most undercover operations consisted of infiltrations by state agents into 
criminal or other perceived anti-state organizations.  This infiltration was frequently 
attended by the undercover operator assuming a degree of vulnerability in his or her 
work.   
 In a Mr. Big sting the vulnerability is all assumed by the target.  In a sense, in 
many of the stings examined in this thesis, it is the target who assumes a persona, acting                                                         
336 Ibid. at para. 7:20:10, page 10.  
337 Ibid. at para. 7:60:20, page 62-63. 
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macho and tougher than he really is, motivated by a desire for power, money, 
companionship and escape from a dull existence.   
 In regular undercover operations officers are frequently required to maintain their 
criminal profile on a continuous basis, twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week, 
never knowing when they may need to appear in-character for the benefit of the criminals 
they investigate.  In a Mr. Big operation, officers only remain undercover during specific 
meetings with targets.  Outside of those times they assumably are free to do as they wish. 
 Traditional undercover operations involve a make-believe criminal in a real world 
of violence and crime.  Mr. Big operations involve a target who wants to be a real 
criminal (and who often actually does have a criminal record) attempting to infiltrate a 
make-believe world of organized crime.  In these and other senses it is arguable that Mr. 
Big is not really a sting, a ploy, or a trick.  Really it is better described as a scam, a con, 
or a grift.  To describe the officers involved as being “undercover” is arguably less apt 
than describing them as confidence men. 
 Bearing the above criticisms in mind, it is usefutl to turn back to Hill et al and 
note what they have to say about hearsay and the role of historical change in its analysis: 
 
Starr recognizes that not every exception will be completely consistent with the 
core values of necessity and reliability. Most were developed in very different 
times, many dating back two centuries. Our underlying assumptions about the 
world, the truisms of human behaviour that drive evidence reasoning, have 
changed radically since then. With other exceptions, the law may not be entirely 
settled as to what the preconditions are to admission.  In either case the 
desirability of intellectual consistency, which is the cornerstone of a morally 
authoritative law of evidence, requires that exceptions conform to the principles 
of necessity and reliability as understood by modern courts, or that those 
exceptions be reformed or abandoned.338 
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Obviously it is the contention of this thesis that maintaining moral authority in the law of 
evidence requires more controls on the use of the Mr. Big tactic.   
 Bryant et al are less equivocal in their examination of admissions as hearsay.  
Indeed at one point they simply state without qualification that “[a]dmissions of a party 
are admissible against him or her in both civil and criminal cases”.339  The three authors 
are judges, and as is often the case in criminal judgments they cite the well-known 
passage from R. v. Evans in which Sopinka J. questions whether or not admissions are 
hearsay at all.340 
 Bryant et al also cite E.M. Morgan, among others, who agrees that admissions 
should be admissible on the basis of the adversary theory of litigation, and that an 
accused cannot object to its admissibility on the basis of his or her inability to cross-
examine himself, or argue that his or her statements are not to be believed except when 
he or she is under oath.341 
 Hill et al also note this phenomenon, likewise citing Sopinka J.’s statement in 
Evans, and also citing Cross and Tapper on Evidence, and that treatise’s characterization 
of a party’s complaint that his or her words are unreliable except when he or she speaks 
under oath as “an absurdity”.342 
 One objection to the above view of the law as it relates to admissions arises 
immediately: at no time in any of the Mr. Big judgments examined in this thesis do any 
of the targets claim that they are not to be believed except when speaking under oath.  
                                                        
339 Bryant et al, supra note 331 at para 6.405, page 364. 
340 Ibid. at para. 6.397, page 361. 
341 Ibid. at para. 6.398, page 362. 
342 Hill et al, supra note 330 at para. 7:160:10. 
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Even when they are characterized as liars, or pathological liars, that claim is not made.343 
Granted, if a target or his counsel were to make such a claim it would be absurd, but that 
is not the claim.  The claim made by a target is different:  he claims that his statement is 
not to be believed when he is making it subject to the very coercive inducements and 
atmosphere of a Mr. Big sting.  This is hardly absurd. 
 The argument that an accused target cannot complain about his inability to cross-
examine himself is also untenable and something of a red herring.  In common-law 
systems it would seem notionally impossible for an accused to cross-examine himself.  
One can imagine a defence lawyer convincing his or her client to take the stand and then 
asking the judge to declare his or her client hostile so that he or she can be asked leading 
questions, but such a scenario surely exists only in the realm of the imaginary.  Once 
again, it is necessary to point out that the Mr. Big target who wants his statement 
subjected to a necessity/reliability analysis is not complaining about what the scholars 
claim he is complaining about.  He is claiming that his statements are unreliable because 
of the inherently unreliable circumstances under which they were made. 
 It is submitted that the theory of the adversary system is the only tenable reason 
for giving such unlimited admissibility to admissions.  It is indeed fair in this sense.  
However, the level of deceit and coercion involved in the Mr. Big operation tends to 
decrease that impression of fairness, arguably to the point where the target’s statement to 
Mr. Big should be subjected to a principled necessity/reliability analysis. 
 Much more could be said about hearsay and admissions and how the scholars’ 
approach to them could be applied to the Mr. Big operation.  However, in the interest of                                                         
343 Indeed, in the cases where pathological lying is suspected, the target’s statements 
would not be believable even when they are made under oath. 
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brevity the confessions rule will now be discussed.  Hamish Stewart, in his article about 
the intersection of the confessions rule and the Charter raises the issue of the overarching 
principle against self-incrimination: 
 
The overarching principle against self-incrimination cannot, by itself, determine  
the precise content of the confessions rule, or of any other rule of evidence or  
procedure.  There may be institutional differences in the way that legal systems  
manifest this principle.  There may also be reasonable disagreement about the 
extent to which any given rule of evidence or procedure is consistent with this 
principle.  Consider, for example, the Canadian holding that neither the common 
law confessions rule nor the section 7 right to silence applies to a suspect's 
statement where the suspect is not in custody and does not know that the listener 
is a person in authority.  On the one hand, it might be argued that this rule of 
evidence complies with the principle against self-incrimination in that the suspect 
who freely, albeit foolishly, confesses to an undercover state agent is not being 
used by the state; rather, the state is simply taking advantage of the suspect's 
voluntary decision to furnish evidence against himself or herself, as if he or she 
had been speaking to another private individual.  On the other hand, it might be 
argued that this rule of evidence violates the principle against self-incrimination 
in that the state uses deceit and trickery to deprive the suspect of the ability to 
make a properly informed decision about whether to speak.344  
 
Here Stewart opines that the confession rule’s not covering statements made to an 
undercover officer may nevertheless offend the overarching principle against self-
incrimination because deceit and trickery operate to deprive the accused of the ability to 
make a properly informed decision. 
 Also of interest is the fact that Stewart appears to identify reliability as the only 
rationale underlying the confessions rule when he states: 
 
the exclusion of a statement obtained in violation of the right to silence is a  
constitutional remedy under section 24 of the Charter, while the exclusion of an  
involuntary statement is simply a rule of evidence intended to protect the trier of 
fact from hearing potentially unreliable information. Thus, if the confessions rule 
is to be constitutionalized as a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of  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the Charter, it should be treated as an aspect not of the right to silence but of the 
right to a fair trial.345 
 
These interpretations of the law would seem to militate in favour of focusing more 
scrutiny on the Mr. Big sting. 
 As far as the focus on reliability is concerned, Mr. Big detractors have typically 
focused on the sting’s relative likelihood of causing a false confession and a wrongful 
conviction rather than on the argument that police conduct needs to be controlled.  If 
reliability is the only factor to be considered, that would seem to favour those detractors’ 
argument. 
 Likewise, the theory that police deceit and trickery on their own could arguably 
violate the principle against self-incrimination, without even a person-in-authority 
requirement, would seem to suggest that Mr. Big stands on shaky legal ground.  The sting 
is, after all, nothing but deception from beginning to end. 
 Hill et al also identify the police trickery aspect of the voluntariness test as 
standing alone as a distinct inquiry, however, they do not suggest that the person-in-
authority requirement can be waived.346  
 Hill et al likewise note that reliability, if not the only rationale underlying the 
confessions rule, is certainly paramount.  They state that the “rule is largely informed by 
the problem of false confessions”347 and they identify reliability as still remaining the 
rule’s “primary concern”.348 
                                                        
345 Ibid. at page 519. 
346 Hill et al, supra note 330 at para. 8:40:20:40, page 28. 
347 Ibid. at para. 8:10, page 2 
348 Ibid. at para. 8:10:20, page 5. 
  200 
 This of course is in accord with the main argument of this thesis about the danger 
underlying the admission of Mr. Big evidence.  It is weak and unreliable evidence.  
Indeed it has in some cases resulted in wrongful convictions.  Its value is undermined by 
the outrageousness of the methods used to acquire it and their effects on the psyche of the 
targets.  This contention has been elaborated upon in the main body of the thesis and 
probably needs no further elucidation in this addendum. 
 Finally, Bryant et al also discuss confessions at length, first identifying it as a type 
of admission and thus an exception to the hearsay rule.349  However, in our analysis, the 
most striking statement they make is the following final paragraph in their opening 
discussion of the person-in-authority: 
 
In the context of declarations against penal interest, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that confessions delivered in “ordinary circumstances” to persons 
who are not in authority such as “an unestranged son, wife or mother”, may lack 
assurances of reliability because the “risk of penal consequences is not real and 
the declarant may have motives such as a desire for self-aggrandizement or to 
shock which makes the declaration unreliable.”  Analogously, the potential for 
criminal self-aggrandizement calls into question the reliability of an accused’s 
out-of-court statement obtained in a Mr. Big strategy.  Reliability is also a 
concern when statements are given as a result of violence, threats, inducements 
or oppression, regardless of whether the person receiving the statement is “in 
authority”.  The Supreme Court has suggested that such statements may require 
exclusion under the doctrine of abuse of process or be admissible if accompanied 
by a strong caution to the jury.  If, however, the underlying reliability rationale is 
absent, the latter position may be inconsistent with the principled approach to 
hearsay requiring an assessment of reliability as discussed in R. v. Khelawon.350 
  
This assessment again focuses on reliability and the very real possibility of dishonesty on 
the part of the target, who is clearly also a hearsay declarant according to Bryant et al. 
                                                        349 Bryant et al, supra note 331 at para. 8.2, page 417. 
350 Ibid. at para. 8.22, page 426-7. 
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Once more, the desirability of greater safeguards against unreliable evidence is broached, 
as has often been argued throughout the main body of this thesis. 
 Again, much more could be said on the topic of the confessions rule, the scholars’ 
assessment of it and its applicability to the Mr. Big sting.  However, in the interest of 
brevity, the final area of evidence and its relationship to reliability will now be discussed: 
expert evidence. 
 Of course the approach to the concept of reliability is somewhat different in the 
case of expert evidence as the evidence proposed does not consist of the target’s 
statement itself, but rather of an expert’s assessment thereof.  However, the ultimate issue 
being put to the trier of fact is still the reliability of the statement.   
 The Hamish Stewart article does not address expert evidence, and indeed the 
other scholars consulted in the research for this addendum do not offer much on this area 
as it relates to statements made by accused persons.  
 Bryant et al also do not discuss expert evidence relating to accused’s statements at 
any length.  However they do make the interesting observation that “[h]istorically, the so-
called ultimate issue rule has been ignored by many Canadian and English courts”.351  
This is significant to the Mr. Big analysis as it could be argued that an expert witness 
proposed by the defence in a Mr. Big case is giving evidence on the ultimate issue if he 
or she plans to give evidence touching on the veracity of the statement.   
 Bryant et al further note that 
 
there are certain subject matters which go right to the very heart of judicial 
decision-making and courts remain wary of expert witnesses providing advice as 
to how they should decide issues such as whether a witness is telling the  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truth….Perhaps it is just a matter of sensitivity over the way the expert gives his 
or her evidence.  For example, a court would be loath to receive explicit evidence 
from an expert that an accused is guilty or innocent….However, it will readily 
receive evidence which is not so direct but which, if accepted, inescapably leads 
to that conclusion.352 
 
Perhaps the point to be taken from the above is that the reliability of expert evidence is 
something that tends to be decided on a case-by-case basis.  This would seem to be borne 
out by an examination of the Mr. Big judgments, in which such evidence has indeed been 
admitted occasionally. 
 Hill et al’s take on expert evidence includes the following statement: 
 
The gate-keeper function must afford the parties the opportunity to put forward 
the most complete evidentiary record consistent with the rules of evidence and 
consideration of the admission of expert opinion evidence tendered by the 
defence must take into account the long-standing reluctance to restrict the power 
of an accused to call evidence steeped in concern that no innocent person be 
wrongfully convicted.353 
 
 
A few pages later they state that  
 
in criminal trials, psychiatric and psychological expert testimony as to an 
accused's mental disorder or state of mind was first admitted, long before the use 
of empirical testing instruments, more out of a concern to avoid a miscarriage of 
justice relating to criminal responsibility than with any real confidence in the 
reliability of the diagnoses. The necessity to avoid a wrongful conviction has 
warranted reliance on such evidence to this day.354 
 
 
The approach put forth in these passages would seem to suggest that reliability of expert 
evidence is secondary to vigilance against wrongful convictions. 
                                                        
352 Ibid. at para. 12.156, page 833. 
353 Hill et al, supra note 330 at 12:30:10, page 23 
354 Ibid. at 12:30:20:10, page 28. 
  203 
 The ever-present menace of wrongful convictions is probably the best image and 
idea with which to conclude this addendum and this thesis.  The prospect of a devastating 
sentence for a serious crime which one did not commit is the fearful rationale underlying 
this whole thesis.  Indeed it is arguably the underlying rationale of all criminal evidence 
law. 
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